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ABSTRACT
A synonymity statement presents a comparison of linguistic items 
in respect of their linguistic meanings, abstracting from the particular 
meanings in question and giving simply an assessment of Semantic 
sameness* vs, * semantic difference*. Questions connected with 
synonymity statements in linguistic analysis are considered in the 
present study under the following heads: (i) the justification of
synonymity statements in terms of the postulates of linguistic 
analysis adopted; (ii) the role of synonymity statements in phonology; 
(iii) the role of synonymity statements in grammar; (iv) the role of 
synonymity statements in semantic analysis; and (v) the justification 
of synonymity statements in terms of a concept of ’linguistic knowledge*. 
In each case, according as the synonymity statement functions as 
explicans or explicandura, the theoretical positions generally adopted 
are examined, and arguments for or against are analysed. The ultimate 
objective in view is to establish a viable basis for integrating a 
linguistic analysis which employs synonymity statements with a theory 
of speech acts which will account for communication between language- 
users*
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Introduction
1An attempt is made in the present study to survey the whole
range of problems connected with developing an account of synonymy
satisfactory for descriptive linguistic analysis# The main purpose of
such an account will be the justification of the use of * synonymity 
1statements' in linguistic analysis.
Synonymity statements may be characterized as statements cast in 
or reducible to the form
'a and b are synonymous in L' 
or 'a and b are not synonymous in L*,
where L is the particular language under description and a and b are 
2expressions of that language.
1. These statements formulate what are called 'synonymity hypotheses' 
in the terminology proposed by Naess (Naess 1953)• The status
of the hypotheses is comparable to that of hypotheses in other 
empirical sciences: they 'may be said to make claims about
actual or possible interpretative processes in the same way as 
hypotheses about certain substances being explosives make claims 
about actual or possible explosions' (loc.cit. p. 17). A 
hypothesis of this kind may, of course, be involved in certain 
explanations without being overtly formulated: it would then be
necessary, strictly, to speak of the use of a 'synonymity hypo­
thesis' rather than the use of a 'synonymity statement', but for 
present purposes the distinction is of no consequence*
2. The term synonym is traditionally restricted to items of the kind 
which appear as lemmata in conventional dictionaries, chiefly 
common nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs. This usage goes back 
to the definition given in Aristotle's Rhetoric III, 2, lWfb,
and is continued by the eighteenth-and nineteenth-century synonymists 
who compiled synonym dictionaries of the modern European languages. 
But it has been generally recognized more recently that 'synonymity 
occurs not only in the case of single words, but both above and 
below words' (Collinson 1939)* In current discussions of the • 
subject, 'synonymous* expressions may include words, bound morphs, 
phrases, clauses, sentences and sequences of sentences. We do not 
have to commit ourselves as to the exact grammatical status of the 
expressions asserted - or denied - to be synonymous (unless it is 
particularly relevant to do so).
2The questions arising with respect to synonymity statements fall 
into two groups and may be summarized as follows.
(1) What is the theoretical basis of a position which 
allows the possibility that natural languages may 
have words,sentences, etc. that differ in form but 
not in meaning?
Topics falling under this head are discussed in Ch. 1.
(2) What particular purposes are synonymity statements 
called upon to serve in linguistic analysis, and what 
is their explanatory function?
Under (2) it is necessary to distinguish between the use of synonymity 
statements (i) in phonological analysis (in connexion with procedures 
for determining phonemes); (ii) in grammatical analysis (in connexion 
with the establishment of certain grammatical relations); and (iii) 
in semantic analysis (in connexion with certain features of semantic 
descriptions)•
These three cases are considered separately in Chs. 2, and
In conclusion, the role of synonymity statements in relation to 
a theory of 1linguistic knowledge1 is discussed in Ch. 5*
Attention is focussed throughout upon arguments and evidence which 
contribute to establishing the basic requirements of an account of 
synonymy, and topics have been included or omitted accordingly. A brief 
comments on two points may serve to indicate the scope of the inquiry.
1* We shall not be concerned with the verification of ‘linguistic
3characterizations* in the sense proposed by Searle. Searle claims:
'As a native speaker of English, I know that "oculist" is exactly
1synonymous with "eye doctor"1 , and further that 'the claim that
"oculist" means eye doctor is not a claim that has to satisfy any
criteria which philosophers might propose for synonymy, but rather any
proposed criterion for synonymy has to be consistent with such facts
2as that "eye doctor" is synonymous with "oculist"' • This standpoint 
is quite different from that taken in the present study. From our 
standpoint there is little or no interest in Searle*s claim to know, 
qua native speaker of English, that certain expressions 'are synonymous*• 
It might perhaps be urged that if eye doctor and oculist are in fact 
synonymous in English, then Searle is right so to claim. But if that 
is the case, the claim might just as well be made by a Martian; i.e* 
if we are interested in whether or not the claim is right, it does not 
matter who makes it or how he knows it* More to the point would be 
to discover what Searle thinks he is claiming when he claims that one 
expression is 'exactly synonymous* with another. But that also would 
be of merely subsidiary interest. Our concern, rather, is with the 
elucidation of what a linguist would be explaining if he attempted to 
account for certain observable facts about Searle*s linguistic behaviour
1. Searle, 1969 p* 11*
2. Searle, 1969 p* 9*
if
(and that of other speakers of English) by postulating the synonymity 
oculist and eye doctor as part of Searle's (and others1) linguistic 
knowledge*
2. By the same token, such matters as proposals concerning dis­
tributional criteria for synonymity, or the 1 quantification1 of 
synonymy, are of no interest here. In connexion with the former,
Chomsky observes that fmany linguists have proposed that synonymy 
be somehow measured in terms of degree of distributional similarity 
(cf. e.g. H. M. Honigswald Language Change and Linguistic Reconstruction, 
Chicago, I960; H. Frei 'Disaccords' Cahiers Ferdinand de Saussure 
l8.35-5i» 1961) and have then concluded that such pairs as 'bachelor1 
and 'unmarried man* are not synonymous, since one, but not the other, 
can occur in the context -hood etc... But all that this observation
shows is that the proposed criterion is entirely wrong, as, indeed,
1
it clearly is.' The issue between Chomsky and the distributionalist 
is irresolvable in the sense that if the distributionalist is right 
then Chomsky's counterexample - or any other - must be mistaken. On 
the other hand, if the distributionalist thesis can be confirmed or 
refuted on the basis of examples or counterexamples, then it is both 
possible and necessary to establish synonymity independently of the 
distributional evidence. But the assumption that meanings determine 
distribution in such a way that difference in distribution is a
1. Chomsky 1962 p. 527*
5sufficient condition of difference in meaning simply leaves one 
puzzled as to what concept of leaning* is being invoked* It seems 
that what we have here is what amounts to equation of leaning* with v 
'distribution*, in which case the proposals concerning synonymy are 
trivial.
As regards 1 quantification* of synonymy, it may be pointed out 
that drawing distinctions between various degrees of or approximations 
to synonymity on the basis of *componential analysis* or * semantic 
classification* (cf. Sparck Jones 196*0 is in all essentials a con- 
tinuation of the approach of the synonymists. But this approach pre­
supposes rather than proposes answers to the questions we are trying 
to answer. It is evident that, given a system of semantic categorization, 
synonymous expressions will be those receiving identical characteriz­
ations under that system. Other degrees or varieties of synonymity 
can be duly distinguished if we wish. Weinreich proposes to call any
pair of terms A and A* * immediate synonyms* if their designata differ
£
by one component. Duchacek proposes a distinction between *perfect 
synonyms*, *approximate synonyms*, and 1words semantically related'; 
but concedes that there is room for disagreement over the criteria to
7
be applied* Abraham and Kiefer propose a distinction between 'full* 
and 'less-than-full* synonymy, with reference to tree diagrams repres­
enting the various grammatical and semantic categories of a word.
6. Weinreich 1963 §***2.
7. Duchacek 196*t.
6According to their definition, 1between two words, w^ and w^» a
full synonymy holds if, and only if, their trees have exactly the
same branching structure (i.e. the same paths) and exactly the same
labels on the corresponding nodes', while 'an i-ways synonymy holds
if, and only if, they have in their tree graphs i paths in common'.
The various paths distinguish between different uses of the word in
question; but if we ask how these uses are determined, all we are
told is that they can be found 'recorded in any good explanatory 
8dictionary* • The point about all such proposals is that conditions 
of adequacy on any system of semantic categorization are imposed by 
considerations external to it. This means that instances of synonymity 
supply a criterion for the system, and not vice versa. If, for example, 
a semantic analysis is to be given of English terms for domestic 
animals, then dog and cat will turn out to be synonymous if 'quadruped* 
and 'carnivorous' are the only two relevant semantic labels the system 
provides. To say that this result shows the system to be absurdly 
inadequate is doubtless correct; but that can only be said if it can 
be determined independently that dog and cat are not synonymous.
8. Abraham & Kiefer 19&6.
Synonymy, form and meaning
71*0 It is important to distinguish at the outset between two related but 
separate issues: (i) whether or not any language could have expressions
differing in form but not in meaning, and (ii) whether or not any language 
does have expressions differing in form but not in meaning. The former 
is a matter of relations between definitions, i.e. the only sense in 
which no language could have expressions differing in form but not in 
meaning would be if we chose to define 'form' and 'meaning1 in such a way 
that it followed from our definitions that any statement to the effect 
that expressions a and b differed in form but not in meaning would be self­
contradictory. If, on the other hand, we do not so define 'form' and 
'meaning' the possibility is open that any language may have expressions 
differing in form but not in meaning. The question whether any language 
does have such expressions is a subordinate question, in that whether it 
arises at all depends on the answer propounded to the question of def­
initions.
1,1 Let us consider the following postulate:
(Pi) The expressions of a language differ one from another in 
form or meaning, but not necessarily in both.
That PI constitutes a reasonable and, for purposes of linguistic 
analysis, an indispensable minimal assumption may be concluded from the 
following argument.
If a linguistic expression is regarded as an item characterized in 
the dimensions of form and meaning, such that in order to recognize any 
expression it is necessary to know its form, and in order to understand 
any expression it is necessary to know its meaning, then
8unless we treat some expressions in a language as having different 
meanings from others, and some expressions as having different forms 
from others, it becomes impossible to explain how a language is 
successfully employed for purposes of communication* That is to say, 
either of the hypotheses (i) that all expressions of the language 
have the same form, or (ii) that all expressions of the language 
have the same meaning, fails to provide a satisfactory basis on which 
to account for the ways in which, by means of discourse, one language- 
user understands and can be understood by others* For on neither of 
the hypotheses mentioned would difference in form be correlatable 
with difference in meaning. An analysis based on either hypothesis 
would thus be unable in principle to account for the successful use 
of a language in communication situations.
It follows from the assumption that some expressions differ in 
form and some in meaning that either some of those expressions differing 
in meaning will differ also in form, or some of those differing in 
form will differ also in meaning. Thus three possibilities must be 
envisaged. First, there will be cases in which two expressions differ 
both in form and meaning. Second, there will be cases in which a 
difference of meaning between two expressions is not accompanied by 
a difference of form: in such cases we may speak of ‘homonymous
expressions*• Third, there will be cases in which a difference of 
form between two expressions is not accompanied by a difference of 
meaning: in such cases we may speak of ’synonymous expressions*.
9The concept of synonymy thus takes its place in a framework of 
assumptions according to which any linguistic expression is taken to 
be determinate in respect of both form and meaning, but in which 
sameness in respect of form does not imply sameness in respect of 
meaning, nor vice versa*
1.2 Acceptance of the foregoing argument may appear to involve taking
the position that 'synonymy1 is a derived concept, defined in terms
1of the prior concepts of 'form1 and 'meaning' •
An objection to treating synonymy 'in terms of a prior notion
2of 'meaning* independently defined' is voiced by Lyons , who contends 
that if two expressions are synonymous this 'fact* must be regarded 
as 'part o f  the meanings of the expressions in question.
This somewhat obscurely formulated doctrine seems to take it 
for granted that synonymous expressions do occur in (some) natural 
languages, and it must therefore assume postulates of linguistic 
analysis (although these are not explicitly stated) from which the 
possibility of synonymity may be inferred. Lyons is reluctant to 
accept, however, what he regards as the usual view of 'semanticists'. 
The typical approach of 'semanticists* is described by Lyons in the 
following termss
1. A concept is derived if it is one defined in terms of prior 
concepts belonging to the science in question (e.g. 'velocity' in 
physics, defined in terms of the prior concepts of 'time* and 
'distance') and primitive if it is not thus defined (as e.g. 'time* 
in physics).
2. Lyons 1963 Ch. 4. Cf. also Lyons 1968 Chs. 9 and 10.
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'the question whether two forms are synonymous (has a the
same meaning as b?) is reduced to the question whether the
two forms designate the same entity, their leaning*. Thus, if
it is established that a in one of its 1meanings1 signifies x
(the different theories being distinguished by the manner in
which they describe x) the test of synonymy of a with b is whether
3b also, in one of its ’meanings', signifies x 1 •
This view Lyons contrasts with the one he is advocating, namely that;
'a is not synonymous with b because of its meaning; the
kfact of their synonymy is part of their meaning* .
3. Lyons 1963 Lyons 1968 §9*^«2: *The second assumption
commonly made by semanticists is that synonymy is a relation of 
identity holding between two (or more) independently-defined 
senses. In other words, the question whether two v/ords, a and b, 
are synonymous is reduced to the question whether a and b denote, 
the same entity, their sense'. There appears, when one compares • 
Lyons 19&3 with Lyons 1968, to be some reassessment of the 
'semanticists*' position (marked by restriction of the discussion 
to 'words', and the replacement of meaning by sense, and of 
designate by denote). But in both cases Lyons is careful to 
attribute to the 'semanticists' a fallacy about the ontological 
status of meanings (cf. Alston 196^. pp. 19-22). The suggestion 
is, clearly, that their approach to synonymy must be wrong because 
their view of meanings is v/rong. Put in to bat on this impossible 
wicket, the 'semanticists* are cheaply dismissed. But the tactic 
would not work against a team e.g. of Wittgensteinian 'semanticists'. 
For one can hold that the question whether a and b are synonymous 
can be reduced to (i) what is the meaning of a?, Tii) what is 
the meaning of b? and (iii) are these two meanings identical? - 
without simultaneously holding the view that meanings are entities. 
This is the real issue, which the manoeuvre against the 
'semanticists* evades.
Lyons 19&3 Cf, Lyons 1968 §9*^*2: 'The synonymy of
lexical items is part of their sense'.
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Two features of the contrast drawn by Lyons call for comment* 
First, there is a failure to distinguish between questions of 
definition and questions of establishing facts* The 'semanticist1 
who proceeds as described by Lyons is not by implication committed 
to the thesis that a is synonymous with b 'because of' its meaning 
(it would be nonsense to say that Jones is as tall as Smith because 
of his height) but to the thesis that a's being synonymous with b 
consists in their having the same meaning, although differing in form. 
That is to say, the 'semanticist' can legitimately regard himself as 
entitled to claim that a and b are synonymous when he has established 
that they have the same meaning* Whereas, according to Lyons, to 
establish the fact that a and b are synonymous is, presumably, merely 
to establish 'part of* their meaning. But no more sense can be made 
of this contention than of the contention that to establish that Jones 
is as tall as Smith is to establish 'part of their height. On the 
other hand, if all that Lyons is contending is that the fact that a 
and b are synonymous is merely one of many semantic facts about these 
expressions, doubtless the 'semanticist* would agree, and consequently 
the alleged contrast between his position and Lyons's collapses.
Second, if we are not to set about determining synonymity by 
investigating whether a and b have the same meaning, i.e. if we are 
not allowed any appeal to a prior concept of meaning, it becomes 
incumbent to ask: what, then, are we asking when we ask whether a
and b are synonymous? Lyons's answer to this, surprisingly, is 
that we are asking whether a and b are interchangeable without change
12
of meaning, this being, allegedly, the criterion employed by
‘■unsophisticated speakers1 •
‘When questions of sameness of meaning arise for
unsophisticated speakers, no appeal is made to an
abstract entity of ‘meaning*: a given word or phrase
is accepted as having the same meaning as another
word or phrase if its substitution for the other in
the given context yields an utterance which they will
accept as having the same meaning as the first 
5utterance.1
This, claims Lyons, is 'not so circular as it may sound*. It 
is, however, just as circular as it sounds, i.e. we cannot sensibly 
contend that we are not asking whether a and b have the same meaning 
if our explanation of what we are asking is merely that we are 
inquiring whether certain larger units, of which a and b are parts, 
have the same meaning. The question is merely deferred: it does not
thereby change its character, and cease to be a question about 
‘meanings*. On the contrary, all that happens is that we have changed 
the units about whose 'meanings' we are inquiring. But the enterprise 
of defining 'synonymy* independently of a prior concept of 'meaning* 
has made no progress.
1.21 The main argument used by Lyons in support of his view of meaning 
relations is an argument from analogy, based on remarks by Reichenbach
5. Lyons 1963 §kA6.
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about the concept of 'weight1.
•What is the weight of a body? It is usually conceived
as an abstract property of the body, recognizable
from certain physical effects. Using Russell’s
principle of abstraction we can reduce the concept
weight to the relation having the same weight. The
weight of a body is the class of all objects having
the same weight as this body. An adept in traditional
logic would object that in order to define the same
weight we must first define the weight, and then
proceed by addition of the differentia specifica to
the genus. But there is no reason to insist on this
impractical method. It is admissible to conceive
the notion of the same weight as prior to that of
weight and to define the latter in terms of the former.
This conception corresponds to the actual procedure
used in the empirical ascertainment of the weight of a
body. The balance is a device which indicates, not
1the weight, but equality of weight' •
Lyons comments:
’The difference between this view of the 'abstract 
qualities’ and a more ancient conception, which regarded 
them as positive properties inherent in things, is
1. Reichenbach 19^7 p» 210
Un­
readily appreciated. We have only to think, for example, 
of Plato's difficulty in connexion with the simultaneous 
predication of 'tallness' and 'shortness* of the same 
person. It seems to me that many of the difficulties 
experienced by semanticists in the treatment of 
meaning-relations such as synonymy or antonymy are of
a similar nature, being caused by their view of 'meaning'
2as prior to these relations' •
But to argue thus is to leave out of account the most 
important feature of the case, namely the particular advantage 
of treating a concept like 'weight' as a comparative concept rather 
than as the concept of an inherent property. For the 'weight* of a 
body varies according to where it is weighed, the 'length* of a body 
is not invariant under all physical conditions, and so on* But to 
apply such considerations to the treatment of 'meaning* is to force a 
quite spurious analogy upon the case. For the option is not, as Lyons 
implies, a simple choice between treating 'meaning* as an inherent 
property of expressions and treating it as a comparative concept, as 
in the case of 'weight*. And since the idea that the 'meaning' of 
an expression is an inherent property of that expression (or is determined 
by inherent properties of the expression) can be taken no more 
seriously than the idea that being a kettle is an inherent property 
of a particular piece of metal, knocking down this Aunt Sally hardly
2. Lyons 19&3
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vindicates Lyons's view of semantic relations *
If, moreover, Lyons were genuinely basing his approach on
Russell's principle of abstraction1, he would have to argue that the
meaning of an expression is a certain class of expressions , whereas
he wishes to argue for a different conclusion: that the 'fact* of
expressions being synonymous is 'part of their meaning.
But the insuperable objection to the argument from analogy is
this: that the treatment Reichenbach describes is limited in its
application to a particular type of empirical concept, namely
measurement concepts in the physical sciences, i.e. concepts fundamental
5to which is the ultimate appeal to a standard . There is simply no
parallel here at all to the concept of 'meaning* in linguistics. In
no sense do natural languages have 'standard meanings' arbitrarily
set up, by reference to which other 'meanings' are measured, and since
this is the plain fact of the matter, there is no sense in which
'sameness of meaning* takes priority over 'meaning* where natural 
*
languages are concerned.
That it is the absence of appeal to standards which vitiates 
Lyons's assimilation of the case of 'meaning' to the case of 'weight*
3* Lyons does not explain how the 'semanticist* is supposed to
reconcile the view that meanings are inherent properties with the 
view that meanings are entities. Perhaps this is another of the 
'semanticist's' confusions: or perhaps he is allowed to opt for
one or other of two equally untenable positions.
if. i.e. 'the meaning of an expression is the class of all the
expressions synonymous with it* (Quine 19^3 P* 130).
5* Cf. Lyons 1968 §10.1,1.
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is readily apparent if we compare accounts which might be given of 
fknowing the weight of x! and 'knowing the meaning of x*• Here it will 
be seen that to treat the p of x as the class of all objects having the 
same p  as x will not do at all* For example, we should certainly not 
regard someone as knowing the weight of x if all he knew was that it 
had the same weight as various other objects, and only those. Nor 
should we regard someone as knowing the meaning of x if all he knew 
was that there were no other synonyms than y and z. We should, however, 
regard someone as knowing the weight of x if he knew that it weighed 
the same as any other single object of which he knew the standard 
weight value. This is the essential point for a correct evaluation 
of the comparison with Synonymy1 and ’meaning1. In other words, we 
should not regard someone as knowing the meaning of x if all he knew 
was that it was synonymous with y, but did not know the meaning of y 
either.
Finally, it must be observed that even in the case of concepts 
of measurement in the physical sciences, to talk e.g. of ’sameness 
of weight1 as taking priority over 'weight* is a mere fagon de parler. 
What this faqon de parler is intended to bring out is the nature of the 
concept 'weight* as employed in these sciences. But to assert that 
'weight* is conceptually derived from 'sameness of weight' would be, 
stricto sensu, as untenable as to assert that 'aeroplane* is concept­
ually derived from a prior 'same aeroplane *. We cannot, under pain 
of self-contradiction, incorporate into the analysans of a prior concept 
any concept which we claim to be derived therefrom.
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If we accept the faqon de parler, however, it may be noted that 
there is no difficulty with the concept of 'form* which parallels 
that arising over 'meaning*: 'sameness of form1 is, on the contrary,
most satisfactorily regarded as prior to 'form*. When we ask whether a 
person knows whether the lecturer said "bust" or "must", i.e. when we 
require someone to make an identification of linguistic form, we are 
indeed asking him to do no more and no less them identify the class of 
items having the same form. For there would be no sense in the 
objection that he might only produce further examples of items having 
the same form, but not know what form they had either.
This difference between the concepts of 'form' and 'meaning', 
whereby 'form' is to be treated as derived from 'sameness of form' but 
'meaning* as prior to 'sameness of meaning', would appear to be funda­
mentally characteristic of the conceptual framework upon which 
linguistic analysis rests*
1.3 If FI (l.l) is accepted, the question of excluding the possibility 
of synonymous expressions arises only if it is maintained that 
linguistic analysis requires some further postulate or postulates com­
patible with FI but precluding the possibility of difference in form 
without difference of meaning*
1 ,The view is advanced by Bloomfield that linguistic analysis is 
based upon a postulate which requires us to suppose that within a 
given natural language there are no synonymous expressions. Bloomfield
1. Bloomfield 1955 § 9.5.
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does not make out a detailed case, but the postulate in question is 
stated to be:
(P2) 'In certain communities (speech-communities) 
some speech-utterances are alike as to form 
and meaning1*
Bloomfield maintains (a) that this postulate obliges us to suppose 
that phonemic difference is invariably concomitant with difference 
of meaning, e.g. 'that each one of a set of forms like quick, fast, 
swift, rapid, speedy differs from all the others in some constant and 
conventional feature of meaning', and (b) that the postulate implies 
that difference of meaning is compatible with phonemic identify, e.g. 
'in English, the phonetic form [bee] occurs with three different 
meanings: bear 'to carry, to give birth to', bear 'ursus', and bare
'uncovered''♦ Thus, according to Bloomfield, homonymity is possible, 
but synonymity excluded.
However, this conclusion does not in fact follow from the single 
postulate as Bloomfield formulates it, since the assertion that some 
utterances are alike in form and meaning does not preclude the possi­
bility of synonymous expressions. There would be no difficulty in 
formulating a postulate which did, e.g.
(P3) The expressions of a language differ one from
another in form or meaning, and if in form then 
also in meaning.
But the question which must be considered is whether there is any 
good reason for adopting a postulate such as P3*
19
1.31 The denial that synonymous expressions occur in natural languages
might be based on the adoption of a definition of 1meaning1 such that
it would then be inconsistent to claim that two expressions had the
'same meaning1, as e.g. if the 'meaning1 associated with any given
form were to be defined as 'the total network of relations entered 
1into' by that form. However, a definition of 'meaning' which has
the effect of rendering difference of form a sufficient condition of
difference of meaning makes it impossible to have synonymous expressions
even in a constructed communication system or symbolic language. This
consequence shows that any such, definition is not a definition of
'meaning1 in the sense with which we are here concerned; for if one
thing is clear it is that in principle we can, arbitrarily, modify a
2constructed language by the introduction of synonymous expressions , 
(just as a government can introduce new coins having the same value 
as old coins, and thus modify the existing currency system).
1. This 'Firthian' definition is offered by J. G, Catford (Gatford 
19&5* §5-1)* If the 'meaning' of a is the total network of 
relations entered into by a, and the 'meaning* of b is the total 
network of relations entered into by b, and a and b are nonidentical, 
then the 'meaning' of the one cannot be the same as the 'meaning*
of the other.
2. E.g. Dr. Zamenhof might have decided (as a whimsical after­
thought) to have two Esperanto words for 'electricity* instead 
of one. The committee responsible for the International Code
of Signals might decide to introduce a new signal as an optional 
alternative to one of the existing signals. (If it is denied 
that 'synonymous expressions' can thus be created by fiat (cf.
Quine 19&1 § 2), we must simply abandon the term 'synonymous 
expressions' as being tied to an inappropriate concept of 
'meaning', and find some alternative way of talking about the 
relation in question).
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1.32 A more interesting denial of synonymity would be one based upon
the thesis that a natural language, unlike a constructed language, is
such that the conditions for synonymity of two expressions are never
fulfilled. P3» it might be suggested, can be supported by an argument
1along the lines advanced by White • White's analysis of synonymy may 
be summarized as follows.
Synonymy is held to be sameness of meaning of different expressions. 
If this is correct, then to interpret aright claims that a is syn­
onymous with b we need to clarify (i) the 'sameness' involved, and 
(ii) the 'meaning' involved*
(i) At least four different kinds of 'sameness* may be dis­
tinguished. We use the word 'same' in connexion with various parts of 
the history of one continuous thing. For example, to whatever position 
in the room a chair is moved, we still regard it as the same chair.
We will correct an acquaintance who mistakenly supposes that the chair 
that used to stand by the window has been sold and that there is a new 
chair that stands by the door. "No,** we say, "it's the same chair". 
Similarly, we refer to "the same man we saw yesterday". Such cases 
are examples of 'type-1 sameness*. Second, there is the kind of case 
in which we have two or more instances of non-continuous things 
('type-2 sameness*), as when we talk about "the same dance step" or "the 
same experiment", alluding to a repetition of previous actions. Then 
there is the kind of case where we recognize sameness in two or more 
coexistent copies of one thing ('type-3 sameness'), as when we talk
1. White 1958.
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about ”the same newspaper”, "the same curtains”, ”the same motor car” 
or ”the same gramophone record”. In such cases there may or may not 
be a prototype over and above the copies. Finally, there is the kind 
of case where we say that at least two continuous things are the same 
in a given respect (*type-*f sameness1), as when we tell someone that 
he has the same eyes, or the same bearing, or the same manner as his 
father. We use this formula even when the comparison between A and B 
hinges on a detachable object which is not part of them, as when we 
say ”they have the same room”, meaning that they share it. There are, 
however, English idiomatic differences corresponding to this latter 
distinction. For if the respect in question is a non-detachable, 
non-interchangeable characteristic (like manner, limp, hair, or even - 
as a marginal case - income) it is usual to say not only that A and B 
”have the same X”, but also that they are ”alike in” or ”in respect of” 
X; whereas if the respect involves a detachable, interchangeable 
object (like room, car or hat) it is usual to say that A and B ”have 
the same X”, but hardly that they are ”alike in” or ”in respect of” X.
'Type-** sameness' may be further analysed as follows. If A and B 
are the same in respect of a given object, we may classify the sameness 
of that object under 'type-1 sameness' or 'type-3 sameness'* That is, 
it will either be one and the same object which A and B share (e.g. 
room or garden fence) or, on the other hand, there will be two distinct 
copies of the same sort (e.g. motor car). But the question of whether 
the object counts as one or two does not depend on how many possessors 
it has. However, if A and B are the same in respect of a given charac-
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teristic, it is not always easy to decide whether we are dealing with 
one characteristic or tv/o, and the question of how many possessors it 
has becomes more important* There are tv/o general arguments for 
classing such characteristics under 'type-3 sameness'* One is that it 
makes perfectly good sense to say in such cases that there is one X 
(e.g. limp, interest, hair-do) which A has, and another X which B has, 
but no difference between them. This is supported by the second argu­
ment, that it is possible for someone to know that both A and B have X, 
but not to recognize it as the same characteristic.
The sameness involved when it is claimed that two expressions 
“have the same meaning11 is 'type-^ h sameness1, i.e. the claim maintains 
that two given expressions a and b are the same in respect of X, their 
meaning* If we accept this, then the further question arises of 
assessing 'meaning* as a respect in which instances of 'sameness1 may 
occur.
(ii) 'Meaning', in the sense in which it may be claimed that two 
expressions "have the same meaning", is most satisfactorily regarded as 
a characteristic in respect of which the expressions are the same.
This characteristic is the way or ways in which the expressions are 
employed by language-users. Thus there are general arguments (see 
above) for classing the meaning which expressions share under 'type-3 
sameness'*
But this conclusion is just the one which raises insuperable diffi­
culties as far as determining synonymity is concerned. For 1 type-3 
sameness* for characteristics is the case where sameness is in the eye
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of the beholder, i.e. where there is no objectively verifiable 'same 
object' involved, and all depends on whether we choose to pay attention 
to the similarities and ignore the differences. It is typical of 
'type-3 sameness' for characteristics that there is always some view­
point from which two allegedly same respects can, in principle, be 
differentiated. Hence if we believe that there are instances where two 
expressions cannot be differentiated in respect of meaning, we must be 
deceiving ourselves. This is not to say that we shall not find 
instances where a plausible case can be made out for saying that two 
expressions are synonymous: but that the decision will be arbitrary,
in the sense that there will always be - if we choose to look for it -
some reason for denying that the meaning is 'the same1.
Thus the case of allegedly synonymous expressions is like that of 
the spanner and the wrench. We may say that a spanner and a wrench 
have the same use, namely to tighten and loosen nuts, or that they have 
different uses, because the way a spanner tightens a nut is not 
exactly the same as the way a wrench does, and besides there are other 
uses which wrenches have and spanners do not. Similarly, e.g. the
expressions brother and male sibling may be alleged to be synonymous,
and there is a good reason for this, namely that both are used to 
specify a certain family relationship. On the other hand, reasons 
may be found for denying that they are used in exactly the same way, e.g. 
that one expression provides a translation of the French word frere, 
while the other does not, or that one expression explicitly analyses 
the relationship in question, whereas the other does not. We thus have
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a choice of asserting or denying that these two expressions are 
synonymous, depending on whether we wish to call attention to the 
similarities of meaning, or the differences.
In general, the following are ways hy one or other of which we 
may always differentiate between the meanings of any two expressions 
if we so wish; (a) by showing that the meaning of a is known to a 
person X, when the meaning of b is not; (b) by showing that the 
meaning of a may be rendered in some other language by an expression 
which is not an exact translation of b; (c) by showing that a differs 
in the organization of meaningful elements from b; (d) by showing 
that the meaning of a differs in some respect other than intension or 
extension (e.g. emotively) from the meaning of b; (e) by showing that 
a has for a person X associations not shared by b.
Thus there will always be something true of the meaning of a 
which is not true of the meaning of b, even in cases where some other 
consideration might induce us to say that the meanings of a and b were 
'the same1»
1.33 White's position may be compared with that taken up by Nida, who 
holds that the non-occurrence of synonymous expressions in natural 
languages is a 'principle of semantic analysis'. In support of this 
contention, Nida observes that certain expressions 'ordinarily listed 
as synonyms' turn out, upon investigation, not to be identical in 
meaning. Examples are! peace and tranquillity, childish and puerile, 
truth and reality. This holds also, In Nida's view, for variant pro­
nunciations of a given word:
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*For example, the alternant pronunciations of duty
(l)/duwtiy/ and (2)/dyuwtiy/ carry certain distinct
connotations* In some circumstances the form /dyuwtiy/
induces an unfavorable response from the listener, who
interprets it as pedantic or associated with people
whose culture he does not appreciate* On the other
hand, among a certain small set of speakers of
American English the form /duwtiy/ is a mark of
educational and cultural inferiority* Ihe alternant
pronunciations of creek /kriyk/ and /krik/ bear
similar distinctions, but to different types of
speakers* If alternant pronunciations of morphemes
do nothing more than identify the dialect area, they
1are to that extent nonequivalent * *
Thus according to both White and Nida close investigation of the 
use of expressions in a natural language will always reveal some 
reason for denying their synonymity*
But pointing out various ways of distinguishing between alleged 
synonyms is the traditional pastime of synonymists. Gollinson lists 
nine possible differentiae:
1(1) One term is more general and inclusive in its 
applicability, another is more specific and 
exclusive, e*g, refuse / reject. Cf* seaman / sailor, 
ending /inflexion, go on foot /march*
(2) One term is more intense than another, e*g* repudiate
1* Nida 19^9 §6*11*
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/ refuse. Of. immense / great, towering / tall,
(3) One term is more highly charged with emotion than 
another, e.g. repudiate or reject / decline, Cf, 
looming / emerging, louring / threatening,
(*f) One term may imply moral approbation or censure
where another is neutral, e,g. thrifty / economical, 
eavesdrop / listen,
(3) One term is more “professional" than another; e,g.
calcium chloride / chloride of lime / bleaching 
powder; decease / death; domicile / house; to ordain 
a priest, institute or induct a vicar, consecrate or 
instal a bishop / appoint a professor,
(6) One term belongs more to the written language, it
is more literary than another, e.g. passing / death. 
The literary language includes further distinctions 
like the poetical and the archaic.
(7) One term is more colloquial than another, e.g. turn 
down / refuse. The spoken language, too, includes 
further distinctions like the familiar, slangy and 
vulgar.
(8) One term is more local or dialectal than another, 
e.g. Scots flesher / butcher, or to feu / to let.
(9) One terra belongs to child-talk, is used by children 
or in talking to children, e.g. daddy, dad, papa / 
father (in which different social levels are
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discernible), teeny / tiny, etc.'^
Ingenuity might find ways of adding considerably to this list.
But however long the list of differentiae, it will still fall short
of providing the required support for P3, unless reason is shown for
supposing that any pair of expressions must be differentiable on at
3
least one such count. For it would be a misapplication of Leibnizs
law to proceed on the assumption that establishing that something is
true of the meaning of a which is not true of the meaning of b is
ksufficient to show that a and b differ in meaning • To clinch White's
2. Collinson 1959 pp. 61-62. The analysis is based on that given by 
Devoto in the article rtSinonomia,f in the Bnciclopedia Italiana 
Vol. XXXI, p. 857.
5. This applies whether or not we accept the validity of particular 
differentiae. E.g. one might question the assumption, apparently 
accepted by Collinson, Nida and White, that to establish that 
different speakers have different attitudes to the use of a and b 
is sufficient to establish that a and b differ in meaning. (This 
leads Ziff (Ziff i960, §179 n.37 to dismiss Nida's conclusion 
that natural languages do not have synonyms as based on a confusion 
between 1meaning1 and 1 connotation'.)
4. Analogously, one could never conclude that two articles in a shop 
cost the same, since certain things might be true of the price 
of one article which were not true of the price of the other, 
e.g. that one price had been determined by the shop manager and 
the other by the wholesaler, or that one price was regarded by 
the customer as cheap, and the other as dear, etc. But to anyone 
who argued thus, it would be correct to reply: these are
certainly possible ways of differentiating between the two 
prices, but they have nothing to do with establishing whether 
or not the prices are the same.
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argument, it would need to be shown that the various criteria for 
synonymity are interrelated in such a way that any pair of natural- 
language expressions satisfying one or some of these criteria necess­
arily fail to satisfy another or others. This final step in the argu­
ment is the step missing.
1*3^ A prima facie case for rejecting P3 can be made out if it can be
shown that natural languages have pairs of sentences whose difference
in meaning depends on a condition that could be falsified. This seems
plausible in the case of many pairs of sentences containing extensional 
1expressions • For example, the difference m  meaning between
(l) John wore shoes 
and (2) John wore boots
seems to depend entirely on the difference in extension of the words 
shoe and boot; for we cannot detect any differences in e.g. grammatical 
structure, idiomatic usage, register, * emotive overtones1 etc* which 
contribute in any way to differentiating the meaning of (l) from the 
meaning of (2). Thus we can say that if - contrary to the facts of the 
case - shoe and boot were co-extensional terms, then (l) and (2) 
would not differ in meaning. But to say this is to concede that there 
could be a natural language exactly like English except in that shoe 
and boot would be, in this hypothetical language, co-extensional 
terms. In such a language (l) and (2) would be synonymous*
1. Extensional expressions are such expressions as chair, which is
said to have as its ‘extension1 the class of chairs, so that when 
we apply this predicate to some object (by saying of it that is
”is a chair”) we are asserting that the object in question is a 
member of the class of chairs.
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Granted the reasonableness of the premisses, we should nonetheless 
be prevented from reaching this conclusion if some general reason 
could be adduced for supposing that no two extensional expressions 
can have the same meaning, even if they do not differ in idiomatic 
usage, register, ‘emotive overtones* etc.; since if shoe and boot, 
although co-extensional, differed in meaning this would provide grounds 
for denying the synonymity of (l) and (2).
The only serious argument in support of the claim that extensional 
expressions which differ in form must also differ in meaning (even 
when identical in respect of idiomatic usage, register, ‘emotive 
overtones' etc.) is one advanced by Goodman • Goodman points out 
that identity of extension would be an adequate criterion of 
synonymity for most pairs of extensional expressions, at least if we 
were restricting our interest to such aspects of meaning as affect the 
truth or falsehood of assertions. Even so, a problem arises if we wish 
to include v/ithin the scope of our definition extensional expressions 
of which the extension is the null class. For according to the 
criterion proposed, such expressions as unicorn and mountain higher 
than Everest would be synonymous, since they coincide in extension.
But if it is the case that Mary thought she saw a unicorn in the garden, 
she would be telling the truth if she said "I thought I saw a unicorn 
in the garden”, but uttering a falsehood if she said ”1 thought I saw 
a mountain higher than Everest in the garden”.
2. Goodman 19^9*
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Goodman's resolution of this difficulty is to propose the following 
amendment of the suggested account of synonymy for extensional 
expressions. An expression such as chair may be regarded not only as 
having an extension in the usual sense, but also as having Secondary 
extensions1* A secondary extension will be defined as the extension 
of a compound expression in which the expression chair appears as a 
constituent part, e*g* the expression picture of a chair* The amended 
criterion of synonymity proposed is: 'identity of primary and secondary
extensions'• That is, a and b are synonymous if and only if they 
coincide not simply in respect of their extension in the usual sense, 
but also in respect of the extensions of all matching compounds which 
include a and b as parts. The amended criterion now seems adequate to 
cope with cases like unicorn and mountain higher than Everest, since 
there will be matching compounds (e.g. picture of a unicorn and 
picture of a mountain higher than Everest) which do not agree extensionally 
and thus rule them out as a synonymous pair*
However, acceptance of the amendment has the consequence that no 
two extensional expressions a and b can be regarded as synonymous. For 
the expression chair that is not a stool can be correctly applied to 
any chair but to no stool: it qualifies, so the argument runs, as a
chair-description but not a stool-description. Thus the expressions 
chair and stool differ in secondary extension, for there are matching 
compounds, namely, chair"description and stool-description, which differ 
in extension. Now in the expression chair that is not a stool we might 
substitute for chair and stool any two nonequiform expressions a and b,
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and arrive at the same result* Whereas if we insert the same expression 
a in both places, we have an expression of the type chair that is not a 
chair - and such an expression, whatever its status, clearly cannot 
simultaneously be and not be a chair-description. 'The conclusion is 
that no two extensional expressions can be synonymous*
Goodman*s case must, however, be rejected. For what is not 
explained is why anyone should accept failure to differ in secondary 
extension as a sufficient condition for difference of meaning between 
two expressions which coincide in primary extension and differ in 
secondary extension only in virtue of the fact that they differ in form. 
For example, granted that the words furze and gorse have the same 
primary extension, it seems that the case for saying that furze that is 
not gorse counts as a *furze-description* but not as a 'gorse- 
description* must rest ultimately upon formal features of that 
expression, i.e. 'furze-description* must here be explicated in some 
such fashion as 'description using the word furze For if any
other word than furze were used, then by Goodman's own argument we 
should not have a 'furze-description* that was not a 1gorse-description*. 
But if that is so, then all the difference in secondary extension 
assures us of is that furze and gorse differ in form, which was known 
at the outset. If we take difference of secondary extension in such 
cases to give a guarantee of difference in meaning, we reach the 
paradoxical position that under no circumstances - e.g. in a fairy 
tale, or a science fiction story - could an author invent a race of 
imaginary creatures and give them two alternative names (e.g. trugs or
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bogglewits) without ipso facto creating tv/o words with different
meanings. But this conclusion conflicts, clearly, with the principle
that synonymous expressions may be created by fiat (cf. 1*31)5 for
neither English nor any invented language with the grammatical apparatus
for constructing ftrug-descriptions* and 'bogglewit-descriptions'
could have trug and bogglewit as synonyms. Thus, even as regards the
meanings of expressions having the null class as their extension,
Goodman's proposal is defective. For while it supplies an Extensional*
explanation of the difference between, say, unicorn and cockatrice,
it does so at the expense of not being able to account for the lack of
difference between cockatrice and basilisk. A picture of a unicorn is
not a picture of a cockatrice: but a picture of a cockatrice is a
picture of a basilisk.
If the argument from secondary extensions is rejected, it seems
that we can say (i) that there are expressions (belonging to the class
of extensional expressions) which differ in meaning only if they differ
in (primary) extension, and (ii) that there may be some such expressions
which do not in fact differ in (primary) extension, and thus do not
3differ in meaning.
3. Other arguments which would support P3 are difficult to find,
Lyons observes that * although it is frequently asserted ... that 
there are no 'real* synonyms In natural languages, I am aware of 
no argument that gives a linguistically useful interpretation to 
the term * synonymy* to support this assertion* (Lyons 1963^.^6). 
Ullmann says that instances of *total synonymy* are *a luxury 
which language can ill afford* (Ullmann 1959 P* 108). But this is 
scarcely an argument; moreover, it is not clear what 1 price* 
a language would have to 'pay* in order to *afford* synonyms.
Pike asserts that 'it is ultimately from an etic point of view,
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l.*f The case presented thus far in favour of accepting PI hut 
rejecting P3 has assumed that a satisfactory account of some kind 
could be given of synonymous expressions in a constructed as opposed 
to a natural language. For the objection to positions which render 
difference in form a sufficient condition of difference in meaning 
was based on the consequence that synonymy would then be impossible 
even in the case of constructed languages. To make good this objection, 
the notion of synonymous expressions in a constructed language 
requires some clarification, and a fuller supporting account of 'form* 
and leaning* must be provided.
We may begin by pointing out that all that has so far been 
taken for granted about ‘form1 and •meaning* is that it is in virtue 
of knowing the form of an expression that language-users are able to 
recognize instances of that expression, and in virtue of knowing the 
meaning of an expression that they are able to understand it when used 
in discourse. These assumptions fit equally well the case of a natural 
language or of a constructed sign system of any kind*
As regards natural languages, a distinction between formal and
alone, that one may claim that there are never any genuine 
synonyms’ (Pike 1967 p. 613). Again, it is not clear what such 
a claim amounts to; nor are any supporting arguments given,
Dixon says that 'there is no absolute synonymy* and links this 
with the assertion that 'there are patently no two lexical 
items which can occur in exactly the same linguistic environments' 
(Dixon 1963 pp. ^3-^*0* Why this must be the case is not 
explained. According to Southworth, 'it is probably true, as 
many linguists assume, that no two lexical items in any language 
are exact synonyms' (Southworth 1967 p, 3^6), But no grounds for 
regarding this as 'probable* are stated.
semantic knowledge answers to certain elementary criteria one would 
apply in assessing language learning* For example, a Frenchman learning 
English might be taught the correct pronunciation or spelling of the 
word eight; but one would not wish to say that he knew the meaning 
of the word simply on the basis of his success in recognizing tokens 
of the type, or producing such tokens himself when called upon to do so* 
Or, on the other hand, he might be taught that there was an English 
word for the cardinal number *8*, and he might even be taught, by means 
of partial translations with blanks, where that word ought to occur in 
English sentences as an equivalent of French huit* He might perhaps 
then be described as knowing the meaning of a certain English word; but 
one would not wish to say he knew the form of the word in question 
until he knew e.g* how to fill in the blanks translating French huit*
The distinction also matches different ways in which one would 
describe features of success or failure in language-using* For example, 
if I have temporarily forgotten the name of the small Hampshire 
village where my Aunt May lives, and so cannot comply with your request 
for her address, it is a form, not a meaning, which I cannot recall.
But it is a meaning not a form which I have (partially) forgotten if I 
used to know the definition of typhlitis, but cannot now remember 
whether the term applies to cases of appendicitis or not.
Thus a distinction between formal and semantic knowledge may be 
supported in various ways. These may be paralleled in the case of 
constructed sign systems even of a very elementary kind; for example, 
the 'builder*s language* described by Wittgenstein in § 2 of the
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Fhilosophische Untersuchungen^• One might in such a case describe the 
relevant linguistic knowledge by specifying (i) what patterns of 
articulated sound count as instances of utterance of the expressions 
Wilrfel, Saule, Platte and Balken, and (ii) what requirement the 
utterance of each of these expressions indicates. For this is the 
knowledge which would enable anyone to assume the role either of the 
builder or of his assistant in the communication situation envisaged.
All that falls under (i) comprises formal knowledge, and all that 
falls under (ii) semantic knowledge. Someone might have the requisite 
formal knowledge without the requisite semantic knowledge, e.g. he might 
be able to recognize utterances of Wurfel, Saule, Platte and Balken, 
but not know, or be mistaken about, which kind of item was to be brought 
in response to which kind of utterance. This is to be distinguished 
from not knowing the difference between utterances of Wurfel, Saule, etc.
From the point of view of an outside observer trying to construct 
a hypothesis about the linguistic knowledge shared by the builder and 
his assistant, it would suffice to 'set up* four linguistic expressions, 
each differing from the others both in 'form* (i.e. in respect of what
1. 'Die Sprache soil der Verstandigung eines Bauenden A mit
einem Gehilfen B dienen. A fuhrt einen Bau auf aus Bausteinen; 
es sind Wdrfel, Saulen, Flatten und Balken vorhanden. B hat 
ihm die Bausteine zuzureichen, und zwar nach der Reihe, wie A 
sie braucht. Zu dem Zweck bedienen sie sich einer Sprache, 
bestehend aus den Wortern; "Wurfel", "Saule", "Flatte", 
"Balken". A ruft sie aus; - B bringt den Stein, den er gelernt 
hat, auf diesen Ruf zu bringen. - Fasse dies als vollstandige 
primitive Sprache auf.'
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sound sequences count as utterances of the expression) and in 'meaning1 
(i.e. in respect of what requirement the utterance of the expression 
indicates)•
This situation is in all essentials that of the linguist engaged 
in the description of a natural language. From his point of view, 
linguistic expressions may be defined as theoretical constructs set 
up as units in terms of which to state linguistic knowledge, this 
knowledge being postulated to account for interpersonal communication 
by speech or writing.
The mechanism of explanation based upon such constructs is typically 
as follows. If on a given occasion A communicates successfully with B 
by uttering a certain sequence of sounds, we explain this by supposing 
that B's linguistic knowledge enables him to recognize the sounds as 
a token of a certain type, and, in virtue of belonging to that type, as 
being understandable in a certain way. We also suppose that Afs 
linguistic knowledge enables him to select the appropriate sequence of 
sounds to utter, on the assumption that B would recognize them as a 
token of the type in question, and understand accordingly. Mutatis 
mutandis, similar suppositions apply in the case where A communicates 
with B by means of marks on a surface, or other visual as opposed to 
auditory signals. Communication is explained, in short, by supposing 
that acts of communication (speech acts, acts of writing) involve the 
instantiation of linguistic expressions by A, and B's application of 
his own linguistic knowledge to their recognition and interpretation.
For each linguistic expression set up, therefore, a specification
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is required of both 'form* and 'meaning*. A language L may be 
described by specifying a set of linguistic expressions, each charac­
terized in respect of form and meaning.
Clearly, it does not advance the explanation of communication- 
in-L to multiply 'linguistic expressions' unnecessarily. If different 
linguistic expressions of L (the language under description) are to be 
set up to accommodate various formal and semantic distinctions, when we 
speak of two linguistic expressions, it is implied that there is a 
difference in form or in meaning, or both. If there is no difference 
either in form or in meaning, there is no sense in which two linguistic 
expressions are involved, as distinct from two instantiations of the 
same expression. This proviso corresponds to the way in which rules are 
to be envisaged as governing a constructed communication system. E.g. 
it would be nonsense for Wittgenstein's builder and his assistant to 
agree (a) that Balken was the word to be uttered by the builder when 
he wanted a beam brought, and furthermore (b) that the requirement of a 
beam by the builder was to be indicated by his uttering the word 
Balken. To agree to both (a) and (b) would be merely to reiterate 
agreement to one and the same rule (i.e. the rule for the expression 
Balken), not to set up rules for the two expressions Balken and Balken.
To create synonymous expressions in a constructed language would 
be to agree that one and the same semantic rule should apply to two or 
more expressions recognized as distinct. E.g. the builder and his 
assistant, dissatisfied with Wittgenstein's meagre and unimaginative 
provision for their intercourse, might agree that (a) the requirement
58
of a beam by the builder might be indicated by his uttering the word 
Balken, and that furthermore (b) alternatively, the very same require­
ment might also be indicated by his uttering the word Austerlitz.
And they might proceed to agree upon using the names of other famous 
battles as optional alternatives to the other words, thus providing each 
of the expressions Wurfel, Saule, Platte and Balken with a synonym* 
(They would thus be instituting rules in a manner no different from 
the mathematician who stipulates (i) 'Let the value of x be 3' and (ii) 
'Let the value of ^ be 3'5 nor from the logician who sets up an 
interpreted logistic system in which 'F' and 'G* are constants 
standing for the same two-place predicate, so that 'Fab' and 'Gab' 
are both interpreted as 'a is the father of b ' •) Correspondingly, the 
linguist constructing a hypothesis about the builder's language, based 
on observation of its use, would be led to set up Balken and Austerlitz 
as synonymous expressions in order to account for the fact that the 
communicational purpose served by both words appeared to be the same*
From this point of view, the concept of synonymy may be considered 
part of the structure of explanatory hypotheses about communication- 
in-L.
The less complex the internal organization of L, and the more 
limited the range of communication situations in which L is used, the 
clearer will be the application of a distinction between expressions 
which differ in meaning and those which do not. We may expect matters 
to be complicated in the case of natural languages by (i) the formal 
complexity of natural languages, (ii) the semantic complexity of natural
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languages, and (iii) the fact that the scope and purpose of commun- 
icational exchanges may be far less clearly demarcated than in the use 
of a restricted sign system of a very simple kind.
Synonymy and Phonological Analysis
*tl
2*0 Questions of synonymy arise in connexion with phonology insofar as 
the assignment of a particular phonological form to an expression is 
not entirely independent of the assignment of a meaning to that expression. 
The interdependence of assignments of form and meaning characterizes what 
may be termed ’semantically based phonology1.
2.01 By ’semantically based phonology* is here meant the view that the 
basis for phonological classification of the sounds of a language is the 
extent to which meanings of words, phrases or sentences in the language 
remain invariant under sound substitution, phonologically distinctive and 
non-distinctive sounds being distinguished in terms of the possibilities 
of interchange without change of meaning. It is characteristic of seman­
tically based phonology to define phonological units, such as the phoneme, 
in such a way as to involve an appeal to meanings, whereas it is charac­
teristic of non-semantically based phonology to deny that appeal to 
meanings enters into such definitions^. It is assumed in semantically 
based phonology that at least some information about how speakers use 
words for communication is essential for phonological analysis, whereas 
it is claimed by the advocates of non-semantically based phonology that, 
at least in principle, correct phonological analysis is possible without
1. ’... the phoneme is essentially a phonetic conception. The fact
that certain sounds are used in a language for distinguishing the 
meanings of words doesn't enter into the definition of a phoneme* 
D, Jones Le Maltre Phonetique (1929): quoted in
Bloch 19^8 p. 5-
bZ
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any semantic information * For non-semantically based phonology, 
therefore, questions of synonymy do not arise,
2.02 It falls outside the scope of the present study to adjudicate
in general between the claims of a semantically based and a non-semantically
based phonology. However, arguments invoking synonymy have sometimes
been advanced as reasons for rejecting a semantically based phonology,
and these merit examination in the present context.
12.1 According to Chomsky , 'the central objection to meaning as a 
criterion of analysis has always been the obscurity of semantic notions1 
and synonymy is 'the most dubious part1 of semantic theory. We must 
therefore realize what we are conceding if we claim 'that in order to 
construct a phonemic system it is necessary to know which utterances 
are different in meaning. To know difference in meaning is to know 
synonymy, and this is the central term of the theory of meaning. If 
accepted, then, this claim is an open admission that linguistic analysis 
must be based on precisely the most dubious part of semantic theory'.
2. 'It would be possible to group the sounds of a language into
phonemes without knowing the meaning of any words' D* Jones loc. cit.
'It is certainly possible to establish phonemic systems v/ithout having 
recourse to meaning at all' Bbeling i960 p. 83. Bloch 19^ *8 admits 
the utility of semantic knowledge for the phonologist 'as a shortcut 
in the investigation of phonemic structure* but insists on the possi­
bility in principle of dispensing with it - with, however, one important 
proviso; 'Theoretically it would be possible to arrive at the phonemic 
system of a dialect entirely on the basis of phonetics and distribution, 
without any appeal to meaning - provided that in the utterances of 
the dialect not all the possible combinations of phonemes actually 
occurred' (Bloch 19^8 p.5 n.3).
1. Chomsky 1935? PP» 1^1-1^2*
This general objection is backed up by more specific theoretical and
methodological considerations* Semantically based phonology is
represented by Chomsky as entailing acceptance of a particular
2
1 synonymity criterion' , namely
SCI 'two utterances are phonemically distinct if and
3
only if they differ in meaning'
or, in an alternative and somewhat more exact formulation,
SC2 'given two utterance tokens U1 and U2, U1 is
phonemically distinct from U2 if and only if
k
U1 differs in meaning from U2f *
The interpretation of the 'synonymity criterion* as applying to 
utterance tokens is stressed; SCI 'cannot be accepted, as it stands, 
as a definition of phonemic distinctness. If we are not to beg the 
question, the utterances in question must be tokens, not types'.
However, explicated thus the 'synonymity criterion* is open to the funda­
mental objection that 'there are utterance tokens that are phonemically 
distinct and identical in meaning (synonyms) and there are utterance 
tokens that are phonemically identical and different in meaning 
(homonyms). The proposed criterion is therefore 'false in both
2. Chomsky 1957, p* 95 n*3* 
3* Chomsky 1957* p* 9^ *
k. Chomsky 1955, p. 1^3*
5* Chomsky 1957, p- 95*
6, Chomsky 1957, p* 95*
kk
7directions* • Specific counterexamples cited are the following, 
fLet U1 be the utterance I saw him by the bank, meaning the bank of 
the river, and let U2 be the utterance I saw him by the bank, i.e. 
the First National Bank* Clearly the two utterances are different in 
meaning* Nevertheless they are phonemically identical* Thus it is 
not the case that if U1 and U2 differ in meaning, then they must be 
phonemically distinct. Notice that we cannot appeal here to the fact 
that these physically distinct utterances are two occurrences of the 
same sentence, two tokens of the same type, because the problem at 
issue is precisely to determine which utterances (i.e. which distinct 
pieces of tape) are repetitions of one another or tokens of the same 
type. To make this appeal is thus to beg the question at issue com-
g
pletely*. Synonyms provide counterexamples falsifying the * synonymity 
criterion* in the other respect mentioned. *Let U1 and U2 be any two 
expressions with the same meaning, e.g; **he is a bachelor” and ”he is 
an unmarried man.” Or, if one is inclined to deny the existence of 
absolute synonyms, consider such pairs as /ekanamiks/ and /iykenamiks/, 
"adult11 and "adult11, "advertisement" and "advertisement", /raiiBn/ and 
/reysen/, /radiyeytar/ and /reydiyeytar/, etc., which often coexist 
in one person*s speech and are clearly synonyms. Such pairs have the 
same meanings but are phonemically distinct. Hence it is not the case 
that if two utterances are phonemically distinct, then they must differ
9
in meaning* * It is thus clear, in Chomsky*s view, that if we adopt
7. Chomsky 1955, p. 1^3; Chomsky 1957, p. 95.
8. Chomsky 1955, p. 1^3* Another homonymous counterexample cited in
Chomsky 1957, p. 95 is that of '"metal" and "medal" (in many dialects)*.
9. Chomsky 1955, pp. 1^3-1^.
5^the synonymity criterion 'we simply get the wrong classification in a
10
large number of cases' * He rejects in advance the defence that such
cases are simply exceptions* 'We cannot circumvent this argument by
holding that this rule *•• holds for all cases except the rather special
case of homonyms and synonyms* For one thing, these are by no means
peripheral cases* For another, 'homonymity* and 'synonymity1 are simply
the names we give to exceptions to this rule, and any rule works except
11for its exceptions'*
2.11 Having argued against a semantically based definition of phonemic 
distinctness, Chomsky also attacks on similar grounds the thesis that the 
phonologist in practice requires semantic information in order to determine 
phonemic contrasts. 'Lounsbury argues in his "A semantic analysis of the 
Pawnee kinship usage", Language 32.158-9^ (195&), P* 190, that appeal 
to synonymity is necessary to distinguish between free variation and 
contrast: "If a linguist who knov/s no English records from my lips
the word cat first with a final aspirated stop and later with a final 
preglottalized unreleased stop, the phonetic data will not tell him 
whether these forms contrast or not. It is only when he asks me, his 
informant, whether the meaning of the first form is different from that 
of the second, and I say it is not, that he will be able to proceed 
with his analysis". As a general method, this approach is untenable. 
Suppose that the linguist records /ek-tnamiks/ and /iyki-namiks/, /vikstn/
10. Chomsky 1957, p. 95.
11. Chomsky 1955, p. lH.
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and /fiymeylitfaks/, etc., and asks whether or not they are different 
in meaning. He will learn that they are not, and will incorrectly 
assign them the same phonemic analysis, if he takes this position 
literally. On the other hand, there are many speakers who do not 
distinguish "metal" from "medal", though if asked, they may be quite sure 
that they do* The responses of such informants to Lounsbury's direct 
question about meaning would no doubt simply becloud the issue.
'We can make Lounsbury's position more acceptable by replacing the 
question "do they have the same meaning?" with "are they the same word?" 
This will avoid the pitfalls of the essentially irrelevant semantic 
question, but it is hardly acceptable in this form, since it amounts to 
asking the informant to do the linguist's work; it replaces an operational 
test of behavior (such as the pair test) by an informant's judgment 
about his behavior. The operational tests for linguistic notions may 
require the informant to respond, but not to express his opinion about 
his behavior, his judgment about synonymy, about phonemic distinctness, 
etc. The informant's opinions may be based on all sorts of irrelevant 
factors. This is an important distinction that must be carefully
1observed if the operational basis for grammar is not to be trivialized* •
2.12 As a non-semantic method of determining phonemic contrast, Chomsky 
advocates the 'pair test' in the following form. 'Suppose that a linguist 
is interested in determining whether or not "metal" and "medal" are 
phonemically distinct in some dialect of English. He will not investigate 
the meanings of these words, since this information is clearly irrelevant 
to his purpose. He knows that the meanings are different (or he is simply 
not concerned with the question) and he is interested in determining
1. Chomsky 1957, P* 97, n.l.
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whether or not the words are phonemically distinct. A careful field
worker would probably use the pair test, either with two informants or
with an informant and a tape recorder. For example, he might make a
random sequence of copies of the utterance tokens that interest him,
and then determine whether or not the speaker can consistently identify
them. If there is consistent identification, the linguist may apply an
even stricter test, asking the speaker to repeat each word several
times, and running the pair test over again on the repetitions. If
consistent distinguishability is maintained under repetition, he will
say that the words "metal" and "medal" are phonemically distinct. The
pair test with its variants and elaborations provides us with a
1clear operational criterion in completely non-semantic terms' • This 
holds true, in Chomsky's view, even if the informant is asked to dis­
tinguish the utterance tokens in terms of meaning. 'One should not be 
confused by the fact that the subject in the pair test may be asked to 
identify the utterance tokens by meaning. He might just as well be 
asked to identify them by arbitrarily chosen numbers, by signs of the 
zodiac, etc. We can no more use some particular formulation of the 
pair test as an argument for dependence of grammatical theory on meaning
than as an argument that linguistics is based on arithmetic or 
2
astrology' •
2.13 Chomsky examines, and also rejects, a somewhat different version 
of the 'synonymity criterion*. 'A weaker claim ... might be advanced as
1, Chomsky 1957, pp. 96-97.
2. Chomsky 1957, p. 99 n.l.
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follows. Suppose that we have an absolute phonetic system given in
advance of any language, and guaranteed to be detailed enough so that
every two phonemically distinct utterances in any language will be
differently transcribed. It may now be the case that certain different
tokens will be identically transcribed in this phonetic transcription.
Suppose that we define the "ambiguous meaning" of an utterance token as
the set of meanings of all tokens transcribed identically with this
utterance token1. It might now be proposed that two utterances are
phonemically distinct if and only if they differ in "ambiguous meaning."
Chomsky concedes that such a proposal 'might provide an approach to the
homonymity problem, if we had an immense corpus in which we could be
fairly sure that each of the phonetically distinct forms of a given word
occurred with each of the meanings that this word might have. It may
be possible to elaborate this approach even further to cope with the
problem of synonyms. In such a way one might hope to determine phonemic
distinctness by laborious investigation of the meanings of phonetically
transcribed items in a vast corpus. The difficulty of determining in
any precise and realistic manner how many meanings several items may
have in common, however, as well as the vastness of the undertaking,
1make the prospect for any such approach appear rather dubious' •
2.1^ Apart from the practical difficulties involved, Chomsky advances 
a further reason for rejecting the attempt to elaborate a semantically 
based phonology. 'There is one further difficulty of principle that 
should be mentioned in the discussion of any semantic approach to 
phonemic distinctness. We have not asked whether the meanings assigned
1. Chomsky 1957, PP* 95-96.
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to distinct (but phonemically identical) tokens are identical, or merely
very similar. If the latter, then all of the difficulties of determining
phonemic distinctness are paralleled (and magnified, because of the
inherent obscurity of the subject matter) in determining sameness of
meaning. We will have to determinevhen two distinct meanings are
sufficiently similar to be considered 'the same'. If, on the other
hand, we try to maintain the position that the meaning of a word is a
fixed and unchanging component of each occurrence, then a charge of
circularity seems warranted. It seems that the only way to uphold such
a position would be to conceive of the meaning of a token as "the way in
which tokens of this type are (or can be) used," the class of situations
in v/hich they can be used, the type of response that they normally evoke,
or something of this sort. But it is difficult to make any sense at all
out of such a conception of meaning without a prior notion of utterance
type. It would appear, then, that even apart from our earlier objections,
any approach to phonemic distinctness in semantic terms is either .
circular or is based on a distinction that is considerably more difficult
1to establish than the distinction it is supposed to clarify* •
2.2 Chomsky's thesis may be considered as falling into two parts, one 
concerned with the definition of phonological units, the other with 
discovery procedures for the determination of such units in particular 
languages. Both parts involve arguments which invoke the concept of 
synonymy, and the arguments in question are in both cases open to 
objections, which must now be examined.
1. Chomsky 1957, p. 98
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2.21 A general objection which may be raised against Chomsky's thesis 
concerns the alleged difficulty of semantic investigations, and, in 
particular, of establishing cases of synonymity. Xt is doubtless true 
that if one does not have a clear concept of synonymy, one will find it 
difficult to establish criteria for instances of synonymity: but this
trivial observation applies equally to the concept of phonemic distinct­
ness and to any other concept. Quite a different question is the 
question whether an investigator who does have a clear concept of 
synonymy, or of meaning, or of any other semantic concept, will find it 
difficult to establish criteria because the concepts in question are 
semantic concepts. Chomsky's arguments appear to assume an affirmative 
answer to this question, but the case for this answer is never satis­
factorily made out. The use of phrases such as 'inherent obscurity' 
seems to suggest the existence of some fundamental difficulty attaching 
to semantic concepts, but the nature of the difficulty is never made clear. 
In practice, there would appear to be no greater order of difficulty 
involved in establishing whether a and b differ in meaning than in 
establishing whether a and b are phonemically distinct, granted the 
possibility of carrying out practical tests with informants. If an 
investigator has a clear concept of the semantic information he wishes
to elicit, there seems no general reason why, either in principle or
1
in practice, he may not devise testing techniques to elicit it • In 
the particular case of testing for sameness of meaning of utterance 
tokens, Chomsky raises an objection which reveals a misconception of
1, Such techniques need not be open to the kind of objection Chomsky 
raises against Lounsbury's direct question about meaning (2.11).
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the question at issue; for, he alleges, such tests are complicated by 
the possibility of recognizing various 'degrees' of similarity of 
meaning. The assumption is, clearly, that unless we have a prior theory 
of synonymy which settles this and similar issues, then we do not know 
what we are testing for. But the 'difficulty' Chomsky raises is an 
irrelevance. No semantically based phonologist need waste time wondering 
whether, because ['laijan] and ['taiga] in a particular context 
appear to relate to very similar animals, he ought to count the meanings 
as 'the same'; nor, mutatis mutandis, for any other 'semantic similarity'. 
In phonology, the theoretical question 'how similar* meanings must be 
to be 'the same* simply does not arise: all the phonologist need be
concerned with is establishing whether or not, in that context, his 
informants make a distinction. If they do, then ['laijen] and 
['taiga] count as 'different': if not, they count as 'the same'. (On
theoretical aspects of testing for differences of usage in semantically 
based phonology, see further below 2.^2).
2.22 The strategy of Chomsky's argument against the hypothetical 
defender of the 'synonymity criterion' contains a number of other un­
satisfactory features, of which the most relevant for present purposes 
concern the implausibility of Chomsky's concept of synonymy. It appears 
that Chomsky wants to include under the term 'synonymy' any type of 
instance where one utterance-token is - in some sense - assigned the same 
meaning as some other utterance-token, as well as meaning-equivalence of 
corresponding types. What exactly is involved in assigning meanings is 
left unclarified, but Chomsky's examples include very disparate types of
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case. If mere instances where there is a variation of linguistic norm 
as regards the pronunciation of an expression (e.g. /eklnamiks/, 
/iyk-tnamiks/) count as synonyms, they must be synonyms of a quite 
different kind from vixen and female fox. For while someone might just 
conceivably ask "Is /eklnamiks/ the same subject as /iykinamiks/?", 
no-one, unless he were joking, would give the definition "/ekinamiks/ 
is /iyk-tnamiks/". Whereas a quite standard way of defining 'vixen* is 
to say: "A vixen is a female fox". It seems, therefore, that before
one could profitably discuss the 'synonymity criterion* and its 
intended application, various distinctions would need clarification, 
including the following.
At least three types of question about meaning may be asked in 
respect of a given utterance-token. (l) We may be asked to identify 
the meaning of a given utterance-token in terms of the meaning or meanings 
assigned to a corresponding utterance-type: e.g. 'Does pink here used of
a newspaper mean pink as regards the colour of the paper it is printed 
on, or pink as regards the political views it expresses?1. (2) We may 
be asked to identify the meaning of an utterance-token by specifying the 
paradigm of non-anomalous semantic choices available in the context, 
and indicating which possibilities are excluded by the occurrence of the 
token in question. E.g. 'He rang off, replaced the receiver, and walked
out of the telephone ------,' What meanings does kiosk here exclude?'
(Answer: kiosk here excludes 'booth', 'room' etc. N.B, The context
already excludes 'wire1, 'engineer1, 'call* and other meanings which 
might otherwise go with telephone.) (3) We may be further asked to
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specify, in as great detail as may be required, the actual interpretation 
of that semantic choice, i.e. we may be required to elucidate in full, 
paying due attention to the speaker, place, time and social setting of 
the occasion, the implications which the utterance-token would have - 
and have been intended to have - for the audience to which it was addressed. 
E.g. 'What speed /length of time taken was implied by fast journey in 
that context?'
It will be relevant to the following discussion to distinguish 
by referring to questions of types (2) and (3) as questions of 'token- 
meaning' and questions of type (l) as questions of 'type-meaning classi­
fication'. These designations are intended to point to the fact that 
(l), although ostensibly a question about the meaning of the utterance-
token, is in fact a disguised question about (exemplification of) a 
1
type-meaning • This is expedient in order to avoid confusion arising 
between questions about the meaning of an utterance-token, and questions 
about the meaning of an utterance-type, which are categorically quite 
different questions. For to ask about the meaning of an utterance-token 
is to ask about a particular spatio-temporally unique event; whereas 
to ask about the meaning of an utterance-type is to ask about an 
abstraction which may correspond to very many particular events, or to 
none.
Now Chomsky is insistent that the 'synonymity criterion' must be 
interpreted as a thesis about the meanings of utterance-tokens. But his
1. Question (l) asks, in effect, 'Which of pink-type's two meanings 
does this pink-token bear?'. Whereas (2) does not ask 'Which of 
kiosk-type's two (three...) meanings does this kiosk-token bear?'
Nor does (3) &sk 'Which of fast-type's two (three..) meanings does 
this fast-token bear?': for '80 m.p.h.' is not a meaning of the
English type fast.
own use of the term synonymity and its cognates appears to cover (and 
thus fails to differentiate) at least three kinds of equivalence: (a)
token-meaning equivalence, (b) type-meaning classification equivalence, 
and (c) equivalence in meaning of utterance-types « For present purposes 
this would not matter much if (a) and (b) entailed (c), and likewise
'not (a)1 and 'not (b)' both entailed 'not (c)1* But it is important
~2
to note that neither set of implications holds .
It might of course be argued that if there were no instances where 
the meaning of a token x was identical with the meaning of a token 
then we should have no grounds for calling the corresponding types X and Y 
synonyms at all. But this is a consideration which cannot be advanced 
in Chomsky's favour, since the claim he makes is that the existence of 
certain synonymous expressions in some varieties of English 'falsifies' 
(sic) the 'synonymity criterion*. But the synonymous expressions cited 
are types (/eklnamiks/, /iykinamiks/ etc.), whereas the 'synonymity 
criterion', as already noted, is said to be a thesis about tokens. The 
assumption that one can argue from synonymity of types to equivalence 
of meaning of tokens simply begs the question against the defender of
2, E.g. 'there are utterance tokens that are phonemically distinct 
and identical in meaning (synonyms)' and - in the same paragraph - 
'such absolute synonyms as /eklnamiks/ and /iykinamiks/.' (Chomsky 
1957 p. 95)* The former use of synonym seems to cover either (a) 
or (b), or perhaps both, while the latter corresponds to (c).
3. The token-meaning equivalence of x and y; does not entail the . 
synonymity of types X and Y, nor vice versa. Similarly, the 
synonymity of types X and Y does not entail and is not entailed 
by the type-meaning classification equivalence of x and y;.
55
the ’criterion' since, obviously, no grounds have been advanced for 
claiming that some particular token [ek-tnamiks] has the same meaning 
as some other token [iykinamiks] , other than the (alleged) synonymity 
of the corresponding types. The most that can be made of Chomsky's 
case on this point would seem to be some such assertion as the following: 
'I am inclined to believe that in some varieties of English instances 
could be found where a token [eklnamiks] would prove to have no 
difference in meaning from another token [iykinamiks] .'
But all our attention is being drawn to here is a phenomenon of 
speech variation. No such instance will 'falsify' the 'synonymity 
criterion1, any more than instances of dialect mixture or bilingualism 
'invalidate' the enterprise of phonological analysis. To content other- 
wise is simply to confuse the notions 'false' and 'inapplicable' . In 
cases like [ekinamiks] / [iykinamiks] the investigator will conclude, 
if his researches are sufficiently extensive, that one or other pronun­
ciation of the word must be excluded as intrusive. Or, if we insist that
both be included within the same phonological description, we must
clearly allow him to mark the two pronunciations, along with any similar 
hesitations for equivalent, eclectic, effectual, etc., as variants.
We cannot expect the 'synonymity criterion', or any other proposed 
phonological criterion, to be capable of consistent application if we 
suppose the data to include phonologically incompatible realizations
f^. Cf. Jones 1962 §6^7: 'The speech of those whose pronunciation is
unstable cannot be reduced to phonemes at all.' This is not an 
admission that the assumptions of phonology are false, but simply 
that their applicability is limited.
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of expressions . No linguistic criterion is deemed to hold for whatever 
data the linguist happens to have in front of him: all that is required
is that it hold for all data conforming to a single linguistic norm^.
It might be urged on Chomsky1s behalf that no such explanation is 
available for cases like fviksln] and [fiymeyl faks] , supposing 
that instances could be found where two such tokens did not differ in 
meaning* But this brings us to a point which raises the question why 
Chomsky has selected a hypothetical opponent who is not in fact a phono­
logist at all but a lunatic, i.e. someone who is, apparently, proposing 
to make a phonological analysis of English with total disregard for any 
phonetic similarities or dissimilarities between items in the data* One 
does not wish to defend the views of lunatics* On the other hand,
5* It might perhaps be argued that CekinamiksJ and [iykinamiksj 
do belong to the same phonological system in the sense of being 
statable in terms of different sequences of phonemes drawn from 
the same (English) inventory. But this is a contingent fact 
which does not affect the issue: the case is in principle no
different from one in which a speaker sometimes does and sometimes 
does not observe a certain phonemic distinction.
6. There is no presumption that collecting material from one informant 
guarantees its linguistic uniformity. The irrelevance of Chomsky's 
objection is indicated by the fact that if the data include speech 
variations which remain undetected the resultant phonological 
analysis will be ’wrong1 regardless of whether the criteria used 
are semantic or nonsemantic; e.g. if we ask an informant to pronounce 
economics on various occasions and, receiving sometimes the answer 
tekinamiks] and sometimes the answer [ iyktnaraiksj , conclude that 
[e] and [iyl are members of the same phoneme. Naturally, if the 
phonologist thinks that by using semantic criteria he will auto­
matically avoid the problem of speech variation he is mistaken.
But that is a quite different matter (and a claim which, in any 
case, no advocate of semantically based phonology makes).
57
7
refuting them is of no great interest • Xf the argument is intended as 
a reductio ad absurdum it fails, since non-semantically based phonology 
which ignored phonetic similarities and differences would be equally 
absurd.
Next, it must be observed that Chomsky's claim against the 
'criterion' is that it is false both (i) as a necessary condition of 
phonemic distinctness (against which he adduces synonyms), and also (ii) 
as a sufficient condition of phonemic distinctness (against which he 
adduces homonyms). But it would go ill with Chomsky's argument against 
any sane defender of the 'criterion', since the case against (i) or 
against (ii) might hold, but just what could not plausibly hold is the 
simultaneous case against both. To adopt Chomsky's language, the 
'criterion* may perhaps be 'false in one direction': precisely what
seems unlikely is that it could be shown to be, as Chomsky asserts,
'false in both directions'. This is because, as emerges from the 
following considerations, at least one part of Chomsky's dual case must 
be abandoned.
Before any substantive point could be debated between Chomsky and 
his opponent, they would have to agree on the question: 'Are we concerned
with difference of meaning of tokens in identical contexts, or with 
difference of meaning of tokens irrespective of context?1 The answer
7. This would hardly excuse anyone from regarding the lunatic's
thesis as one open to refutation by counterexample, which it is 
not. Qua counterexample, fviksln^ / £fiymeyl faksj is just 
as vain as [ekinamiks] / [iykinamiks] * (It would be equally 
vain to argue against someone who said "A triangle has four sides" 
by claiming "I can show you some which have only three".)
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must be that they are concerned with difference of meaning of tokens in 
identical contexts, since if context is disregarded questions about 
token-meanings become conflated with questions about type-meanings. The
g
distinction is no longer viable •
Now if context is to be taken into account, the defender of the 
’criterion1 can claim that the argument from homonymy collapses straight 
away (since 'I saw him by the bank1 i.e. river bank, and !I saw him by 
the bank1 i.e. First National, patently occur in different contexts: 
or, should they occur in identical contexts, then the token-meanings do 
not differ). It is pointless to invoke here the semantic difference 
'bank (finance)' vs. 'bank (river)', since to apply that distinction to 
tokens in identical contexts is to impose a type-meaning classification, 
when what is at issue is a token-meaning difference. If, however, someone 
were to insist that homonyms are nonetheless token-meaning-different 
in identical contexts, the defender of the 'criterion* 'would then be 
justified in maintaining the counterclaim that any expressions are token- 
meaning-different in identical contexts (including synonyms). He does 
not have to be able to show what the difference is in order to substantiate 
such a claim: for that cannot be shown either in the case of homonymous
tokens in identical contexts.
8. If, for example, we have simply a fragment of undated manuscript
bearing just the words milites moriuntur, we are simply not in any 
position to contrast the token-meaning of these words with the 
type-meaning of the Latin words milites moriuntur, since the context 
is unknown. A similar position is reached by disregarding known 
contexts.
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In short, the argument from homonymy can be pressed, ultimately, 
only at the expense of sabotaging the argument from synonymy. Likewise, if 
the argument from synonymy is maintained (by showing lack of token-meaning- 
difference between items in identical contexts), the argument from homo­
nymy must be abandoned (since there will be parallel lack of token- 
meaning-difference between items in identical contexts).
Chomsky's best move here would be to press the argument from synonymy 
and drop the argument from homonymy. This means attacking the 'criterion' 
as a necessary condition of phonemic distinctness, at the expense of 
conceding it to provide a sufficient condition. But, for reasons to be 
examined below (2.23)i it is precisely the 'criterion' as a necessary 
condition which is the least indispensable part of any case for a 
semantically based phonology. Indeed, it was a misrepresentation to 
contend that it constituted part of that case in the first place 
(cf. 2.23 n.2).
2.23 A further comment must be added concerning the question of 
equivalence (c), i.e. iype-meaning equivalence. Here three points should 
be noticed. First, it is incorrect to claim, as Chomsky does, that the 
'synonymity criterion' is properly applicable only to tokens. The 
phonologist who inquires, for example, whether [pil] and [bilj are 
phonemically distinct in English is not primarily concerned with tokens - 
that is, with single particular instances of these utterances - but rather 
with a general question of classification. He begs no questions by 
distinguishing between a type [pill and a type [bil] , since the 
types in question are phonetic types. And, in general, one may legitimately
6o
define an utterance-type in purely phonetic terms without in any way 
prejudging the question of its phonological status'^ . Second, if the 
'synonymity criterion* is interpreted in this sense, i.e. as a thesis 
about phonetically defined utterance-types, it becomes irrelevant to 
cite cases of homonymy as weighing against it (since it will not prove 
possible to assign different meanings to distinct phonetic types of 
a given homonym,) Thirdly, granted this interpretation, the 'synonymity 
criterion' does not in fact represent the position for which advocates 
of a semantically based phonology have usually argued or need argue.
Specifically, it is not usually argued that a phonemic distinction 
must differentiate meanings (of phonetically defined utterance types) 
but that such a distinction may differentiate meanings and (sometimes)
1. Various phonetic but non-phonological typologies for utterances 
might be suggested: cf. Rosetti 19&3* general, the type-
token distinction may be set up in various ways with respect to 
any particular item.■ This point may perhaps best be illustrated 
by analogy. E.g. an English shilling may be regarded as a token 
of two or more coin-types, according to our interest in coin 
classification. It may or may not be relevant that it is made of 
silver alloy, or bears a certain monarch's head, or is valuable 
by reason of the small number of shillings minted in its particular 
year* Thus it may be regarded as a token of the type 'English 
silver shilling1, or of the type 'George V shilling', or of the 
type *1930 shilling'. All the relevant characteristics are 
manifested in praesentia in the token.
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2does so m  the language under investigation . To bring up such 
examples as English economics, adult, etc, is thus to miss the point, 
since a semantically based phonological analysis of English will have 
no difficulty in establishing that in (many) other instances, the 
phonetic differences in question do. distinguish meanings, and hence a 
correct phonological analysis of these differences will result,
2.24 A semantically based phonology is compatible with the denial 
of synonymy, provided phonological units can be established without
1
exclusive reliance on controversial cases. The Bloomfieldian position 
with regard to such pairs as /ektnamiks/ and /iykinamiks/ may be represented 
as follows: 'I assume that the two differ in meaning, although I am
unable to ascertain what the difference is.* This may be an unprofitable 
assumption for purposes of semantic analysis; but that is not the
2, Fischer-JpJrgensen 193& p. 144: 'it is only required that a replacement 
should be capable of entailing a difference in the content, not 
that it should always do so.' Chomsky's formulation of the 
'synonymity criterion' makes the error of representing the condition 
of meaning-difference as a necessary condition as well as a 
sufficient condition. Chomsky is not the only opponent of seman­
tically based phonology guilty of this misrepresentation. Cf.
Bloch 1948 32.2: 'It is customary to base the difference between
distinctive and non-distinctive sounds on meaning: to say, for
instance that any interchange of distinctive sounds will affect 
the meaning of a word or phrase, while any interchange of non- 
distinctive sounds will leave the meaning unaffected*' It is 
ironical that Bloch should refer for confirmation of this statement 
to Bloch and frager 1942 where, however, the promised confirm­
ation is not forthcoming. The position stated in Bloch and Trager 
1942 coincides in fact with that of Fischer-Jorgensen (above): 
distinctive differences or contrasts are there said to be 'capable 
of distinguishing one meaning from another', but there is no claim 
that they must invariably do so*
1 Cf. 1.3
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question here. The issue between a Bloomfieldian phonologist and 
Chomsky must be whether or not such an assumption is consonant with a 
correct phonological analysis of English. If indeed all the pairs 
exhibiting the same phonetic differences as [ektnamiks] and 
[iyk-tnamiks ] we re controversial cases, in the sense that no semantic 
distinction between the members of such pairs could be clearly established, 
a Bloomfieldian phonologist would have no ground for recognizing the 
distinction as phonological. But he is not committed to the prop­
osition that failure to discover a semantic difference in one such case 
is sufficient to justify classing the members of that pair as 
phonemically identical. Furthermore, for the Bloomfieldian it is only 
on condition that a semantic difference can be established for at least 
one such case that any question of assuming that /ekinamiks/ and /iyklnamiks/ 
differ in meaning arises.
2.23 Finally, the theoretical obscurity of Chomsky's own position 
must be noted. It is far from clear why anyone should regard the "pair 
test" in the form described by Chomsky as a test of phonemic distinctness, 
when what it is is manifestly something quite different, namely a test 
of auditory distinguishability of utterances. Such a test would, of 
course, become a test of phonemic distinctness if we had some guarantee 
that the utterance-tokens in question were not distinguishable by any 
other than phonemically relevant features. But any such proviso must of 
necessity involve the phonologist in circularity.
Nor can this circularity be broken by the proposal to define the 
phoneme simply by reference to the "pair test": e.g. by saying 'Let us
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mean by phonemically distinct nothing more than distinct as measured by 
the pair test.1 For the effect of such a proposal would be simply to 
equate 'phonological unit* with 'auditorily distinguishable unit1, and 
for purposes of phonological analysis this equation is clearly intol­
erable.
2.26 To summarise, Chomsky's arguments, considered as an attack upon 
semantically based phonology, are misdirected inasmuch as the positions 
attributed to his opponents are not, on the whole, those which seman­
tically based phonologists have defended, nor in any case those which 
they need defend. As a positive phonological programme, on the other 
hand, Chomsky's appears to lack precisely the theoretical foundations 
required to validate an independent branch of scientific inquiry. With 
regard to synonymy, his thesis reduces to the trivial truth that if there 
are phonologically different expressions with the same meaning, sameness 
of meaning is not a sufficient condition of phonological identity.
2.3 It will at this point be appropriate to examine a divergence of 
opinion among semantically based phonologists as to the scope of phono­
logy.
2.31 The fact that in any given language certain utterances do, while
others do not, have the same meaning, is fundamental to the distinction
betv/een phonology and phonetics as drawn by Trubetzkoy:
'Die Phonologie hat zu untersuchen, welche Lautunterschiede in
der betreffenden Sprache mit Bedeutungsunterschieden verbunden
sind, wie sich die Unterschiedungselemente (oder Male) zueinander
verhalten und nach welchen Regeln sie miteinander zu Wortern
:£bezw. Sateen) kombiniert werden durfen'.^
1. Trubetzkoy 1939, p. 14.
6k
A characteristic feature of phonetics is its lack of concern with meanings
il;Besonders kennzeichnend fur die Phonetik ist die vollkommene
Ausschaltung jeder Beziehung zur sprachlichen Bedeutung der unter-
2suchten Lautkomplexe1.
Whereas the basis of phonological description is the discovery that
certain phonetic contrasts differentiate meanings:
'Der Anfang jeder phonologischen Beschreibung besteht in der
Aufdeckung der in der betreffenden Sprache bestehenden bedeutungs-
3
differenzierenden Schallgegensatze*•
2.32 The notion 'capacity to differentiate meanings' thus enters
into the definition of certain basic phonological concepts in Trubetzkoy's
theory, notably that of 'phonological opposition' (1phonologische
Opposition*), which Trubetzkoy introduces as follows:
•Schallgegensatze, die in der betreffenden Sprache die intellek-
tuelle Bedeutung zweier Worter differenzieren konnen, nennen wir
phonologische Coder phonologisch distinktive oder auch distinktive)
1Oppositionen*•
The same applies to Trubetzkoy's concept of the phoneme, which is derived 
from that of phonological opposition, via that of 'phonological unit': 
'Unter (direkt oder indirekt ) phonologischer Opposition verstehen
2, Trubetzkoy 1939, p. 13.
3. Trubetzkoy 1939, p* 17*
1, Trubetzkoy 1939, p. 30.
2* The distinction between direct and indirect phonological oppositions
is that the tefms of indirect oppositions occur in complementary
distribution but share no common phonetic features distinguishing
them in the sound system of the language, whereas the terms of
direct oppositions are not in complementary distribution 
(Trubetzkoy 1939, p. 32).
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wir also jeden Schallgegensatz, der in der gegebenen Sprache eine 
intellektuelle Bedeutung differenzieren kann. Jedes Glied einer 
solchen Opposition nennen wir phonologische (bezw. distinktive) 
Einheit'
Phonologische Einheiten, die sich vom Standpunkt der betreffenden 
Sprache nicht in noch Idirzere aufeinanderfolgende phonologische
If
Einheiten zerlegen lassen, nennen wir Phonemef.
R
The phoneme is thus essentially a meaning-distinguishing unit.
2.33 lf» then, a language has a given distinction D and a set of pairs 
a^ vs. b^, vs. b^, a^ vs. b^ ... such that both members of each pair 
are realizations of meaningful expressions, and each pair is differen­
tiated solely by the distinction D (as e.g. English [pKin] vs. [bin], 
[phi:k] vs. [bi:k] , [phaet] vs. [bast]... where D = [ph] vs. [b]), it 
follows from the definitions cited in 2.32 that D will constitute a 
phonological opposition if and only if for at least one pair a vs. b the 
expressions realized by a and b differ in meaning. For if this is not 
the case then D cannot be held to differentiate meanings. But since a 
and b cannot differ in meaning if they are realizations of synonymous 
expressions, it is a necessary condition that the expressions realized 
by some pair a and b should not be synonymous. Strictly, since the 
meanings Trubetzkoy specifies are 'intellectual meanings* (intellektuelle
3. Trubetzkoy 1939» PP* 32-33*
k* Trubetzkoy 1939? p* 3^*
5. The credit for being the first to advance this concept of the
phoneme is given by Trubetzkoy to L. V. Sderba (Trubetzkoy 1939i 
p. 3^ n.l).
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Bedeutung) the relationship in question between the expressions realized 
by a and b will be that of 'intellectual synonymy1. Thus, for every 
case in which D has the status of a phonological opposition, there must 
be at least one pair a and b which do not realize 1 intellectually 
synonymous1 expressions (although there may be other pairs in the same 
set which do). For every case in which D does not have the status of a 
phonological opposition, no pair in the set will realize 'intellectually 
synonymous' expressions. Thus determining the phonological status of D 
is tantamount to determining whether or not the relationship of 
'intellectual synonymy' holds between expressions realized by the 
members of some pair a and b in the set.
2.3^ The significance of the term 'intellectual meaning* (2.33) 
derives from Trubetzkoy's acceptance of a distinction between phonology 
and phonostylistics, based on Buhler's analysis of the three functions 
of speech^. Phonology, in Trubetzkoy's view, is concerned only with 
the 'intellectual meanings' of expressions, that is to say with the 
'representative' function of speech. All phonetic distinctions which 
serve the 'expressive' and 'appellative* functions are the concern of 
phonostylistics, not phonology. Thus from the phonological point of view 
any two expressions a and b may be considered synonymous if they differ 
in respect of the expressive or appellative functions, provided that 
they do not differ in respect of the representative function (whatever 
that is taken to be in a given case). E.g. if it is agreed that a
1, Trubetzkoy 1939» PP* 17-29*
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and b have different meanings, but that the difference of meaning consists 
solely in that a expresses emotional involvement on the part of the 
speaker, whereas b is emotionally 'neutral' (cf. French fe'ppuvatabl] vs* 
[epuva'tabli ), this difference of meaning does not count against the 
assessment of a and b as 'intellectual synonyms.'
2.35 The importance of the function of distinguishing between 
'intellectual meanings' is further evident in the rules given by 
Trubetzkoy for the determination of phonemes. The first rule is as 
follows:
'Wenn zwei Laute derselben Sprache genau in derselben
lautlichen Umgebung vorkommen und mit einander vertauscht
werden durfen, ohne dabei einen Unterschied in der intellektuellen
Wortbedeutung hervorzurufen, so sind diese zwei Laute nur fakultative
1
phonetische Varianten eines einzigen Phonems* •
This rule is a statement of a sufficient condition for classifying the 
distinction between sound a and sound b as non-phonemic. By implication 
it states also a sufficient condition for refusing to classify two 
phonetically distinct meaningful items as realizations of synonymous 
expressions (i.e. if the two items differ solely in respect of sounds 
which always occur in the same environments and may always be inter­
changed without altering the 'intellectual meanings' in question, then 
the two items are formally (phonologically) identical, and hence there 
is no question of synonymity.)
1. Trubetzkoy 1939» P* ^2
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Trubetzkoy does not always, however, take the existence of synonyms
sufficiently into account, as in the formulation of the following rule:
'Wenn zwei Laute genau in derselben Lautstellung vorkommen und
nicht mit einander vertauscht werden konnen, ohne dass sich dabei
die Bedeutung der Worter verandern oder das Wort unkenntlich werden
wurde, so sind diese zwei Laute phonetische Realisationen zweier
2
versbhiedener Phoneme* •
This rule states a sufficient condition for classifying the distinction 
between soynd a and sound b as phonemic. But it falls foul of cases 
of the following kind. Suppose we are investigating the [t] / [dj 
distinction in a language in which all words are monosyllables having the 
structure CV. We find that for some values of V there corresponds to 
Ltvja word pronounced [dV]with a different 'intellectual meaning'. In 
other cases there corresponds to [tv] no word * [dV] . But in a 
third class of cases there corresponds to [tvj a synonym pronounced 
[dV] • Under Trubetzkoy's rule cited above, the [t] / j[d| distinction
fails in this language to satisfy the sufficient condition for classi­
fication as a phonemic opposition. Yet, ex hypothesi, it is a dis­
tinction capable of distinguishing between 'intellectual meanings'. It 
must be assumed that Trubetzkoy either overlooked the possibility of 
such cases in formulating his rule, or else believed that they never 
occurred. To take such cases into account, the rule would need to be 
amended by adding some such proviso as 'or substitute for one word its 
intellectual synonym'•
2. Trubetzkoy 1939* p*
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2.^6 The scope of phonology according to Trubetzkoy is more restricted 
than in the view of those linguists (e.g. Bloomfield) who draw no dis­
tinction between phonology and phonostylistics. The distinction between 
phonology and phonetics, on the other hand, is drawn very similarly in 
both cases. According to Bloomfield:
"The study of language can be conducted without special assumptions 
only so long as we pay no attention to the meaning of what is 
spoken. This phase of language study is known as phonetics^ ...
The study of significant speech-sounds is phonology or practical
2
phonetics, Phonology involves the consideration of meanings’ •
Like Trubetzkoy, Bloomfield distinguishes between distinctive and non- 
distinctive sound-features, and assigns the study of the former to 
phonology:
"The features of sound in any utterance, as they might be recorded 
in the laboratory, are the gross acoustic features of this utterance. 
Part of the gross acoustic features are indifferent (non-distinctive), 
and only a part are connected with meanings and essential to comm-
Z
unication (distinctive)’ .
Bloomfield further states:
'It is important to remember that practical phonetics and phonology 
presuppose a knowledge of meanings: without this knowledge we
1. Bloomfield 1935, P* 75*
2. Bloomfield 1935? P* ?8.
3. Bloomfield 1935, p* 77*
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could not ascertain the phonemic features’ .
But the meanings relevant to a Bloomfieldian analysis are not the
•intellectual meanings’ of Trubetzkoy. Bloomfield’s definition of meaning
is a very broad one: ’the meaning of a linguistic form (is) the situation
in which the speaker utters it and the response which it calls forth in 
5the hearer*• Bloomfield further specifies that 'a very important part
of every situation is the state of the speaker’s body* which includes 'the
predisposition of his nervous system, which results from all his experiences,
linguistic and o t h e r * I t  appears from this that the meaning of an
expression for Bloomfield encompasses both what Trubetzkoy terms its
'intellectual meaning' and also elements which belong to the 'expressive*
and 'appellative* functions of speech. While admitting the difficulty
7
of obtaining reliable data about meanings , Bloomfield nonetheless
insists on the importance of information about meanings as a prerequisite
of phonological analysis. 'Since we can recognize the distinctive
features of an utterance only when we know the meaning, we cannot
identify them on the plane of pure phonetics' • 'The observer who
hears a strange language, notices those of the gross acoustic features
which represent phonemes in his own language or in other languages he
has studied, but he has no way of knowing whether these features are
9
significant in the language he is observing' . However, it is not
k. Bloomfield 1935, pp. 137-138.
5. Bloomfield 1935, P* 139*
6 . Bloomfield 1935, P» 1^1*
7. Bloomfield 1935, PP* 139*"lif-2.
8. Bloomfield 1935, p- 77•
9. Bloomfield 1935, P* 93«
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necessary to start with a comprehensive account of the meaning of every
utterance under investigation: what is needed to discover the phonemic
distinctions is sufficient information to determine 'which utterances
10are alike in meaning, and which are different* *
2.37 Thus Bloomfield places the phonologist in essentially the same
position as Trubetzkoy: he is given sets of pairs of phonetically
different items and must determine which pairs are realizations of
expressions differing in meaning, and which are not* Since, however,
Bloomfield explicitly rejects the view that natural languages have
1
synonyms as untenable for purposes of linguistic analysis , it follows 
that the phonologist*s task is to assign phonetically different pairs 
to one or other of two classes; namely, ..pairs which are and pairs which 
are not variant realizations of one and the same phonological form.
But Bloomfield's broader view of the scope of phonology means that it 
will be sufficient for the phonologist to discover any consistent 
difference between the situations in which members of a given pair are 
uttered in order to claim that there is a difference of meaning and thus 
of (phonological) form* On this view, if it can be established that 
French [epuvatabll is emotionally 'neutral* whereas [e'ppuvatabl] is 
emotionally 'committed', then /epuvatabl/ and /e'ppuvatabl/ are 
different non-synonymous expressions*
10. Bloomfield 1935* p* 93*
1, Bloomfield 1935, p* 1^5* Of. above 1*3
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2*38 A semantically based phonology is, then, compatible with somewhat 
varying criteria for synonymy. According to one view, it is possible 
that two phonetically different types may be realizations of different 
synonymous expressions, although conveying different 'phonostylistic1 
information. According to another view, any systematic correlation 
between two different phonetic types and two different situational 
features or sets of features counts against the classification of those 
types as realizations of different synonymous expressions. And 'in 
between* these views one can envisage others, the criteria for synonymy 
varying according as the scope of phonology tends to be 'restricted* 
(Trubetzkoyan) or 'unrestricted' (Bloomfieldian). We may speak, then, 
of synonymy as related to the assumed scope of phonological investi­
gations in any given case. Accordingly, the statement that a and b are 
synonymous may or may not imply the absence of distinctions of ah 
expressive or appellative nature* In every case, however, the phono­
logist 's concern with meanings ends with his postulating a sameness or 
difference of meaning between certain expressions. He is not further 
concerned with any 'positive' characterization of the meaning(s) in 
question, nor with justifying his postulation other than by reference 
to the analytic procedures which, qua phonologist, he employs. Such 
procedures must now be considered in some detail, since upon the nature 
of the procedures depends the question whether a clear operational 
crtierion for synonymity can be given, or whether the semantically based 
phonologist is reduced to borrowing (with or without acknowledgment) from 
some (specified or unspecified) prior semantic theory.
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2.4 It must first be noted that the claim that phonemic distinctions, 
by definition, distinguish meanings does not commit the claimant to the 
view that establishing a phonemic distinction between a and b is 
dependent on the prior discovery of a difference in meaning between a 
and b* This latter view has, however, been independently maintained.
A well known article by Pike^ * contends that ascertainment of certain 
semantic information is essential for the determination of phonemes:
'The phonemic analysis cannot be completed until some initial 
grammatical steps are taken. Perhaps the most important of these 
is the identification of at least a limited number of morphemes.
Thus Hockett, and Bloch and Trager utilize pairs of utterances 
which (1) have different meanings, and (2) are minimally different 
in their pronunciation.
Recognizing that the utterances are different in meaning is 
a grammatical process, not a phonemic one. It is thus absolutely 
essential that a minimal grammatical identification be achieved 
before phonemic analysis can be carried on: the irreducible minimum
prerequisite is that the investigator know enough aboiit two items 
to be sure that they are 'different''.
But if we must discover differences in meaning before we can establish 
phonemic distinctness, then since we cannot discover differences in 
meaning if we do not know what differences in meaning are, phonology 
becomes dependent upon a prior theory of meaning, or at least upon
1* Pike 1947? p* 138
7^
the prior acceptance of some partial theory of meaning - that part which
deals with differences of meaning and thus with non-synonyms. But since
synonymy and non-synonymy are heads and tails of the same coin, a theory
of synonymy then becomes a prerequisite of phonological analysis.
2Some critics of semantically based phonology evidently believe
that appeal to meanings in phonological definitions and analytical
procedures renders this conclusion inevitable, and, seeing no well
established prior theory of synonymy available, reject semantically
based phonology for this reason. Nor are matters improved by the fact
that some semantically based phonologists commit the theoretical error
of equating the discovery of differences in meaning with the discovery
of informants* beliefs about differences in meaning. Or, if not equating
the two, they are at least content to treat the former as directly
derivable from the latter. Thus, for example, Fischer-Jorgensen contends
that the necessary information can be obtained by the phonologist by
* eliciting short utterances and presenting them to a native who has to
3
decide whether their meaning is the same or different* . Specifically, 
the native speaker merely has to say *yes* or *no* to a direct question 
of the form 'Does a mean the same as b?' Fischer-J^rgensen goes to 
some lengths to justify this procedure and to explain why a simple 
'yes/no* answer is adequate. The reason is that in the direct question
'the utterances are taken out of 
their natural (linguistic and non-linguistic) context. Consequently,
2. E.g. Chomsky, Cf. 2.1.
3. Fischer-J^rgensen 195&, P* 1^2.
these utterances have no contextual differences of meaning, and 
the native will react to them as representatives of classes of 
utterances and will react to their meanings as being the same 
(in the sense of representatives of one class of meaning) or 
different (in the sense of representatives of different classes 
of meaning). In most cases it is possible to leave this decision 
of being the same or different to the informant, simply because the 
relation between sound and meaning in the linguistic sign is 
arbitrary and unsystematic, so that it is rare that small differ­
ences of sound (which will be the crucial ones for the investigator) 
correspond to small and dubious differences of meaning, whereas it 
will normally happen that they correspond to obvious differences 
of meaning ••.'
It appears from this that the linguist, in Fischer-Jorgensen's view, 
is engaged in the enterprise of discovering the proclaimed semantic 
beliefs of speakers, in order to differentiate thereby phonemically 
distinct from non-phonemically distinct utterances. This is confirmed 
by the following revealing comment:
'Of course, if the linguist himself masters the language,
4. Fischer-J^rgensen 195&, p* 1^2. Fischer-J^rgensen concedes that 
there may be borderline cases 'where gradual differences of sound 
will correspond to gradual differences of meaning*.
5. Examples of statements which proclaim semantic beliefs are: (i)
'To disembark' means ' to go on shore from a ship', (ii) 'Rejection' 
does not mean the same as 'refusal', (iii) There is no French word 
which means the same as 'chair', (iv) 'Slithy toves' doesn't mean 
anything in English.
?6
the problem of avoiding meaningShalysis is of no practical 
importance*
The implication is, clearly, that if the linguist speaks the language 
himself, then simple introspection will tell him which utterances differ 
in meaning and which do not. In other cases, v/here informants can be 
interrogated, it would seem that semantic distinctness - and hence 
phonemic distinctness - is established directly by informants' responses 
to questions about sameness of meaning.
Such a view is unacceptable as a basis for phonology, for at least 
two reasons. First of all, phonology cannot, any more than any other 
branch of linguistics, afford to ignore the distinction between fact and 
belief. Just as in grammar a distinction must be drawn between gramma­
tical sentences and sentences which informants are willing to call 
'grammatical1, so here there must be no confusion between a difference 
of meaning and what informants are willing to call a 'difference of 
meaning'. Equally, in the case where the linguist is his own informant, 
there must be no equating the ascertainment of semantic facts with 
introspection. By introspection, the linguist merely substitutes his 
own semantic beliefs for those of an informant - and this will not do, 
if linguistic analysis is to be counted as different from autobiography.
Second, even if semantic beliefs as proclaimed by speakers were 
held to reflect certain facts about meaning in a reliable way , it is
6. Fischer-Jorgensen 1936, p. 1^2,
7. This,of course, could never be established if we refused to make 
the distinction between semantic facts and semantic beliefs in the 
first place.
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clear that the naive pre-theoretical concept of 'meaning* appealed to 
in the question 'Does a mean the same as b?1 - as put to an unsoph­
isticated informant - is simply not the concept of meaning in which the 
linguist is interested (any more than the naive pre-theoretical concept 
of a 'sound' corresponds to the linguist's 'phoneme': one might as well
go about phonological analysis by asking informants directly 'Would you 
say these sounds are the same?'). But since, into the bargain, we 
have no guarantee that semantic beliefs - either in general or in part­
icular instances - are based upon some uniform concept of meaning which 
language-users happen to have, exactly what it is that has been established 
when informants agree verbally upon (or when the linguist is himself 
introspectively sure of) a 'difference of meaning1 is itself obscure.
Nor can it be argued that at least the linguist's own introspections 
are exempt from this obscurity. For to the extent that he is able to 
give some account of what it means to assert or deny sameness of meaning 
he is acting as his own analyst, not his own informant. The fact that 
the semantic beliefs under analysis are his own becomes at that point 
irrelevant,
2.^1 The attempt to base phonological analysis upon direct establishment 
of the proclaimed semantic beliefs of native speakers destroys a para­
llelism which it is important to preserve between that side of the 
analysis which deals with sounds and that side which deals with meanings. 
The semantically based phonologist should start on the one hand from 
certain observable phonetic differences, and on the other from certain 
observable differences of usage. It will be his ultimate objective to
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determine how these may best be accounted for (i) by postulating
phonemic differences, and (ii) by postulating differences in meaning.
But are these two objectives attainable independently? If (i) is
regarded as attainable independently of (ii), then the case for a
semantically based phonology collapses. If (ii) is regarded as attainable
independently of (i), it becomes incumbent upon the theoretician of a
semantically based phonology to set out and justify the semantic theory
which guarantees his procedures and conclusions under (ii). But in fact
he usually omits to do this, starting his discussion at a point where
it is assumed that one already has a fund of semantic information 
2available .
1. Trubetzkoy is a notable example. Another is Twaddell, v/ho 
attempts to bypass the problem as follows:
’The events
which correspond to the 'same' form are phonetically significantly 
alike, for by ’significant’ we indicate the correlation of an 
utterance to a social situation. The phonetic events ’Light the 
lamp’ as produced by two different individuals are objectively 
very different; in so far as these events evoke similar responses 
in similar social situations, the two events are phonetically 
significantly alike.' (Twaddell 1933 p* ^1). But taken literally 
this position allows for indefinitely many degrees of phonemic 
distinctness, since different events, different social Situations 
and different responses will always be similar up to a point, 
but up to a different point in different cases. To say that the 
phonologist recognizes formal identity 'in so far as' events have 
certain similarities dispenses from the obligation to specify 
the semantic conditions further; but 'in so far as' wins this 
dispensation at the cost of opening a Pandora's box full of 
disparate similarities.
2. It is undoubtedly this, in part at least, which has led Chomsky 
and others to view semantically based phonology with scepticism. 
One cannot take seriously a claim to the effect that phonemes 
distinguish meanings, when it rests merely upon a procedural 
assumption which no-one ever justifies.
79
There is, however, a third possibility, which allows the inter­
dependent attainment of both objectives. The account which follows 
(2.^2 - 2.^ -3) argues that this third possibility is theoretically and 
practically viable, and that a set of procedures is available which begs 
none of those questions which are indeed begged if we suppose that the 
phonologist has available some separately acquired fund of semantic 
information. This argument, if successful, affords the semantically 
based phonologist a stance which is not vulnerable to the objections 
previously discussed. It will also be argued that one can arrive in this 
way at a criterion of synonymity which is adequate in the context of 
phonological analysis but v/hich is not derived from a prior theory of 
the meanings of linguistic expressions.
2.^2 Let the phonologist begin by establishing that there is a non-
1phonorelative difference of usage between a phonetic type a and some 
grossly dissimilar phonetic type b. This difference of usage is estab-
1. A difference of usage is established by finding correlations of 
the following kind which hold for all the data under observation.
Let ap be the proposition that for all the a-tokens, an a-token 
occurs if and only if p, and pa the proposition that if p then 
no a-token occurs. Similarly for b and p the propositions bp 
and pb. For a, b, p and p together, we have eight such prop­
ositions: ap, pa, ap»pa, bp, pb, bp and pb. Then a difference of
usage between the phonetic types a and b is defined as any 
difference which can be stated in a conjunction of the following 
form: ap. bp. pa. pb. Since the satisfaction of such a conjunction
depends simply on establishing the truth values for the component 
propositions, we in no way prejudge the question whether items for 
which a difference of usage is established are realizations of 
expressions having the same meaning or different meanings. A 
difference of usage is phonorelative if p or p include reference 
to phonic features of a or b, or of the contexts in which they 
occur.
8o
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lished without prejudice to the question whether it will ultimately be 
accounted for in terms of a difference in meaning. For example, if the 
phonologist1s informants are willing to apply a-tokens to members of a 
certain class of objects ©( but reject their application to members of a 
disjoint class of objects but, conversely, apply b-tokens to objects 
of class j|, while rejecting their application to members of class o<, 
such tests could reasonably be taken as establishing a difference of usage 
between a and b. The phonologist may then bring forward a phonetic type 
b 1 having some minor point of phonetic difference with b, in order to 
determine whether or not b and b* are phonologically distinct. The tests 
with 2<-objects and 0-objects may be repeated, substituting b' for b. If
2
exactly the same results ensue , the phonologist may then formulate a 
provisional hypothesis (H) as follows:
H 'Either (i) b and b' do not contrast phonologically,
or (ii) b and b ' are realizations of synonymous expressions.1 
He must then test H by attempting to discover values of p and p for 
which the conjunction bp. b fq. pb. pb1 issatisfied. On failure to 
discover appropriate values for p and p, H may be considered established,
2.^3 The next step is to determine which of the alternatives H (i) or 
H (ii) is preferable. This may be done as follows. Let the phonetic 
difference between b and b f be called D. Further pairs of items 
(k-k1, 1-1'...), each pair differing solely by D, must be examined •
2. i.e. if ap.bq.qa.pb.b1q.pb1 with values of p and p held constant, 
allowing for the substitution of bf for b.
1. The problem of defining D is for present purposes irrelevant: i.e.
whichever value(s) of D the phonologist decides to investigate, 
the procedures here described are valid.
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Each pair will be tested against other phonetic types (r, s • ..) when 
a difference of usage can be demonstrated between such a type and either 
member of the pair, These tests will show whether or not the hypothesis 
H can be established for k-k' (i.e. that k and k' either (i) do not 
contrast phonologically, or (ii) realize synonymous expressions). By 
testing k-k*, 1-1* the phonologist can establish a matrix of the values 
of D for a number of phonetic pairs. This matrix will show the regul­
arity with which D is associated with differences of usage for various 
phonetic types in the language. Such a matrix must be interpreted by 
the phonologist in the light of the following two methodological 
principles:
1. Any assignment of phonological status which has the 
effect of proliferating synonyms in the lexicon is 
suspect.
2. Any such assignment which creates a substantial class of 
synonym pairs in the lexicon which may be subsumed under 
a general rule of form F, where F is 'For every lexical 
entry having the phonological characteristic(s) M 
there is a synonymous entry having the phonological 
characteristic(s) N'must be rejected .
2. Two explanatory comments on Principle 2 may be offered at this 
point. First,.the provision 'a substantial class of synonym 
pairs' takes care of the kind of objection raised by Ebeling 
to the employment of semantic criteria to determine phonological 
differences:
... cont'd.
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‘Usually linguists refer 
in this connection to meaning. But this cannot be done 
consistently. An example may illustrate this: the Russian
words skaf and skap are usually regarded as synonyms. If we base, 
however, our criterion for the distinction between relevant and 
nonrelevant differences of sound upon meaning, we must admit that 
in Russian immediately after ska- the opposition stop versus 
continuant is neutralized in contact with labiality and orality. 
Nevertheless, nobody seems to accept this formulation. To every 
Russian [skaf J and [skap] are no doubt two different forms.
This criterion should prevail everywhere as it does in this case.
•I take an English example from Hockett: root may be
pronounced [ruwt] or [rut] • In such cases the environment,
§ka- or r-t, is usually considered too complicated or too 
specific for the assumption of a neutralizing influence, but 
this can only mean that probably a native speaker will not be 
inclined to interpret the forms as the same: we can in no way
dispense with an appeal to his interpretation1. (Ebeling i960
p. 38).
Evidently, the exact numher which counts as a 'substantial 
class' is open to argument; but it is nonetheless a different 
way of deciding the issue from appealing to the native 
speaker's Sprachgefuhl. To reject gkaf and §kap as an example 
of neutralization because it would be a unique example is 
in no sense equivalent to admitting skaf and gkap as synonyms 
because that is how Russian speakers feel about the matter.
.Second, there will doubtless be cases in which the admission 
of two sounds as belonging to different phonemes creates a 
substantial class of synonym pairs, even though that solution 
is imposed by other examples in which a difference of usage 
can be shown to depend solely on the distinction between 
the sounds in question. (Such cases may even be common in 
a language where the phonological system is undergoing a change at 
certain points). It will be the duty of the phonologist to draw 
attention to such 'inconsistencies' in the way the 
language utilizes sound differences; but the validity of the 
principle invoked above is in no way called in question by 
these cases.
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In short, the phonological status of D will be decided in such a way 
as to comply with the rejection of H (ii) wherever possible.
The justification for the two methodological principles mentioned 
above is obvious, for the principles themselves are essentially no 
different from those implicit in the application of such phonological 
concepts as 'free variation' and 'neutralization1. There is in seman­
tically based phonology a close connexion between these concepts and that 
of 'synonymy.' 'Free variation' and 'neutralization' may both, from a 
certain viewpoint, be seen as safeguards against the proliferation of 
synonyms. For example, if a linguist investigates the hypothesis that 
a language has the phonemic oppositions /p/ vs. /b/, /t/ vs. /d/ and /k/ 
vs. /g/, and finds that as regards the /p/ vs. /b/ opposition (but not 
the other two) all pairs of items differentiated solely by that oppo­
sition show no difference of usage, this will be a reason in favour of 
modifying the hypothesis by treating [p] and [b] as free variants\
By this revision the provisional phoneme inventory is reduced by one, 
and the provisional lexicon is consequently alleviated by the removal of 
a set of potential synonym pairs involving simply the /p/ vs. /b/ dis­
tinction, each such pair being now replaceable by a single entry. 
Similarly, in such a language as Spanish we have the choice between 
accepting a great proliferation of synonym pairs of the type /ganar/
'to gain': /ganar/ 'to gain', and saying that the opposition /r/ vs.
1. Assuming there are no features of the distribution of [p] and [b] 
which argue against their treatment as free variants.
A /  is neutralized in final position. The reason why it is preferable 
to accept the latter alternative is twofold. First, back door admissions 
make nonsense of front door refusals* By adhering rigorously to the 
principle 'one a phoneme always a phoneme' we would simply be achieving 
a certain 'front door* uniformity of phonological description at the 
expense of a very great 'back door' multiplication of lexical entries for 
Spanish. Second, the principle itself is brought in disrepute if the class 
of candidates admitted at the back door contains all and only those 
refused at the front. The possibility in this hypothetically expanded 
Spanish lexicon of subsuming the relevant synonym pairs under a general 
rule of form F (i.e. 'for every lexical entry ending in /-r/ there is a 
corresponding synonym ending in /-£/') shows that we are dealing with 
a fact which should properly be accounted for at the level of phonology.
In short, a semantically based phonology may be said to operate under 
the standing prohibition: synonyma non multiplicanda praeter necessitatam.
2.^5 On this view, the 'sameness of meaning' which the phonologist 
postulates reduces solely and simply to failure to meet certain criteria 
of difference of usage as evidenced by test procedures employed. It 
remains to stipulate two general conditions concerning non-phonorelative 
differences of usage in phonology.
The first condition is that the differences of usage which the 
phonologist establishes in investigating the phonological status of a 
given phonetic difference or set of differences must show 'typological 
similarity'. This condition is simpHy a safeguard against conflating in 
one and the same analysis facts which properly belong to separate analyses.
0
85
The condition would be infringed, for example, if the phonologist admitted 
simultaneously as evidence bearing on the phonological status of one dis­
tinction both (i) a difference in usage between a and b which consisted 
in their use by speakers of different regional provenance and (ii) a 
difference in usage between c and d which consisted in their application 
by speakers of whatever regional provenance to different objects. Two 
such differences show too great a typological dissimilarity to be reliably 
included in the same analysis'*'*
The second condition is that the differences of usage must be 
'informational1: i.e. we assume that no conventional correlation
between phonetically differing items and different usages is the concern 
of the linguist unless there is evidence to show that speakers are 
aware of the correlation. This condition, in appearance trivial, is in 
fact not so, since it can be shown that some accounts of linguistic 
analysis, e.g. Bloomfield's, fail to satisfy it. It would, for example, 
be sufficient in principle for a Bloomfieldian linguist to establish
1. It is easy to ex&mplify relatively gross infringements of the 
condition; but no detailed typological theory of usage seems to 
have been worked out by linguists. Conceivably, there might be 
relevant phonological differences within the 'representative* 
function of speech which Trubetzkoy correlates with the province
of phonology: e.g. there might be, to adopt Malinowski's distinc­
tions, a phonology of pragmatic utterances, a phonology of narrative, 
and.a phonology of phatic communion - at least for certain languages. 
Similarly, there might be some point in distinguishing a phonology 
of statements, a phonology of questions, a phonology of exclamations, 
and so on. Such matters have not been at all fully explored.
2. i.e. non-natural. Phonology has no concern with phonic differences 
attributable to natural causes (e.g. age, sex, physiognomy).
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any consistent correlation between two phonetically different items and 
two different situational features in order to conclude that the expressions 
in question differed in meaning (2.37)* The difference in usage need 
not, in Bloomfield's formulation, be informational. But if speakers 
are unaware of the situational difference in question, no information 
about such a difference is conveyed by any linguistic forms they use.
The reason for saying this is simply the commonsense reason that if we 
are prevented by ignorance from drawing even a hazardous inference from 
£ to £, or the probability of £, then £ can in no sense inform us that 
£. For example, for a strictly monogamous community unaware of the 
connexion between sexual intercourse and childbirth, it would be nonsense 
to identify the informational difference between their use of the word 
for a woman's offspring and the wordibr a woman's male consort after 
the birth of an offspring with that between English father and child.
The condition of 'informationality1 stipulates that it would be irre­
levant for the linguist to establish that the one word applied only to 
fathers and the other only to their children; since the community 
ex hypothesi lacks the relevant concepts, whatever informational diff­
erence there might be uses of the two words, it could not be, either 
in whole or in part, that difference. Likewise, if in a given language 
there is only one mid back vowel, and in the north it is realized as
[o] , whereas in the south it is realized as [o'] the correlation is 
'informational* only if there is recognition of foj as a 'northern' 
pronunciation and [o} as a 'southern' pronunciation. For without such 
recognition, the difference in pronunciation between e.g. [pot] and
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[pot] cannot in the relevant sense give information about the speakers,
1.e. information about their provenance: it thus fails to qualify as 
a conventional phonic difference relevant to the analysis of the 
expressive function of speech in that community.
The condition of 1informationality1, it should be noted, is not 
based upon any specific view of the proper way to define the 'meaning1 
of an expression, but simply upon the point that a language is an 
instrument of communication and the epistemological principle that what 
is not known cannot be communicated.
2.^6 Subject to these two conditions, the phonologist's criterion of 
synonymity may be formulated as follows:
'Two phonetic types are realizations of synonymous expressions 
if they show no difference of usage and the phonetic difference 
between them is also that between other pairs of phonetic types 
which do show a difference of usage.'
This criterion goes no further than giving a sufficient condition for 
synonymous expressions, and this is adequate for purposes of phonological 
analysis, since the aim of the phonologist is here limited to dis­
covering the phonological distinctions of L. To draw up a complete 
inventory of synonymous pairs for L lies outside his province qua 
phonologist. He is interested merely in such syhonymous pairs as have 
phonetic realizations sufficiently alike to raise the question of whether 
or not he is dealing with phonologically identical items. These are 
the cases in which it may be in doubt whether it is correct to account 
for the facts of communication by setting up one expression, or two 
expressions differing in form but not in meaning.
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2.k? Thus the essential feature of synonymity statements here is 
their role as providers of an alternative explanation of the fact that 
two phonetic types may have no discoverable difference of usage*
The role is a vital one because without this alternative the 
phonological analysis breaks down* If synonymity statements are 
eliminated, the case of phonetic types not differing in usage can be 
dealt with in only one of two ways; either (i) by assigning the same 
phonological form to both members of the pair, irrespective of other 
pairs showing the same phonetic difference, or (ii) by treating the 
pair in question as realizations of expressions differing in both form 
and meaning. But (i) will lead to inconsistency in the phonological 
classification of the phonetic difference should there be other pairs 
where the same difference proves to be correlatable with a difference 
in usage, while accepting (ii) introduces the paradox of two expressions 
allegedly differing in both form and meaning but not differing in usage. 
To admit either possibility would be tantamount to admitting the 
inadequacy of the analytic procedures employed*
Synonymy and grammatical analysis
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3*0 At the level of grammatical analysis, there are intimate 
connexions between the concept of synonymy and those of morpheme 
variant (or allomorph), grammatical ambiguity, and optional trans­
formation.
3*1 The question of morpheme variants raises a prior general issue:
to what extent is lameness of meaning' relevant at all to morphological
analysis? As in the case of phonological analysis, two views stand in
conflict. On the one side it is maintained that morphological analysis
requires semantic information about the data under analysis, and that
semantic considerations enter into the definition of morphological
units. Hence such definitions of the morpheme as fa linguistic form
which bears no partial phonetic-semantic resemblance to any other form1'*’,
2or 'any form... which cannot be divided into smaller meaningful parts1 , 
or, 'the smallest individually meaningful elements in the utterances
3
of a language* . On the other side, it is maintained that criteria of 
form and distribution alone are adequate for morphological analysis, and 
so morphological units may be defined without reference to semantic 
considerations. Hence such assertions as 'distribution suffices to
4
determine phonemes and morphemes and to state a grammar in terms of them' , 
or 'it would certainly not be impossible to determine roughly the 
morphemes of long enough printed texts without taking meaning into
5
consideration' .
1. Bloomfield 1933 p. l6l.
2. Bloch Sc Trager 1942 §4.2.
3. Hockett 1958 514.1.
4. Harris 1954 § 3*
5* Bazell 1954.
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Two questions concerning synonymy therefore arise: (i) is it
possible to make good the claim, inherent in the procedures of non- 
semantically based morphology, that morphological analysis does not 
require a concept of synonymy? (ii) supposing this claim to be false 
or irrelevant, what then is the function of a concept of synonymy 
in relation to morphological analysis?
3*11 The answer to the first of these questions depends on how the 
scope of morphological analysis is envisaged* To avoid involvement 
with the varying interpretations of the terms Morpheme1, 1 morph1, 
^llomorph1, etc*, we may call the units with which morphology deals 
,M-unitsf, and distinguish between various views of the scope of morph­
ological analysis by reference to different concepts of such a unit*
If it is observed that in a language there are certain restrictions 
on the occurrence of phonemes or sequences of phonemes which cannot be 
brought within the scope of plausible phonological rules, and if it is 
desired to account for these restrictions in terras of units of a 
different order from the phoneme, such units (M-units) may be set up
'I
without appeal to meanings* This assertion commits us to no assumption 
about the structure of the language in question, nor about the structure 
of language in general (apart from propositions to the effect that languages
1* No need arises to offer an argument in support of this proposition. 
Since the sequences governed by the restrictions are given as 
sequences of non-meaningful units (phonemes), the problem is no 
different from that of stating macro-unit combinatorial rules for 
any set of non-linguistic micro-unit sequences (e.g. the marks of a 
wallpaper pattern). Argument, on the other hand, would be required
In ©upport of the opposite view, namely the assumption that semantic 
information is necessary in order to do this*
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manifest, or may manifest, nonphonological distributional constraints).
Quite a different matter is whether the M-units set up to account for
nonphonological patterns of distribution have determinate meanings,
2and an answer, whether affirmative or negative, to this question would
commit us to a proposition about linguistic structure. A different
question again would be whether, supposing the answer to the latter
question to be 'yes', M-units are better determined by means of semantic
or non-semantic criteria. A view about this has no implications
concerning linguistic structure, however, for the question belongs to
the empirical methodology of morphological analysis.
3.111 Clearly, the decision to set up M-units in a particular case
will depend on the usefulness of so doing in order to account for
certain facts of (non-phonologically determined) distribution. But
these include facts of varying generality and different kinds of
importance. It is therefore slightly beside the point to cite, as does 
1Zellig Harris , cases such as English persist and person, in an attempt 
to show the superiority of non-semantically based morphology. Harris 
argues that 'if the morphemic composition of a word is not easily 
determined, we cannot decide the matter by seeing what are the component 
meanings of the word and assigning one morpheme to each. Do persist, 
person contain one morpheme each or two? In terms of meaning, it 
would be difficult to decide, and the decision would not necessarily fit
2. .Strictly speaking, there are at least two questions here: (i)
whether M-units have meanings, (ii) whether M-units as such 
have meanings.
1. Harris 195^ 5 A.
93
into any resulting structure. In terms of distribution we have 
consist, resist, pertain, contain, retain, and the like (related in 
phonemic composition and in sentence environment), but no such set 
for person; hence we take persist as two morphemes, person as one'•
But all this example shows is that there is a non-semantic 
criterion available which gives a certain solution. There is also, 
however, a semantic criterion available which gives a different 
solution (i.e. persist and person as single M-units on the ground 
that no cut yields independently meaningful segments). What needed 
demonstration to prove Harris's point was not the availability of some 
non-semantic (distributional) criterion, but either (a) the existence 
of a 'correct* answer to which the distributional criterion leads 
directly, but the semantic criterion dubiously, if at all, or (b) that 
the solution given by the distributional criterion is useful, whereas 
that given by the semantic criterion is not, or less so. But, as 
regards (a) it would clearly be question-begging to assume that the 
analysis per-sist is correct and per-son incorrect in order to show the 
improbability of producing a correct analysis by semantic criteria.
As regards (b), no attempt at all is made to assess the utility of the 
preferred analysis, which in fact turns out to be of a somewhat low 
order. We can thereby, it is true, subsume certain morphological facts 
about English verbs under a general rule (e.g. 'English verbs admit the 
structure AB but not BA where A = 'per-, re-, con-....' and B =
'-sist, -tain....'); but the same facts can be stated hardly less 
economically on the supposition that the forms are monomorphemic
9 k
(’The class of English verbs includes persist, resist, consist, pertain,
retain, contain •.•• but excludes *sistper, *sistre, *sistcon,
2*tainper, *tainre, *taincon ....') .
Moreover, the facts in question are relatively unimportant in 
the sense that an infringement of the rule merely produces a non-English 
lexical item in an otherwise grammatical English arrangement (e.g. *The 
defenders did not sistre for The defenders did not resist), which is 
tantamount to saying that no basic grammatical distinction of English 
would be obliterated if the language admitted both the permitted and 
the excluded sequences. Admission of the excluded sequence would merely 
require that the lexicon of English be expanded to accommodate such
~z
synonym pairs as resist/sistre, contain/taincon, etc*
2. There is no comparison here with the situation which would arise
if a criterion gave he eats, they eat etc. as monomorphemic, and a 
rule consequently had to exclude specifically by listing *he eat,
*they eats etc*
3* Furthermore, the apparent determinacy of the non-semantic solution 
in Harris’s example is to some extent illusory. It is doubtless 
easy to find analogies which will support splitting persist into 
per-sist* Nonetheless, some can be found, if one looks hard enough, 
to support splitting person into per-son (e.g. parson, mason, pervert, 
Persian). What remains unanswered, if one relies on non-semantic 
criteria, is the question how many supporting analogies have to be 
found, and how closely they have to conform to the distribution of 
the form under analysis. Any investigation of such questions is 
likely to reveal a continuous scale of ’phonetic-distributional 
likeness’, which leaves the investigator - not the criterion - 
to decide when there is a 'sufficient likeness* to support one 
analysis rather than another.
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3*112 On the other hand, if morphology is envisaged as extending to 
include what may be called 'M-relations' (e.g. 'plural of, 'past tense of1), 
then it becomes questionable whether non-semantic criteria can produce an 
adequate analysis* It would seem that the most powerful theory of M- 
relations achievable on the basis of non-semantic criteria is one which 
would be incapable of explaining e.g. what is meant by describing went as 
the past tense of go.
The units between which M-relations hold are items which traditional 
grammar normally treats as different morphological forms of the same 
'word', e.g. look and looked, bonus and bonum, and moi, and it is 
relevant to observe that the metalanguage of traditional grammar acknowledges 
the distinction between M-relations and mere grammatical classification: 
e.g. one says that looked is the past tense of look, or that bonum is the 
neuter of bonus, or that moi is the strong form (disjunctive form) of je, 
whereas of looked and see, or of bonum and clarus, or of moi and il, one 
does not say that one is any kind of form of the other - instead, the 
similarities or differences in their grammatical behaviour are described 
by simple classification (e.g. by categorizing them as 'verb', 'past', 
'adjective1, 'neuter' etc.)’*'.
1. The term 'grammatical synonym' has been proposed by Winter for sets 
like English walked, went and came, and 'may be applied equally well 
to entire constructions and to fractions of constructions, whenever 
these can be isolated by strictly formal procedures' (Winter 196^ pp* 
14-15)• By this is meant that the forms 'are synonymous in respects 
other than lexical meaning'. This proposal, however, stands in need 
of considerable clarification, since according to Winter 'the basic 
characteristics of a set of synonyms are that they have a comparable 
range of distribution (or meaning) - they are synonymous only to 
the extent that they do just that It is not clear exactly how to
take the 'or' here in 'distribution (or meaning)', and this is one 
reason why it is not clear whether e.g. pairs like boy and girl would
cont1d.
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But it is a non-trivial fact about natural languages that M-relations 
may obtain between items not identifiable by criteria of formal resemblance, 
and this fact precludes one possible basis for an account of M-relations 
which would exclude semantic considerations. This is perhaps best 
illustrated by means of a hypothetical example.
Suppose that ziff is an English verb occurring in such sentences 
as I usually prefer to ziff it, They turn out better if you ziff them, etc., 
and the question arises how we may determine whether or not ziffed is the 
past tense of ziff. The claim that we may resolve this question by 
using exclusively non-semantic criteria implies of course that we do 
not need to take into consideration the distribution of these items in 
semantically 'acceptable contexts, but simply their distribution in the 
grammatical sentences of English. Now if ziffed is in fact the past tense 
of ziff, ziffed will occur in a set of environments in which it is 
substitutable salva grammaticalitate for such forms as spliced, crossed, 
missed etc., which are not presumably correctly describable as 'past 
tense forms of ziff.' That is to say, granted distributional definitions 
of the notions 'past tense form' and 'present tense form' such that ziff, 
splice etc. count as presents and ziffed, spliced etc. as pasts, we are 
still left without a criterion to effect unique M-relation pairings 
between members of the two classes. Therefore, to be the past tense 
of ziff cannot be simply to be a member of a certain class of forms
count as 'grammatical synonyms'. Another reason is that unless 
some criterion is proposed for determining exactly what is included 
in 'lexical meaning', it is difficult to decide whether forms 
'are synonymous in respects other than lexical meaning'.
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interchangeable salva grammaticalitate. But all that apparently remains 
to distinguish (non-semantically) ziffed from spliced, crossed, missed, 
etc. in a way that clearly links ziff with ziffed and excludes the 
pairings ziff - spliced etc* is the formal (i.e. phonological) 
constitution of ziffed* If, however, this is the sole differentia which 
singles out ziffed as that member of the class of past tense forms which 
is the past tense of ziff, it becomes apparent that the notion 'past 
tense o f  reduces to the conjunction of a distributional classification 
(i.e. 'past tense form') and a phonological classification (i.e.
'/zif/+*..')*
The example may be taken as illustrating a general strategy for 
reducing any M-relation to concepts which remain within the limits of 
non-semantically based morphology. But against anyone who is tempted 
to defend this reduction by maintaining that an M-relation is just the 
conjunction of a distributional and a phonological classification, two 
points must be made. First, that if so, then there are indefinitely 
many M-relations, most of which no-one would dream of calling a grammatical 
relation at all (e.g. that between an English noun and English adjective 
with a phonologically common segment: dent, dental; gent, gentle; roof,
rueful; etc.) Second, that in cases of the relationship between forms
2. If it is counterargued that reducing M-relations to distributional- 
cum-phonological classifications does not commit us to the view that 
all such classifications define M-relations, the question then arises 
how we know which classifications do and which do not, and to this 
there seems to be no answer which can be arrived at by invoking 
solely non-semantic criteria. The reductionist cannot both have 
his bun and eat (part of) it.
where the phonological resemblance involved is nil (as e.g. in saying 
that went is the past tense of go) there is no basis for identifying 
the invariant which is implied in the concept of an M-relation. For any 
useful concept of an M-relation must be essentially that of a two-place 
predicate M such that to assert M(ab) implies the existence of some 
linguistic entity realized in common by a and by b. Pursuing the analysis 
further, it is evident that statements to the effect that b is the past 
tense of a have the underlying logical form:
3x (M^ (ax).M^(bx))
- that is to say, we assert that there is an entity x (in this case a 
verb) such that a is its infinitive form and b its past tense form. But 
if there were to be cases where phonological resemblance or lack of it 
between a and b just did not count, then the M-relation would amount 
simply (by the reductionist thesis) to a distributional classification.
This means that the past tense of a in such a case must be reckoned to be 
any item which falls into the distributional class 'past tense form*, 
and this consequence is clearly intolerable. E.g. if we suppose that ziff 
may have a past tense form phonologically unrelated to ziff, we are left 
with no plausible method of identifying the form in question among the 
members of the class of English past tense forms, whether or not that class 
includes ziffed.
Nor can this reductionist dilemma be avoided by treating such 
instances as deviations from a standard case in which both phonological 
and distributional criteria are involved, as e.g. to say that went is to go
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3as looked is to look 9 except that the phonological resemblance in the 
former case is nil* For if appeal to meanings is dispensed with, then 
went can no more be established as the past tense of ,go than as the past 
tense of any other verb lacking a phonologically 'regular' past tense 
form* (If there happens to be only one 'irregular' pair in the system, 
a simple process of elimination will ensure the correct pairing; but 
good luck should not be confused with adequacy of the criterion employed). 
We cannot in any sense 'suspend' the requirement of phonological resem­
blance in order to link went with go, as we might e.g. suspend a colour- 
bar rule in order to let black Mrs. Smith accompany her white husband* 
Waiving a general rule in favour of a particular relationship assumes 
that the relationship is established - or in principle establishable - 
in advance of the rule* But this will not do where the purpose of the 
rule is precisely to establish such relationships*
Parallel arguments can be adduced for any M-relation. It must be 
concluded that a theory of M-relations which explicates them solely in 
terms of phonological-cum-distributional classification is ill suited to 
the purposes of linguistic analysis, since it embi*aces on the one hand 
relations of no conceivable linguistic interest, while sometimes 
excluding on the other hand relations between items having functions 
exactly analogous to those between which M-relations hold. There is simply
3. The proportion is inexact in that went does not function as a past 
participle, as does looked; but this may be ignored for purposes 
of the example.
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no point in having such a theory of M-relations to account for how 
natural languages work. For all it can do in the way of accouhting for 
non-phonologically conditioned distribution patterns can already be
kdone without reference to M-relations at all * Whereas if we seek to 
account for the morphological phenomena of 'variable words' in general,
we shall need a more powerful theory which covers both cases where there
is and cases where there is not a parallelism between form and function. 
3.113 A more radical reductionist thesis, avoiding appeal to phono­
logical resemblance altogether, is embodied in the proposal that the 
morpheme, as distinct from the morph, be regarded as a factor of dis­
tributional proportion. Lyons argues in favour of this proposal as 
follows:
"To say that worse is composed of two morphemes, one of which 
it shares with bad (and worst) and the other of which it shares 
with taller, bigger, nicer, etc., is equivalent to saying that 
worse differs from taller, bigger, nicer, etc* in grammatical 
function (that is, in its distribution throughout the sentences of 
English) in the way that bad differs from tall, big, nice, etc*
(and worst from tallest, etc.). This is commonly expressed as a
4. E.g. by recognizing as M-units such forms as he, she, they, and also 
eat, eats, find, finds, and formulating a selectional rule which 
forbids the combinations *he eat, *they eats, etc*, we can account 
for restrictions of great generality in English. But in order to do 
this we do not need to say e.g. that they is the plural of he, she, 
or that eats is the third person singular of eat; introducing 
M-relations adds nothing to the precision or generality of the 
selectional rule*
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proportion of grammatical, or distributional, equivalence...
bad : worse : worst = tall : taller : tallest 
This proportion expresses the fact that, for example, worse, 
and taller (as well as bigger, nicer, etc.) are grammatically 
alike in that they are the comparative forms of the adjective - 
they can occur in such sentences as John is worse (taller, etc.) 
than Michael, It is getting worse (taller, etc.) all the time*
Worse and taller (as well as bigger, nicer, etc.) differ from 
one another, however, in that they cannot occur in exactly the 
same set of sentences - for instance, as traditional grammarians 
would say, they cannot ’qualify' exactly the same set of nouns.
In so far as the class of nouns which can be qualified by a particular 
adjective is grammatically determined ... this feature of their 
distribution is accounted for by postulating a particular morpheme 
as a component of one adjective and another morpheme as a component 
of another adjective which 'qualifies' a different class of nouns'^. 
Interpreted as a theory of M-relations, this means that a statement
to the effect that the comparative of bad is worse (or 'bad + -er —>
worse') reduces to a distributional proportion bad : worse - tall :
2taller etc.
1. Lyons 1968
2* i*e. the invariant implied in saying that a is the comparative of b 
is identified by means of a distributional factor common to a and b: 
the x of which a and b are both forms is assumed to be characterized 
by this distributional property.
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The first point which calls for comment about this proposal is that, 
conspicuously, one of the environments in which tall occurs is the 
environment 1...-er1, and it is just the fact that bad does not occur in 
this environment which gives rise to the need for factorization. Thus 
it would seem that the proportion bad : worse =: tall: taller cannot be 
an identical proportion (in spite of the sign for it is possible
to cite a respect in which the distribution of bad is not to that of worse 
as the distribution of tall is to that of taller, namely in the respect 
that in the one case there is and in the other case there is not an 
environment which, by insertion of the first form, yields the second 
form (which is a distributional feature of very many English positive- 
comparative pairs).
This observation prompts the further question: what, then, exactly
is the statement of proportion intended to assert? Is the exception 
cited above the sole exception to an otherwise identical proportion?
If we exclude by stipulation from the distribution that counts just any 
contexts which occur as morphs in the proportion, we.presumably arrive at 
a statement of the following kind: 'Excluding the environment '...-er',
the distribution of bad is to that of worse as that of tall is to that 
of taller, etc.' This is a statement which appears to make an empirical 
claim of a quite specific kind, yet when we come to consider ;how, we might 
test it, it emerges that it is by no means clear precisely what the "claim 
is.
According to (part of) Lyons's explanation, worse is alleged to 
differ distributionally from taller in the same way as bad differs from
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tall. But what, in turn, does that mean? Is to say that A differs
distributionally from B in the same way as does C from D to say that any
environment in which A occurs but not B is also an environment in which 
C occurs but not D? Or is it to say that those environments in which A 
occurs but not B are all and only the environments in which C occurs but
not D? Or is it to say merely that a common feature can be found which
characterises those environments in which A occurs but not B and also 
those in which G occurs but not D? Or is to to say, even more merely, 
that a condition ^  can be established such that if cj. then either A but 
not B or C but not D? Lyons introduces the notion of 'similarity of 
distributional differences' by way of explanation: but until this notion
itself is given some substantive content we cannot tell what it is that 
statements of distributional proportion assert.
However, it is not necessary to wait upon this enlightenment in 
order to see that, as a theory of M-relations, any attempted reduction 
to distributional factors has a fundamental flaw. In a proportion of the 
form 'A : x = G : 1)' where, for the sake of argument, the distributional 
relation of C to D is that of distributional identity, any candidate 
for x must be distributionally identical with A. If there is no form in 
the language with such a distribution, no x will be forthcoming. But if 
there is more than one such form, more than one x will be forthcoming.
The same holds, mutatis mutandis, for cases of inclusive distribution, 
overlapping distribution and complementary distribution - in short, for 
whatever condition is imposed by the distributional proportion. It 
follows that the equation of M-relations with distributional relations
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yields absurd consequences, e.g. that any English form which happens to 
have a distribution identical with that of bad must (irrespective of form 
and meaning) have worse as its comparative. That there may be no such 
form in English does not affect the argument. The existence or non­
existence of a form distributionally identical with bad is an empirical 
fact, and the theory provides no guarantee against contradiction by such 
facts. There is an assumption, in other words, that it is a property 
of natural languages that any two forms a and b uniquely paired by an 
M-relation are terms of a distributional relation which obtains for at 
least one other pair of forms, and that either a or b is distributionally 
unique. But this does not follow from any postulate of linguistic 
analysis; nor is any general reason apparent why it should be held to be 
true - except, circularly, to validate the theory of M-relations under 
discussion.
3.11^ It might perhaps be urged that at least a semantically based 
theory of M-relations is no better off, since it leads to the parallel 
conclusion that any English form which happens to be synonymous with bad 
must have worse as its comparative. But no-one is obliged to argue that 
M-relations are determinable by semantic criteria alone: the point at
issue is whether semantic criteria can be excluded. If anyone did 
maintain that an English adjective synonymous with bad must ipso facto 
have worse as its comparative, this would not be totally absurd, and 
well known facts of historical linguistics might be adduced to support 
it. A word a may 'take over' or 'assimilate' formally disparate elements 
from another word b if the semantic contrast between a and b lapses:
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e.g. the Spanish verb ir ’to go’ (from Latin ire) has acquired present 
tense forms which originally belonged to Latin vadere (Sp. voy, vas, etc.), 
and this replacement presupposes a transitional state in which eo and 
vado were both 'first person present indicative1 of ire.
3*12 Reverting now to the question of M-units, it is clear that if 
M-units may be set up to account for non-phonologically conditioned 
distributional patterns without recourse to meanings, then since such an 
enterprise needs no analysis of meanings, a fortiori it requires no concept 
of synonymy. This, however, leaves open the question of whether the 
enterprise could be carried out with M-units established on a semantic 
basis. It is not difficult to imagine a language structured in such a 
way that it would be quite impractical to attempt to state all or even 
most of the non-phonological sequence restrictions in terms of seman­
tically determined units. (Such a language would have a ’third 
articulation', two of its three articulations being non-meaningful).
A semantically based morphology (of which,the general feasibility is not 
denied by 'distributionalists1 ) is intimately related to the assumption 
of dual articulation as a universal property of natural languages. But 
it does not follow from this assumption, granted its correctness, that
X. Harris 1951 §12.^1 n.67: '..there is in general a close
correspondence between the morpheme division we might establish 
on a meaning basis and that which results from our distributional 
criteria. This is so because in general morphemes which differ 
in meaning will also differ in their environments, if we take 
sufficiently long environments and enough of them.’ But this is 
not in fact a reason unless the point is tacitly conceded that 
natural languages have no important classes of non-meaningful 
morphemes.
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units established on a semantic basis are readily available for stating 
every grammatical fact. In support of this, one need look no further than 
the frequent discrepancies between proposed semantic definitions in 
morphology and some of the items occurring in natural languages to 
which the proposer is prepared (or not prepared) to apply the term.
Such discrepancies usually arise from attempts either to ’stretch' the 
morpheme to cover units which it is morphologically useful to have 
included, but which happen not to be readily definable on a semantic
basis, or else to 'shrink' it, so as to exclude troublesome items which
appear, on semantic grounds, to have some claims to be included.
Examples of 'morpheme-stretching' and 'morpheme-shrinkage' can be found 
in the presentations of semantically based morphology by Bloomfield,
Bloch & Trager, and Hockett. Others could be cited, but the examples 
examined below are typical of the phenomenon. The relevant arguments 
clarify various points which have a bearing on questions of synonymy in 
relation to grammatical analysis.
3*121 The three definitions of the morpheme already cited in 3-1
(i) 'a linguistic form which bears no partial phonetic-semantic resem­
blance to any other form', (ii) 'any form... which cannot be divided into
smaller meaningful parts', and (iii) 'the smallest individually
meaningful elements in the utterances of a language' - are by no means 
equivalent, but share a common appeal to semantic considerations. 
Definitions (ii) and (iii) require us to be able to decide simply 
whether or not certain items are meaningful, whereas (i) imposes the 
further requirement of determining a likeness of meaning between items
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(assuming that to speak of a semantic resemblance is not merely to 
speak of a resemblance which consists simply in being meaningful).
However, the envisaged applications of (ii) and (iii) also involve this 
further requirement, as will become apparent below.
3*122 Definition (i) - Bloomfield's - assumes that we are dealing 
with meaningful expressions to which a determinate phonological form is 
assignable, and proposes a bipartition of this class of expressions into 
two disjoint classes (called 'simple' and 'complex'), using 'phonetic- 
semantic resemblance* as the criterion:
'... some linguistic forms bear 
partial phonetic-semantic resemblances to other forms; examples are,
John ran, John fell. Bill ran, Bill fell; Johnny, Billy; playing, 
dancing; blackberry, cranberry; strawberry, strawflower. A linguistic 
form which bears a partial phonetic-semantic resemblance to some other 
form is a complex form. The common part of any (two or more) complex 
forms is a linguistic form; it is a constituent (or component) of these 
complex forms'***.
The constituents in the examples quoted are said to be: John, ran,
Bill, fell, play, dance, black, berry, straw, flower, cran-, -y, and-ing.
The requirements of morphological analysis as envisaged in the fore­
going statement appear to be three. 1. The linguist must be able to 
determine with respect to any given linguistic form whether that form is 
simple or complex. 2. In order to satisfy himself that it is complex
1. Bloomfield 1933 p. l6l.
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he must he able, in the simplest type of case, to analyse it as a 
bipartite form ab, and to show that either a or b occurs elsewhere in the 
language as a linguistic form or part of a linguistic form. 3* In order
to satisfy himself that it is simple, he must be able to show that the
form does not yield to analysis in such a way that at least one part 
occurs elsewhere in the language as a linguistic form or part of a 
linguistic form.
An assumption underlying these requirements is that a linguistic 
form is determinate with respect to meaning, and that this meaning is 
ascertainably constant for all instances of the linguistic form.
3.123 A somewhat different assumption is made in Bloch and Trager's 
presentation of definition (ii):
'As we examine the
recorded utterances of an informant or a speech community, we note that
the same or similar forms recur again and again with the same or
similar meanings. Thus, the utterances of an English-speaking informant 
will contain many instances of such forms as yes, person, I think so, 
out of town, each time with about the same meanings, and also such 
different but phonemically related forms as play, plays, played, playing, 
or ride* rides, rode, ridden, riding, or man, manly, mannish, or 
conceive, perceive, coneeption, perception, perceptive, with different 
but related meanings.
On the basis of such recurrence, we analyze the utterances into 
fractions of various lengths, each with a more or less constant meaning. 
Any fraction that can be spoken alone with meaning in normal speech is a
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FREE FORM; a fraction that never appears by itself with meaning is 
a BOUND FORM. All the examples in the preceding paragraph are free 
forms; per-, con-, -ing, -ly, -ish, -ceive, -tion are bound forms' •
A feature of this account is its supposition that morphological 
analysis has a certain semantic discovery structure. Some semantic 
information (about sameness or similarity or relatedness of meanings of 
expressions) is assumed to be available to empirical observation, and on 
the basis of this information the linguist constructs hypotheses about 
meanings not 'observable', namely those of the constituents of the 
expressions whose meanings are already known. The morpheme is the unit 
reached when factorial analysis of known or hypothesized items with their 
meanings can proceed no further.
3.12*f A similar concept of the morpheme as the ultimate unit arrived 
at by a process of factorial analysis lies behind definition (iii) - 
Hockett's. The twin tests he suggests for the identification of any 
segment of a sentence as a morpheme are these: (I) that the segment
recur in other utterances 'with approximately the same meaning', and (II) 
that it should not be the case that the recurring segment can 'be broken 
into smaller pieces, each of which recurs with approximately the same 
meaning, in such a way that the meaning of the whole form is related to 
the meanings of the smaller pieces'**'* By these criteria, it is claimed, 
English older consists of two morphemes, one recurring in e.g. oldster, 
oldest and the other in e.g. younger, finer, while sister is monomorphemic, 
since neither sist-er nor any other division gives units which can
1. Bloch & Trager 19^2 §*f.2.
1. Hockett 1958 §0A.l.
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plausibly be identified as having 'reasonable similarity of meaning' 
with phonemically comparable units in other utterances*
3*125 Ihe definitions discussed above and their application to the 
morphological analysis of natural languages give rise to various important 
questions concerning identification of meanings* One which may profitably 
be discussed here concerns so-called 'unique' morphemes, since what is at 
issue in this case is the legitimacy of applying what purports to be a 
meaning-based definition of the morpheme in such a way as to yield 
criteria for identification of meanings, which will, in turn, enable 
certain otherwise excluded items to be classified as morphemes.
Unique morphemes make their appearance in morphological analysis 
as presented both by Bloomfield and by Hockett, and the justification 
given for their recognition is as follows.
1. (Bloomfield) *... having heard the form cranberry, we soon 
recognize the component berry in other forms, such as blackberry, and 
may even hear it spoken alone, but with the other component of cranberry
we shall have no such luck. Not only do we wait in vain to hear an
isolated *cran, but, listen as we may, we never hear this element outside 
the one combination cranberry, and we cannot elicit from the speakers 
any other form which will contain this element cran-. As a practical 
matter, observing languages in the field, we soon learn that it is 
unwise to try to elicit such forms: our questions confuse the speakers,
and they may get rid of us by some false admission, such as, "Oh, yes,
I guess cran means red." If we avoid this pitfall, we shall come to the 
conclusion that the element cran- occurs only in the combination cranberry.
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However, since it has a constant phonetic form, and since its meaning is
constant, in so far as a cranberry is a definite kind of berry,
different from all other kinds, we say that cran-", too, is a 
.1linguistic form1 •
2. (Hockett). Occasionally, after we have extracted all the morphemes
2
from some utterances by successive applications of Tests I and II , we 
seem to have something left over. Consider, for example,
2Please pass the Cranberries'1 ^
The last word of this sentence can obviously be broken into cranberry 
and a morpheme /z/ meaning "plural11 • Cranberry, in turn, seems clearly 
to contain an element /berij/ which recurs in strawberry, raspberry, 
gooseberry, blackberry, blueberry, and so on. But how about cran- ?
We look in vain for any recurrence of cran- with anything like the 
meaning it has in cranberry.
A strict adherence to Tests I and II would therefore force us to 
take cranberry as a single morpheme. Yet this is obviously undesirable.
In the first place, the identity of the second part of cranberry is 
hardly subject to doubt. In the second place, cran- clearly carries a 
meaning, even if the element occurs nowhere save in this one combination. 
Cranberries are different from strawberries, raspberries, gooseberries, 
and so on; the meaning of cran- is therefore whatever it is which 
differentiates cranberries from those other kinds of berries. It might be
1. Bloomfield 1935 P* 160.
2. Cf. 3.12*f.
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hard to describe this meaning, but it is easily demonstrated in a fruit 
market•
V/hat we do under such circumstances is to recognize the element 
in question as a morpheme of a rather special kind - a unique morpheme.
The recognition of such special morphemes does not require any modification 
of our definition, but only calls for a slight change in the way we 
apply Tests I and XI
The question of unique morphemes is of interest because it points 
up a conflict between the enterprise of giving a semantically based 
definition of the morpheme and the desideratum that morphological analysis 
should be an analysis without residue. For if it proves possible to 
analyse an expression into ab such that a clearly occurs elsewhere with 
the same meaning, but b does not appear to, then v/e have the choice
either of saying that there is a residue b whose status is unaccounted
for, or else of declaring b a morpheme. V/hat is dubious is whether we 
can opt for this latter alternative while maintaining unchanged or 
unsupplemented our original definition of the morpheme. It is the attempt 
to do this which leads Bloomfield and Hockett to deploy some very bad 
arguments.
Bloomfield contends that the meaning of cran- is constant 'in so 
far as a cranberry is a definite kind of berry1, thus committing the
double error of nonsense and non sequitur. V/hat makes sense (and is true)
is not that a cranberry is a kind of berry but that a cranberry is a kind
3. Hockett 1958 JlA.2.
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of berry. But it does not follow from that, nor from the fact that
cranberry and berry are words for cranberries and berries respectively,
that the meaning of cran- is constant. For it does not follow, quod
erat demonstrandum, that cran- has a meaning at all (unless we define
'having a meaning1 in such a way that being a unique element of the kind
described is a sufficient condition for having a meaning - which would
be clearly circular in the present instance).
Hockett, on the other hand, claims that since cranberries are
different from strawberries, raspberries, gooseberries, etc., the meaning
of cran- is therefore 'whatever it is which differentiates cranberries
from these other kinds of berries'. Here, Bloomfield's non sequitur is
compounded by a further non sequitur, namely the identification of the
meaning of cran- with the whole set of differentiae of cranberries as a
subclass of berries • For there is no reason, granted that cran- has
a meaning, why that meaning should be equated with all rather than any
of the differentiae of the subclass of cranberries, nor, further, why we
are obliged to equate it with a differentia of cranberries at all.
(Gran- might be, as Bloomfield's hypothetical informant suggested, an
otherwise unattested morpheme meaning e.g. 'red'.) The method of
assigning meanings by simple 'semantic subtraction' is open to the
5objection levelled by Bazell against Z.S. Harris's proposal that 'the
It is not entirely clear whether Hockett's thesis is that, or 
whether he holds the meaning of cran- to be whatever differentiates 
cranberries from other berries having names ending in -berry.
He seems at times to be advancing the former and at times the latter 
view, without apparently realizing that this is to ascribe two 
different meanings to cran-.
5. Bazell 195^ p. 330.
lift-
meaning of blue in blueberry might be said to be the meaning of 
blueberry minus the meaning of berry*; *one could give any element whatever 
a meaning in this sense: e.g. the meaning of b in beat would be the
difference between the meaning of beat and the meaning of eat.' Should it 
be replied that this reductio ad absurdum is unfair, since there is no 
presumption that the meanings of beat and eat are related, it would then 
be legitimate to point out that the blueberry example trades on the 
opposite presumption, namely that the meanings of blueberry and berry 
indeed are related. Applied without any such presumption, the method of 
'semantic subtraction* yields trivial results: e.g. the meaning of blue
in blueberry is the meaning of blueberry minus the meaning of berry, and, 
on the other hand, the meaning of berry in blueberry is the meaning of 
blueberry minus the meaning of blue.
Even if the semantic identity between berry standing alone and the 
second elements in blueberry and cranberry be conceded, the operation of 
'semantic subtraction* is on no sounder theoretical footing. For, in 
general, for any bi-partite meaningful expression ab where a hut not b 
recurs with the same meaning elsewhere, it does not follow that b has a 
meaning. The fact that the language may have comparable expressions of the 
form ac, ad, etc., where both elements recur with the same meanings 
elsewhere, affords no demonstration of the meaningfulness of b in ab, 
since it does not follow from any postulate of linguistic analysis that 
related expressions must have identical semantic structures. In assigning 
a meaning to b, the linguist in fact yields to the same temptation as 
Bloomfield's informant - to be rid of the embarrassing question 'What does
1X5
it mean?1.
3.126 There are other awkward cases which semantically based morphology 
seeks either to accommodate or to dismiss by disregarding its own pro­
claimed definition of the morpheme.
One such case is examplified by series of forms such as:
1. slime, slush, slop, slobber, slip, slide, slurp, slick.
2. flash, flare, flame, flicker, flimmer.
- where the members do seem to bear a phonetic-semantic resemblance to 
one another, which might be stated in the instances quoted as
[ si-] = 1 smoothly set'
and [ fl-] = 'moving light1.
1Bloomfield recognizes such elements as 'root-forming morphemes' • He 
does not, however, isolate similarly an initial element [n-] =
'negation' in such a series as:
2
££1 not, none, nor, never, neither.
But in terms of the definition of the morpheme as a linguistic form which 
bears no partial phonetic-semantic resemblance to any other, series 1, 2 
and 3 stand or fall together.
Nida, on the other hand, refuses to recognize the elements [si-] 
and [fl*-] of series 1 and 2 as morphemes, because in spite of the 
'partial phonetic-semantic resemblances', the elements in question 'do
3
not occur with free forms or with forms which occur in other combinations' .
Two observations are in order concerning this objection. First, it 
is in fact not a valid objection to such cases as none, nor, never.
1. Bloomfield 1935 p. 2^5.
2. Bloomfield 1935 p.
3. Nida 19^9 p. 6l.
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neither (where one, ever, either presumably qualify as free forms) nor 
even to cases such as flash (in view of bash, clash, crash, dash, where 
[-a[ ] = 'violent movement')* Second, valid or not, the objection 
appeals to a principle which has no justification in terms of the given 
definition of the morpheme, i*e* tie principle that elements not occurring 
in combination with free forms or with forms occurring in other combin­
ations are not morphemes.
3*127 A further type of 'awkward case' is examplified by such series as:
1. conceive, deceive, perceive, receive.
2* attend, contend, distend, pretend.
3« adduce, conduce, deduce, induce, produce, reduce.
- where the usual view taken by advocates of semantically based morphology
is to regard elements such as con-, de-, re-, -ceive, -tend, -duce as
morphemes, in spite of the difficulty of determining a semantic similarity.
Bloomfield conceded that 'it seems impossible ... to set up any consistent
1meaning' for such elements ; but does not tell us why in that case they
should be regarded as morphemes. Nida reasons as follows: 'The prefix
con- occurs only in combinations, e.g. conceive, consume, contain, condense,
but the form dense occurs in isolation. This provides justification for
considering con- a morpheme. Added evidence is available in the fact
that the stem forms occur in other combinations, e.g. perceive, resume,
2
detain' • All that is missing here is the explanation of why anyone 
should regard con- as a morpheme for that reason. For no attempt is made
1. Bloomfield 1935 p. 15^ *.
2. Nida 19^9 p. 59.
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to find the semantic element of a presumed phonetic-semantic resemblance
theoretically required for establishing morpheme status.
3.128 Unsatisfactory analyses of the kind discussed in the preceding
sections might lead one to question whether a definition of the morpheme
based on 'phonetic-semantic resemblance' can be viable, since its champions
are evidently so hard put to it to give an account of awkward cases. It
is possible, on the other hand, that the definition merits vindication
at the expense of its champions. One might come to the conclusion that
there is nothing wrong with the definition, but a great deal v/rong with
the way its proponents pay it lip service in theory but deny it in
practice. Perhaps all that is needed to set matters right is a consistent
application of the definition in various types of case.
Some of the arguments advanced by 'distributionalists' may be met in
this way. For example, the case is cited of 'empty' morphs such as the
to in English I tried to swim, which is simply present by requirement
of English syntax, and thus held to be a counterexample to the thesis
that morphemes are minimal meaningful units. The answer to this - if
the charge of meaninglessness is conceded - is to withdraw the proposition
1that to is a morpheme . For what is objectionable is not the intolerable 
consequences of denying so-called 'empty* morphs morphemic status, but 
the inconsistency involved in swelling the morpheme inventory of a
1. Weinreich 1963 §1.2 meets the objection in a different way by
contending that 'empty' morphs are 'an artifact of an Item-and- 
Arrangement grammar: in an IP grammar, they are not "empty1', but
are the segmental markers of a transformation process'. It might 
still be objected that this is to fill the 'emptiness* with quite 
a different concept of 'meaning'#
Il8
language by the addition of admittedly meaningless members.
Quite a different objection, on the other hand, would be the objection 
that a definition of the morpheme in terms of 'phonetic-semantic resem­
blance' is incapable of consistent application. The chief ground on which 
this objection might be raised is that since neither 'phonetic resemblance' 
nor 'semantic resemblance' are defined in any very precise way, it seems 
impossible to decide, except ad hoc in different cases, what constitutes 
a phonetic-semantic resemblance. Those who try to maintain a semantic 
justification for the morpheme status of elements like to sometimes lay 
themselves open to this objection. Gleason, for example, concedes that 
'it is impossible to find a specific factor in the situation which can be
considered as the "meaning" of to. Nevertheless, to does have a function,
2since without it *1 want go means nothing* • But, of course, in. that 
sense the w of want also has a function, and moreover can be found with 
the same form and function in many other English sentences (I want treacle, 
I wishyou'd stay etc.)
As regards the element of phonetic resemblance in a 'phonetic- 
semantic resemblance', the objection raises a point of some significance 
in connexion with synonymy. It would presumably be possible for the 
Bloomfieldian to meet the objection by falling back, if pressed, on a 
notion of phonetic resemblance which no-one could reasonably question,
i.e. phonemic identity. Now a grammar constructed on the basis of this 
interpretation of 'phonetic-semantic resemblance' would have no room for
2. Gleason 1966 §5*11#
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synonymity statements, i.e. there would be no cases in which the deter­
mination of M-units depended on deciding whether two phonologically 
different items were alike in meaning. But a further and related property 
of such a grammar would be that the difference between e.g. the noun 
forms knife and knive (as in knives) would be exactly on a par with the 
difference between, say dock and dog, these four forms counting as four 
different M-units.
In other words, without appeal to the notion of synonymy in a grammar 
based on 'phonetic-semantic resemblance1, the distinction between morph 
and morpheme collapses. Synonymity statements are required in Bloomfieldian
grammar precisely to support the contention that a given morpheme may
3appear in various forms , a requirement which makes Bloomfield's theoretical 
rejection of synonymity (1*3) all the more paradoxical*
3*13 The concept of synonymy plays a somewhat different role in seman­
tically based morphology if the morpheme is defined not in terms of 
'phonetic-semantic resemblance', but as a unit determined conjointly by
semantic and distributional criteria, as e.g. in the account of morpholo-
1
gical analysis given by Gleason . Here the function of the concept is 
precisely to allow morphological analysis to proceed without any 
reliance at all on phonetic or phonological resemblance between morphs*
The point is perhaps best illustrated by reference to one of Gleason's 
definitions. Two (or more) morphs are said to represent the same
3. Bloomfield 1933 p* l6*f.
1, Gleason 1966.
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morpheme if they have 'some common range of meaning1, and if they are 
'in complementary distribution conditioned by some phonologic feature' . 
(Such a case would be the English noun plurals /-z/, /-s/ and /-iz/.)
It is clear that the enterprise of constructing a grammar here depends on 
being able to identify various morphs (e.g. /-z/, /-s/, /-iz/) as having 
the same meaning (say, 'more than one1); but provided we can do this we 
need not bother about any lack of phonological resemblance between the 
morphs in question.
Thus although the case is different from that of setting up M-units 
on the basis of 'phonetic-semantic resemblance', it is again the appeal to 
synonymy which supports the distinction between morph (or allomorph) and 
morpheme.
3.1^ It may perhaps be questioned whether a proviso as strong as that 
of synonymity of the morphs in question is required in the cases under 
discussion. Would it not be sufficient to allow that e.g. /~z/, /-s/ and 
/-iz/, or duke and duch-, may differ in meaning, provided any such 
differences are granted to play no part in determining the selection of 
these morphs as elements in English sentences? V/e might conceive of 
these cases as ones in which, to adopt Hockett's words, the choice 'is 
made for the speaker rather than b^ him'\ or -we must add- if b^ him, 
then not as a semantic choice. This would allow the distinction between 
morph and morpheme to be drawn, and drawn on a semantic basis, but without 
invoking synonymy.
2. Gleason 19&6 § 7*3*
1. Hockett 1958 § 15.1.
12.1
3.15 Along these lines, the concept of morpheme alternance might be 
explicated for purposes of semantically based morphology as the concept of 
the relation between members of a class of phonologically differing forms 
which share a common meaning, and between which the language affords the 
speaker no grammatically indeterminate semantic choice. (That is to 
say, either there is no choice (because by grammatical rule all members 
of the class but one are excluded), or, if more than one member of the 
class is grammatically permissible, then it makes no semantic difference 
which of those permitted is chosen.)
This appears to cover all the usual examples adduced in discussions 
of morphological analysis. And yet there is something very curious 
about this concept. It may be observed, first of all, that if we 
strengthen the first semantic requirement so that instead of speaking 
forms which 'share a common meaning' we speak of forms 'which are 
identical in meaning', then the second requirement becomes redundant, 
since if the forms have the same meaning, then ipso facto a speaker has 
no semantic choice. (We thus reintroduce the proviso of synonymity.)
On the other hand, it is difficult to see how the concept of alternance
as stated could be of any practical use in morphological analysis unless
supplemented by criteria for determining sameness of meanings. Attention
is rarely paid to such criteria, and when it is the results are palpably
1inadequate. For example, the demonstration given by Hockett that the 
English noun plurals /-s/ and /-z/ have no discoverable difference in 
meaning is question-begging. What Hockett successfully demonstrates is
1. Hockett 1958 §15.1.
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simply that they occur in complementary distribution. But it is hardly 
surprising that a substitution test of the kind Hockett uses should fail 
to discover a difference in meaning between forms in complementary dis­
tribution: on the contrary, it must fail. To take such a test seriously
involves supposing that complementarity of distribution is a sufficient 
condition of synonymity. But anyone who supposed that could easily 
demonstrate that e.g. English the and 's are synonymous. Moreover, if 
such a test is to be treated as decisive, it would be simpler to stop 
talking about differences of meaning and simply rely on the test. For 
the test is applicable, irrespective of what we suppose it to be a test of.
But normally no-one goes even to the trouble taken by Hockett to 
exhibit the supposed synonymy of allomorphs of the same morpheme: at
best we are offered a brief identification of 'the meaning1 they are 
said to share (e.g. 'more than one' for noun plurals) and for the rest it 
is simply assumed that any differences of meaning are morphologically 
irrelevant.
If we relied simply on the discovery of a 'common meaning', however, 
we should be forced to conclude that e.g. knives and forks contained not 
one but two pairs of morphs with common meanings. For a common meaning 
can be stated for each pair (e.g. 'implement', 'more than one') and the 
grammatical rules of English never offer a choice between the morphs in 
question (knive : fork and /-z/ : /-s/). It is no objection to this 
example to point out that everyone knows that the plural of knife differs 
in meaning from the plural of fork. Doubtless they do differ, and this 
is the point of the example. What is illustrated thereby is that there
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is no way of saying just how much the two morphs must have semantically 
in common, short of the synonymity proviso.
3.16 To summarize, setting up synonymous morphs is necessitated in 
semantically based morphology to the extent that the morphophonemic rules 
of L produce alternations like /-s/, /-z/ and /-iz/, or 'irregularities' 
like good / better etc. If such phenomena occur, the postulation of 
synonymous morphs can be avoided in the last resort only by treating the 
word as the minimum unit, and not inquiring into its internal structure.
Some semantic basis would still be needed for dealing \vith M-relations, 
but synonymities could be dispensed with. (Thus, for example, we would 
need some semantic basis for identifying the invariant which allows us to 
say that better is the comparative of good; but if we renounce interest 
in the bimorphic structure bettfrer» identifying that invariant need not 
involve equating the meaning of good with that of bett-, any more than 
we need to be able to identify a segment of worse having the same meaning 
as bad.) Granted, however, that morphological description is - some would 
say by definition - committed to the analysis of words, it may be said that 
setting up synonymous morphs by way of accounting for word structure is 
ultimately determined by certain empirical facts about the surface grammar 
of natural languages.
3.2 If the objective of syntactic description is taken to be simply the 
specification of all and only the grammatical concatenations of morphs 
in the language, the question whether two such concatenations are synonymous, 
like all other questions about the semantic properties of grammatical 
sequences, falls outside the province of syntactic analysis. Questions of
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meaning become relevant, however, if we take it to be part of the function
of a syntax to assign structural descriptions to the specified grammatical
sequences. For it may be asked of any given sequence whether it has one
or more than one grammatical analysis, and the fact that a sentence is or
is not ambiguous is here of some importance. E.g. the fact that the
German sentence Das ist naturlich genug is assigned two structural
1descriptions is directly related to the fact that it is ambiguous •
Transformational grammarians, following Chomsky, have normally included
non-lexical ambiguities as being among the facts to be accounted for by
2
an adequate grammar , and in accounting for these have implicitly
3
provided explanations for certain synonymities and non-synonymities as well . 
1. Bach 1964 §3*3 gives the analyses:
2.
3-
s
Das ist naturlich genug 
That1s natural enough
Chomsky 1957 §§4.1 and 8*1. Bach 1964 f$1.2 and 5*2*
Das ist natiirlich genug 
That's naturally enough
For example, the fact that, in spite of certain structural and 
lexical parallels, old men's shoes and men's old shoes do not receive 
identical semantic interpretations is very well accounted for by the 
grammatical ambiguity of the former.
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5.21 The relation between synonymy and grammatical ambiguity may 
conveniently be discussed by taking as a starting point the following 
proposition:
A1 'If axy and bxy are synonymous, then either both 
are grammatically ambiguous, or neither.1 
That is to say, if the sequences a + x + y and b + x + £ are both 
syntactic arrangements permitted by the grammar of the language, and we 
have a guarantee that the resultant expressions axy and bxy do not differ 
in meaning, then it cannot be the case that only one of these expressions is 
grammatically ambiguous.
A1 appears to correspond to the basic position adopted by trans­
formational grammarians, as witnessed by such statements as the following: 
'Occasionally, a grammar may permit us to construct nonequivalent 
derivations for a given sentence. Under these circumstances, we say that
we have a case of "constructional homonymity", and if our grammar is
1correct, this sentence of the language should be ambiguous' .
'Obviously, not all kinds of ambiguity will be analyzable in syntactic 
terms. For example, we would not expect a grammar to explain the 
referential ambiguity of "son" - "sun", "light" (in color, weight), 
etc."^
'We can test the adequacy of a given grammar by asking whether or not each 
case of constructional homonymity is a real case of ambiguity and each 
case of the proper kind of ambiguity is actually a case of constructional
1. Chomsky 1957 §k.l.
H. Chomsky 1957 §8.1 n.l.
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3homonymity1 .
'We can state as a general requirement for a total theory of a language
that any ambiguous sequence must have several representations in the
theory, This requirement is quite parallel to the condition placed on a
phonological theory that no two sequences that are "different11 (i,e,
consistently distinguishable by a pair test) may be represented phonemically
in the same way. That is, beyond the phonological level, we can demand
that no two sequences that are "different" may be represented in the same
way, even if they happen to have the same phonemic shape. Some of these
differences will be accounted for by a theory of language usage Some,
presumably, will be accounted for by a semantic theory: Look at the table
is ambiguous only because table has several meanings, e,g., 'mathematical
table,1 'dinner table.' In the realm of grammar proper, different
representations may exist ,., on the level of phrase structure (different
P markers for the same string). They may also exist in the transformational
if
level, as in ... I don't approve of his cooking, or John is crazy to go' .
In discussing Al, it may be taken for granted that if, in the context 
1 •*x£,» ^ lexically ambiguous but b is not, then axy and bxy will not 
be synonymous; but then the grammar is not expected to account for the 
ambiguity.
The case for believing Al to be correct - if it is correct - depends 
on the semantic implications of the term 'grammatical ambiguity', which 
must now be examined.
5. Chomsky 1957 §8.1
Bach 196^ § 5*2.
12 7
3»22 Some clarification of the distinction between grammatical and
lexical ambiguity is first necessary. It may be and often is the case
that a grammatical ambiguity involves the assignment of two meanings to a
1single lexical item. For example, in I saw logs the lexical item saw 
may be assigned two distinct meanings, but also two distinct grammatical 
classifications ('past tense' of see vs. 'present tense* of saw). Thus 
although the ambiguity centres about one particular lexical item, the 
grammatical analysis of the sentence containing it is affected. This is
p
the justification for calling I saw logs a 'syntactical ambiguity* : the
sentence yields the two phrase markers
(1) ((I) ^  ((PAST) ^  (see) ^ (logs) jjp)yp)g
and (2) ((I) Np ((saw) y (logs)
If we prefer to reserve the term 'syntactical ambiguity' for bracketing 
ambiguities (constructional homonymities), an alternative would be to
3call I saw logs a 'distributional ambiguity* since, as Lyons observes , 
the ambiguity in such cases is a function of the distributional classi­
fication of the item involved, (Here saw belongs to two distributional 
classes, in one of which it has such co-members as heard, found, brought, 
and in the other such co-members as hear, find, bring.)
When 'lexical ambiguity* is contrasted with 'grammatical ambiguity' 
the implication usually is that no grammatical factors are appealed to in
1. An example discussed by Katz & Martin 1967 P*
2. As do Katz & Martin loc. cit.
3. Lyons 1968 §6.1.3*
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explaining the ambiguity of the expression in which the lexically
*
ambiguous item occurs. The connexion between lexical and grammatical 
(syntactical) ambiguity is analysed along these lines by Katz & Postal as 
follows:
'A lexical item is ambiguous when it has more than one sense.
Ambiguity at the lexical level is the source of semantic ambiguity at the
sentence level. Thus, a necessary but not sufficient condition for a
syntactically unambiguous sentence to be semantically ambiguous is that
*
it contain at least one ambiguous lexical item. For example, the source 
of the semantic ambiguity in the sentence
(2) he enjoys wearing a light suit in the summer 
is the ambiguity of the lexical item light. Since an adequate dictionary 
entry for a lexical item must mark every one of its senses, the dictionary 
entry for light must represent it as at least two ways ambiguous, in terms 
of two readings which differ from each other in that one contains the 
semantic marker (Color) but not the semantic marker (Weight) and the other
contains (Weight) but not (Color). Since there is nothing in (2) to exclude
either one of these readings as genuine readings for the occurrence of 
light, the sentence is semantically ambiguous, one term of this ambiguity 
stemming from each of these readings.
However, the presence of an ambiguous lexical item in a syntactically 
unambiguous sentence is not a sufficient condition for that sentence to be 
semantically ambiguous. For example, although the sentence
b(3/ the stuff is light enough to carry
*t* Katz & Postal's example here is poorly chosen, since it appears that
'... enough to carry1 must be grammatically ambiguous: i.e. somewhere
cont1d.
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contains an occurrence of the ambiguous lexical item light, it is not 
itself ambiguous because light enough to carry is not understood to mean 
'light enough in color to be carried*. Thus when there is an ambiguous 
lexical item in a semantically unambiguous sentence, either the syntactic 
properties of the sentence or the meanings of the other constituents prevent 
the ambiguous lexical item from contributing more than one of its senses 
to the meaning of the whole sentence* *
The example of light illustrates the residual character of the notion 
of lexical ambiguity, being dependent on the assumption that the deriv­
ations for sentences containing light are identical in respect of the way 
in which they eventually produce the formative light. But a detailed ^ 
analysis of English might perhaps uncover grounds for assigning two 
syntactic markers to the lexicon entry for light (? 'Appearance Adj.* vs, 
'Substance Adj.'), and then the need to consider light a case of lexical 
ambiguity would lapse.
3.23 An analysis which appears to allow the possibility of contra­
dicting Al (3.21) is offered by Lyons in his version of the distinction
1
between grammatical and semantic ambiguity:
'Let us assume, for the sake of the argument, that neither fresh 
fruit market nor new fruit market has more than one interpretation:
in the history of the sentence there has occurred conflation which 
has obscured the modal difference between 'it is possible to carry x* 
and 'it is desirable (advantageous, opportune, etc.) to carry x'.
Hence the sentence, contrary to Katz & Postal's interpretation, can 
have the reading 'the stuff is light enough (in colour) to carry*.
3. Katz & Postal 196  ^ p. 15.
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from the semantic point of view, we will say that they are not ambiguous.
Are they grammatically ambiguous? Is the constituent-structure fresh 
(fruit market), in the one case, and (new fruit) market, in the other, 
grammatically acceptable? To answer these questions we must of course refer 
to some explicit grammar of English. , It is clear that, in general, the 
bracketing A + (N + N0) is acceptable if the first noun can combine
_L “ c
with the second (fruit market) and if the adjective can combine with the 
second noun (new market, ? fresh market); and the bracketing (A + N^) + 
is acceptable if the first noun can combine with the second noun and if the 
adjective can combine with the first noun (fresh fruit, ? new fruit) ...
Any phrase of the form A + N + will be given two grammatical analyses,
unless the grammar and the lexicon to which we refer prohibits explicitly 
the combination of the adjective in question with one or other of the
flnounsT •
Let us now develop Lyons's example in the following way: first, by
assuming fulfilment of the condition mentioned in Lyons's last sentence, 
namely that the grammar and lexicon explicitly prohibit the combination 
of the adjective with one (but not the other) of the nouns in question, 
and second, by stipulating not merely that fresh fruit market and new fruit 
market are semantically unambiguous but also that they are synonymous.
It would now follow from Lyons’s argument that, unless there is a 
contradiction in the stipulations, we have a case where axy and bxy are 
synonymous but only one is grammatically ambiguous.
1. Lyons 1968 §6.1.3.
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That there is no contradiction in the stipulations may be concluded 
from the following considerations. 1. If we were committed to supposing 
that the synonymy of fresh fruit market and new fruit market was the 
result of the independent synonymy of fresh and new, then it might be 
queried why one of these adjectives could qualify one but not the other 
of the nouns. But there seems to be no general reason to deny that 
synonymous complex expressions may be made up of lexical items which, 
considered in isolation, or in other combinations, are not synonymous.
The unambiguous and identical semantic interpretation of two phrases or 
sentences is not a sufficient condition for Identity of the lexical 
entries of their corresponding lexical items. 2. There seems to be no 
general reason to deny that a lexical item which is grammatically 
permissible in a given context may not be so in a partially similar 
context C . 3* The stipulations made involve no stronger claims than
c.
those covered by the preceding two points, namely that (i) axy and bxy 
may be synonymous even if a and b are not, and (ii) axy and bxy may be 
grammatical when ax, or ay, or bx, or by are not.
It now appears that by following Lyons1s argument we have reached a 
conclusion which conflicts with Al, and indeed this is so if the term 
'grammatically ambiguous' in Al is to be given the sense which Lyons 
implicitly gives it in answering the question 'Are they grammatically 
ambiguous?1.
But there are reasons for rejecting the way Lyons interprets this 
question, and hence also for rejecting the answer he gives. The main 
objection may be stated concisely as follows. Lyons assumes the question
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to mean fAre they ambiguous according to a grammar?' and gives the
trivial and unhelpful answer 'They are if the grammar says so'. Whereas
if the question is to have any linguistic interest at all* it must mean
•What linguistic facts would lead one to construct a grammar which
represented them as ambiguous?1• Lyons's answer - if it is read as an
answer to that question - is perhaps less trivial, but now becomes
baffling. For we are being told that the ungrammaticality of new fruit
(in isolation) should preclude the assignment of grammatical ambiguity
to new fruit market - without, however, being told why. But that is
precisely what we want to know in order to clarify the notion of gramma- 
2tical ambiguity •
An alternative interpretation of 'grammatical ambiguity' is 
available, but it leans too heavily on semantic considerations to be 
acceptable to one who adopts Lyons's position. According to this 
alternative interpretation grammatical ambiguity is a property of certain 
types of construction, and any individual construction either belongs to 
a grammatically ambiguous type (in which case it counts individually as 
grammatically ambiguous) or it does not. On this view, the ungramma- 
ticality of new fruit would not count against the grammatical ambiguity 
of new fruit market; for the question to be answered is not 'Is new fruit 
grammatical?' but 'Boes new fruit market belong to a grammatically
2. Putting forward a solution for a particular example, in advance of 
any general principle, simply constitutes a retreat into obscurity, 
i.e. what is now unclear is what constitutes the incompatibility 
between the ungrammaticality of new fruit and the grammatical - as 
opposed to semantic - ambiguity of new fruit market« For it will 
hardly do to say that 'grammatical ambiguity of axy' just is 
'independent combinability of a, x and •
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ambiguous construction-type?', where 'grammatically ambiguous construction-
type' is defined as one in which semantically unambiguous elements may be
combined into semantically ambiguous complexes.
To indicate the general reasons for adopting this definition (which
places 'grammatical ambiguity* in a position of dependence on the prior
notion of 'semantic ambiguity') it will be relevant to consider some
grammatical ambiguities other than 'bracketing ambiguities'. Lyons
distinguishes two further basic types of grammatical ambiguity,
exemplified by They can fish and amor Dei, the former being a case of
what was above (3*22) termed 'distributional ambiguity' (can is both a
modal auxiliary and a transitive verb, and fish both an intransitive
verb and a noun), and the latter a case of 'transformational ambiguity'
1(Peus amat vs. Deum amat)•
It is relevant to the problem under discussion to note that in 
drawing a distinction between such cases as types of grammatical ambiguity, 
there is already a certain amount of illicit trading on the notion of 
'ambiguity' - illicit, that is to say, if we v/ish to maintain that 
semantic ambiguity and grammatical ambiguity are independent notions.
For example, although it may be convenient to speak of 'grammatical 
ambiguity1 in cases when a position which can be occupied either by an 
A-class form or by a B-class form is in fact occupied by a form which 
belongs to both classes, it must be realized that strictly from the point 
of view of distribution of forms it is nonsense to apply the term
1. Lyons 1968 §6.1.3* §6*6.2#
1'ambiguity1. For there is no sense in which a form must be either 
A-class or B-class (exclusive disjunction) to occur in such a position: 
we could equally well set up an AB-class limited to forms which occur 
both in A-class positions and in B-class positions, and the question 
whether a form occurring in a position open to both is an A-class form or a 
B-class form would then simply not arise. The term 'ambiguity' in such 
cases tacitly appeals to the fact that in sentences where an AB-class 
form occupies an A-class position it will often receive a different 
semantic interpretation from that which it receives v/hen occupying a B-class 
position; with the result that v/hen it occupies an AB-class position, 
one asks which semantic interpretation it should have. No-one, presumably, 
v/ould speak of 'ambiguity' either (i) if a position is filled by a form 
which elsewhere occurs only in A-class (or only in B-class) positions, 
or (ii) if forms which may occur both in A-class positions and B-class 
positions receive exactly the same semantic interpretation in both types 
of position.
Or, to take a different type of case, if men and old women did not 
differ in meaning from old men and old women or from old men and women 
(i.e. if the adjective semantically applicable to both nouns could be 
syntactically preposed to either or to both) and if constructions of this 
type did not admit the interpretation whereby the adjective was seman­
tically relevant to one noun only, then presumably no-one would regard 
old men and women as grammatically ambiguous. Yet it would remain true 
that old men and women could be treated as syntactically derived in more 
than one way (e.g. by deletion of the second old from old men and old women, 
or by preposition to men and women, ox* by fronting from men and old women). 
But if there is to be any point in speaking of 'ambiguity' there has to be
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some sense in which one construction subsumes the other two, and they are 
not just equal partners.
3*23 In general, it would seem that to maintain a distinction between 
grammatical and semantic ambiguity is legitimate only to the extent that 
knowledge of grammatical ambiguities may be explicated as non-semantic 
(i.e. formal) linguistic knowledge. The question how far this 'extent' 
goes requires some consideration.
Knowledge of the grammaticality or otherwise of a sentence or 
construction must be counted formal knowledge, since it is knowledge of 
the combination rules governing sets of formally defined items (i.e. the 
words or morphs of the language). The knowledge which enables a speaker 
to segment utterances into constituent grammatical units is also to be 
counted formal knowledge, since it can be treated as knowledge of sub­
stitution procedures not presupposing any knowledge of the meanings of 
the items involved. In short, all knowledge of the nouns, adjectives, 
verbs, etc. of a language and their rules of combination may be regarded 
as knowledge of what may be substituted for what and in what contexts.
But whether this includes knowledge of grammatical ambiguities is not 
immediately obvious.
It might appear that in some instances at least a case can be made 
for analysing knowledge of grammatical ambiguity as knowledge of relations 
between substitution constraints. S.g. knowledge of the grammatical 
ambiguity of They can fish might perhaps be said to be knowledge that in 
this sentence can and fish may each be replaced salva grammaticalitate by 
members of two different sets of expressions related in a certain way. If
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we call these sets of expressions 'can-A1, 1can-B!, 1 fish-A' and
'fish-B 1, the rule is that f can-A* substitutes must go with 'fish-A1
1substitutes and 1can-B1 substitutes with 1fish-B' substitutes . Knowledge 
of the grammatical ambiguity, it might be suggested, is simply knowledge 
of this rule, i.e. of a specific interdependence between the substitution 
possibilities for can and fish.
But grammatical ambiguity cannot simply be equated with inter­
dependence between substitution patterns of morphs or words in a given 
sentence. For on the one hand there would seem to be cases of gramma­
tically ambiguous sentences where no relevant interdependence obtains, 
while on the other hand there are cases of interdependence which do not 
correspond to grammatical ambiguity. An example of the former would be 
I saw logs, and of the latter John bought it. In the former instance, 
the grammatical ambiguity of saw (present tense of saw vs. past tense 
of see) matches no interdependence between the permissible substitutions 
for saw and the permissible substitutions for I, log or -s. In the case 
of John bought it, the following interdependence holds between substit­
utions for bought and substitutions for it: 'bought-A includes ate;
'bought-B1 includes drank; 'it-A1 includes bread; 'it-B includes wine. 
This rule expresses the fact that we cannot have *John drank bread, nor 
*John ate wine. Thus there is here a substitutional interdependence, 
but it does not seem to correspond to a grammatical ambiguity in John 
bought it.
1. 'Gan-A' will include may, could, will,... ; ' can-B 1 will include
pack, sell, take,...; 'fish-A will include j^ o, come, stay,...;
'fish-B1 will include peas, beans, tomatoes, ...
13?'
More generally, a major difficulty in the way of explicating gramma­
tical ambiguity in terms of membership of substitution sets is that each 
word in the language may be regarded as belonging to many overlapping 
substitution sets. The approach thus leads ultimately to the proposition 
that if a word belongs to n different substitution sets in different 
contexts, and there is a context in which it may be replaced by any member 
of any of its n substitution sets, then in that context the word is n-ways 
grammatically ambiguous. Similarly, a word would be n-minus-x-ways 
grammatically ambiguous in contexts where it may be replaced by any 
member of n-tninus-x of its substitution sets, and unambiguous where 
n-minus-x equals one. But since almost every sentence in every natural 
language would then turn out to be multiply grammatically ambiguous, this 
is presumably an account of •grammatical ambiguity' which no-one would 
readily accept,
3-26 An alternative approach to the explication of grammatical ambiguity 
is by reference to an explicit set of generative rules for producing the 
sentences of the language. Then a sentence or constituent is unambiguous 
if the rules give only one way of generating it, and n-ways grammatically 
ambiguous if the rules give n ways of generating it. However, this account 
of grammatical ambiguity depends on there being guarantees that the rules 
do not contain either 'superfluous' ways of generating particular sen­
tences, or 'insufficient' ways of generating particular sentences. But 
since the tests of 'superfluity' and 'insufficiency' are semantic
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tests , this approach does not enable us to account for grammatical
ambiguity without appeal to meanings,
The plausibility ox a semantically based interpretation of grammatical
ambiguity gains support from the difficulty of finding convincing
counterexamples, i.e. intuitively clear cases of grammatical ambiguity
where no systematic semantic ambiguity is generated. Examples which come
to mind in this connexion - e.g. that of recursive co-ordinate constructions
seem to be cases in which any alleged grammatical ambiguity' is a product
of the convention adopted for representing the grammar, and corresponds to
2no genuine item of linguistic knowledge at all •
3*27 The above considerations weigh in favour of explicating gramma­
tical ambiguity in terms of capacity to generate semantic ambiguities* 
Accordingly, the question whether fresh fruit market and new fruit market 
are grammatically ambiguous even if semantically unambiguous becomes the 
question whether the combination A + N + N is one able to combine seman-
1. cf. 3*21 n.3* The 'insufficiency' of rules which give only one way 
of generating old men's shoes is demonstrated by the fact that
old men's shoes has two distinct semantic interpretations, given 
only one meaning each for old, men*s and shoes. The 'superfluity' 
of rules which give fourteen different ways of generating old men's 
shoes is demonstrated by the fact that old men's shoes does not 
have fourteen distinct semantic interpretations.
2. A grammar's ambiguous representation of old men's shoes corresponds 
to a genuine item of linguistic knowledge in that the competent 
speaker-hearer knows that old may go either with men or with shoes, 
whereas it would be nonsense to say that a grammar's ambiguous 
representation of Tom and Dick and Harry corresponds to the competent 
speaker-hearer's knowledge that Pick may go either with Tom or
with Harry.
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tically unambiguous items into semantically ambiguous complexes, This
question will receive an affirmative answer if suitably ambiguous
expressions of the type A + N + N can be found, where the ambiguity
corresponds to the possibility of bracketing (A + N) + N or A + (N + N),
1
the same meanings being assigned to individual words in either case • 
Interpreting Al in this sense, Al states that if axy and bxy are 
synonymous, then it cannot be the case that only one of them belongs to a 
construction-type able to combine semantically unambiguous items into 
semantically ambiguous complexes. Now for this to be so, we have to take 
the assurance of synonymity to preclude the possibility that one expression 
but not the other instantiates a grammatical ambiguity which in this 
instance happens to be semantically inconsequential. An assurance merely 
of the 'synthetic synonymity' of axy and bxy (i.e. an assurance that the 
two expressions command the same semantic interpretation as wholes, 
irrespective of their internal structure) is insufficient to validate Al 
in the light of the interpretation given above of 'grammatical ambiguity*, 
For it might be the case that a but not b belongs to a class of words 
which combine grammatically with members of the class to which x 
belongs, but that in this instance 'a + x* has a meaning which, combined 
with the meaning of £, yields the same meaning *M? for the whole 
expression axy as is independently yielded by combining the meaning of a 
with that of 'x + . In such a case, the possibility of interpreting
1. Such expressions exist in English, e.g. red wine punch, foreign 
book shop.
axy grammatically either as (ax)y or as a(^) is semantically of no 
consequence, since axy means fM* in either case.
The guarantee of ’synthetic synonymity1 between axy and bxy, (here 
the guarantee that axy and bxy have only the meaning 'M') thus does not 
ensure parity of grammatical ambiguity between them.
Can we, then, formulate a stronger condition which will validate Al? 
3*2.8 We may usefully explore this question by drawing on the theoretical 
apparatus of generative grammar. Of particular relevance is the dis­
tinction of Katz & Postal between sentence and sentoid (the latter 
defined by reference to a semantically interpreted P-marker) • Taking 
axy and bxy as sentences, the possibility we are attempting to guard 
against is the possibility that axy (but not bxy)represents two sentoids, 
each of which receives the same derived reading as that for the sentoid
2corresponding to bxy. This possibility would be instantiated by a case 
in which axy had only the P-markers
PMl (((a) T (x) u ) p (£) ) gl
1. Katz & Postal 196^ p. 27*
2. The relevant P-markers may be diagrammed as follows:
141
and PM2 ((a) R ((x) y ($) ) p ) ^
and bxy only the P-marker
PM3 ((b) g ((x) tj (^) q  ) ^ )
and where SI, S2 and S3 were full paraphrases (fully synonymous) under 
Katz & Postal's definition
D3 G and C' are fully synonymous with respect to PM and PM'
if and only if the set of readings associated with the 
node labeled fC' in PM and the set of readings 
associated with the node labeled 'C'* in PM' are
■z
identical; PM may equal PM'.
But there is another possibility which wo^ ild be equally damaging to 
Al. This is the possibility that axy (but not bxy) represents two 
sentoids, one of which happens to be semantically anomalous under Katz 
& Postal's definition
D1 C is semantically anomalous with respect to PM if
and only if the set of readings associated with the node
4labeled 1C1 in PM contains no readings, i.e. is null, 
and the other of which receives a derived reading identical with that 
of the sentoid corresponding to bxy. This would be the case, in terms of 
the example just given, if in PM1 the node Q had a reading which failed 
to combine v/ith the derived reading for P, and S2 and S3 were fully 
synonymous under D3*
3« Katz & Postal 1964 p. 27.
4. Katz Sc Postal 1964 p. 26.
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The assurance of what was referred to in 3-2? as the 'synthetic 
synonymity1 of axy and bxy may be reformulated in Katz & Postal's term­
inology as an assurance that all pairs of nonanomalous sentoids for axy 
and bxy respectively are fully synonymous (are 'full paraphrases') 
and there is at least one such pair* But this condition is not strong 
enough to validate Al because of the possibility of counterexamples of 
the kind just discussed.
The stronger condition which must be met to eliminate such counter­
examples is clearly that axy and bxy should have the same number of sentoids 
and that it should be possible to put their respective sentoids in 
one-one correspondence, each such pair being fully synonymous under D3. 
Sentences (and, by extension, constituents of sentences) which meet this 
condition might be termed 'structurally synonymous'.
If an assurance of the synonymity of axy and bxy is taken to be an 
assurance of their 'structural synonymity* as defined above, then Al 
is correct.
3.3 We are thus led to draw a distinction which it would have been 
irrelevant to introduce into a discussion of the role of synonymity state­
ments at the phonological level, but which assumes importance in 
connexion with grammatical analysis.
It is not the only distinction of which this is true. Another is 
that between synonymous sentences which have different underlying P- 
markers and those which have the same underlying P-marker(s).
(la) He brought home some furze 
(lb) He brought home some gorse
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(2a) He wrapped the parcel up 
(2b) He wrapped up the parcel 
If we assume the above pairs are synonymous pairs, then (la) and (lb) 
are 'structurally synonymous' in the sense of 3*28, i.e. they represent 
two fully synonymous sentoids. (2a) and (2b), on the other hand, pre­
sumably come not from underlying P-markers which happen to coincide in 
their semantic interpretation but from one and the same P-marker. Such 
pairs may be said to be 'intrinsically synonymous'.
Pairs like (2a) and (2b) are related by optional singulary trans­
formations as defined by Katz Sc Postal:
'In earlier treatments of transformational grammar, such as 
Chomsky's in Syntactic Structures, optional singulary trans­
formations had at least two distinct functions. First, they 
derived various distinct sentence types, questions, imperatives, 
negatives, etc., from one underlying declarative type. They thus 
had a substantive role in explaining differences in cognitive 
meaning between sentences of the same syntactic type. Second, 
singulary transformations related optional variants that were full 
paraphrases. These were intuitively stylistic variants of each 
other like
(135) a. all the men are married
b. the men are all married
c. he found out the truth
d. he found the truth out
In our discussion of the syntax of questions, imperatives, etc.,
lvf
we have given a great deal of support for a conception in 
which only the second function of singulary transformations 
survives. It therefore seems reasonable to say in general that 
the different outputs produced by optional singularly trans­
formations are merely stylistic variants necessarily having the 
same cognitive meaning. Thus there can be a uniform character­
ization of the function of optional rules for both the syntactic 
and phonological components; such rules derive what is referred 
to in linguistics as free variation, and nothing else1 .
It may be noted that intrinsic synonymity of expressions is not the 
guarantee required to validate Al, but rather one condition which would 
validate
A2 If abed and abdc are synonymous, then either both 
are grammatically ambiguous, or neither.
We do not, however, need a guarantee of intrinsic synonymity to rule out 
e.g. the possibility that abdc might, unlike abed, be open to the 
bracketing a(bd)c. For that purpose structural synonymity of abed and 
abdc would meet the requirement. Thus intrinsic synonymity of the two 
expressions is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for validation 
of A2.
1. Katz & Postal 196^ pp. 112-113* In connexion with 'free variation', 
however, it should be noted that whereas in syntax the truth of the 
statement that a and b are synonymous is a necessary condition of the 
correctness of treating a and b as 'free variants* (in the sense 
of being 'merely stylistic variants of the same sentence'), the same 
statement assumes, at the phonological level, the incorrectness of 
treating the phonetic realizations of a and b as free variants.
0A5
3*31 r-£he much discussed"*" synonymy of actives and their corresponding 
passives may be subsumed under 'intrinsic synonymy', although a case 
can be made out for treating e.g.
(3a) John kissed Mary 
and (3b) Mary was kissed by John
as having different underlying P-markers, which differ only in ways
2
that are 'semantically insignificant' • This can be accommodated by 
modifying the definition of 'intrinsic synonymy' so as to include pairs 
of expressions having the same underlying P-marker(s) or 'noncontrastive' 
P-markers•
The question of deciding which pairs of sentences stand in an 
active-passive relation may be compared to the question earlier discussed 
(3.112 - 3.11*0 of determining M-relations. No difficulty arises when 
there is a clear formal correspondence, as in cases such as (3a) and (3b). 
But there may be instances which are more like the go/went problem, as 
e.g. if (3a) and
1. Chomsky 1957 5 9*2.7, Katz 8c Postal 196*f § *f.2.1, Ziff 1966, Katz 8c 
Martin 1967*
2. Katz & Postal 196*f p. 73* Katz 8c Postal propose to treat passives as 
deriving from 'underlying P-markers containing an Adverbmanner
constituent dominating b£ plus a passive morpheme dummy' and not 
from the P-marker underlying the corresponding active (Katz 8c 
Postal 196*f p. 72). Cf. Katz 8c Martin 1967 p. *f80, where 
'sentences with the same underlying phrase marker or underlying 
phrase markers that are the same, except for elements that do not 
bear meaning' are said to be synonymous. The treatment proposed 
assumes that one of the 'semantic properties of dummy morphemes' 
is that they are assigned a null reading (Katz 8c Postal 196*f p. 73)*
1^6
(3c) Mary was bussed by John 
were grammatical, but (3b) and
(3d) *John bussed Mary 
were ungrammatical. Here buss could be treated as the 'passive of1 
kiss. If, however, we have a situation in which (3^), (3c) and (3d) 
are grammatical but (3b) ungrammatical, or (3a), (3b) and (3c) are 
.grammatical but (3d) ungrammatical, the resolution of the choice 
between setting up one P-marker or two is less clear .
It would of course be a complete confusion to appeal to the synonymity
buss and kiss as a ' reason1 for settling the issue one way or the
other. For their synonymity is assured whatever the solution. This is
simply another way of putting the point that in grammatical analysis a
synonymity statement about particular morphs may correspond either to the
structural synonymity or to the intrinsic synonymity of pairs of sentences 
/
in which they occur, and this is here a relevant difference (whereas for 
purposes of phonological analysis it is irrelevant),
3 A  Both Structural synonymy' and 'intrinsic synonymy' must be
distinguished from 'analytic synonymy', which is a term we may reserve 
for describing part-to-part semantic correspondence of expressions which 
are, as wholes, synthetically synonymous. Thus to the extent that 
synonymous complex expressions are composed of semantically equivalent
3* There will doubtless be other considerations which weigh in favour 
of or against treating buss as an independent lexical item, e*g. 
whether or not we can say There was a lot of bussing and cuddling 
at the party.
\V*
morphs and grammatical arrangements of morphs, we shall say they are 
analytically synonymous. The pairs cited in 3*3
(la) He brought home some furze
(lb) He brought home some gorse
and (2a) He wrapped the parcel up
(2b) He wrapped up the parcel
are analytically synonymous in this sense, the former pair being also 
structurally synonymous, and the latter pair intrinsically synonymous.
Each; imorph and construction in (la) can be matched with a semantically 
equivalent morph and construction in (lb), and similarly for (2a) and 
(2b). But
(*fa) John likes his unmarried aunt
and (^ fb) John likes his spinster aunt
1even if (let us assume ) structurally synonymous, are not analytically 
synonymous throughout in that spinster does not match un-t-marri+ed.
3,^1 Where morphological analysis is concerned, the distinction between 
synthetic and analytic synonymy often answers to the difference between 
forms which are determinate with respect to segmentation and those which 
are not. Thus suppose we have a noun zog which has a regular plural 
by addition of -s and also an irregular plural without parallel elsewhere 
in the vocabulary; so that we say one zog but either two zogs or two zigo. 
Then zogs and zigo are synthetically synonymous but not analytically 
synonymous, since whereas the meaning of zogs can be treated as the meaning
1. Doubtless there is in fact a semantic difference, since John's 
unmarried aunt might be a young girl.
1^ 8
°£ zog plus the meaning 'more than one* of the suffix -s, the meaning 
of zigo is not comparably analysable in terms of the meanings of 
constituent parts. For in the case of morphs which are not determinate 
with respect to segmentation we cannot say what the constituent parts are.
3**1-2 Where syntactic analysis is concerned, analytic synonymity is a 
stronger condition of semantic equivalence than structural synonymity, 
as may be shown by comparing the requirements in terms of Katz & Postal's 
D5 (3*28). That is to say, for two unambiguous sentences to be analytically 
synonymous it will have to be the case not only that they represent 
sentoids satisfying but additionally that D5 hold for every corres­
ponding pair of constituents dominated by C and C* respectively, without 
residue, i.e. the pair of sentoids must match structurally in respect 
of occurrence of nodes. Thus in
G C'
Cl 02
Gil C12 C21 G22
C'l C'2
C111 G'12 C'2l C'22
there will be structural synonymity if D5 is satisfied for 0 and C*, but 
analytic synonymity only if D5 holds for each of the pairs G and Cf, Cl 
and C'l, C2 and C'2. Furthermore, the readings for the matching pairs 
of ultimate constituents Gil and C'll, C12 and C'12, G21 and C'21, C22 
and O'22 must be the same. But the conditions cannot be satisfied for e.g.
G '
C l " c 2 c »
Gil C12. C21 C22 C'll C'12 C'2
since C21 and G22 cannot be put in correspondence with anything under C'.
1^9
Accordingly C and C' do not satisfy our requirement unless for any 
constituent (Cl, C2...) immediately dominated by C there is a corres­
ponding constituent (C'l, C'2...) immediately dominated by C  such that 
the pairs of constituents (Cl and C'l, C2 and C'2,*.*) each satisfy D3, 
and similarly for constituents immediately dominated by those, until the 
ultimate constituents are reached.
3.^3 The operation of a semantic component in transformational grammar 
does not normally allow for the distinction between synthetic and analytic
synonymy to apply to sentences, since projection rules are cumulative,
i.e. include an erasure proviso. Thus amalgations of readings will be 
accomplished by a rule such as:
1 Given two paths of the form
(1) Lexical Stringy— ^ syntactic markers of head 
(a^)— $ (a^)-^* •. -Ka^-^flJ^set of strings of 
markers
(2) Lexical Stringy— > syntactic markers of modifier 
—> (b^) (b^)^* • • (b^ )-?* [2] -^ set of strings of
markers jQ
such that there is a substring cr of the string of
syntactic or semantic head markers and There
is an amalgam of the form
Lexical Stringy + Lexical Stringy— dominating
node marker — > (a,) —> (a_)-> • •. ~>(a )—>(b_ )—> (b„)-—>—I —2 —n —1 —2
[[2] till<-Sl> •
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where any b is null when (3 a^) (b^ = a .) and [[23 [l]] is
Cl J when [2] = [1] a'1
Katz 8c Fodor comment as follows:
’The limiting case, where the addition to the compound of semantic
material from the modifier is zero, is of considerable theoretical
significance. The compound unmarried bachelor is a case in point. The
erasure clause in (R_), i.e., ’’any b_ is null when (3 a.) (b. ~ a.) and
— 1 — 1 —1 - a  —  1
[[2] QL]] is [l] when [2] = [l] tells us to delete from the path
of the modifier any semantic material already represented in the path of
the head. Thus, in forming the compound unmarried bachelor all the semantic
information in the path of the modifier unmarried will be deleted so that
the derived path for unmarried bachelor will contain no more than the
semantic material which comes from the path for bachelor. The failure
of the modifier to add semantic information would appear to account for
the intuition that such expressions as unmarried bachelor are redundant
and that, correspondingly, such statements as TtBachelors are unmarried”
2are empty, tautological, vacuous, uninformative.1
Katz 8c Postal give a similar formulation for amalgamation by pro-
■z
jection rule and defend it by asserting that ’it makes no sense to 
include the semantic markers (Human) and (Female) twice in the reading 
associated with the compound expression spinster aunt just because each 
of the readings combined contains occurrences of both these markers. In
1. Katz 8c Fodor 1963 p. 307.
2. Katz & Fodor 1963 P* 509*
3. Katz 8c Postal 196^ p* 21*
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the derived reading for spinster aunt one occurrence of these markers
kis sufficient; another occurrence of each adds no semantic information' • 
What derived readings miss in this way is the fact that pairs like 
spinster aunt and unmarried aunt are, if synonymous, synthetically but 
not analytically synonymous. If we substitute for the first word in 
unmarried aunt the word spinster we produce a phrase synthetically 
synonymous with unmarried aunt; but we have not done it by substituting 
a synonym for unmarried. This is indeed implicit in the elimination of 
the 'redundant' semantic information by the projection rule in the case of 
spinster aunt; but the derived reading no longer distinguishes betv/een 
various ways in which the 'nonredundant' information represented by the 
reading has been accumulated. Thus all the synonymy definitions associated 
with the semantic component are in effect definitions of synthetic synonymy.
It follows that differences between analytically and synthetically 
synonymous constituents are not allowed to contribute to the derived 
reading(s) of the sentences in which they occur. But this is a mistake.
For it takes no account of the distinction normally drawn by logicians 
between two kinds of semantic equivalence. Analytic synonymy, as the 
term has been used here, corresponds to what is sometimes called 
'intensional isomorphism', or else appears as one of two possible varieties 
of 'equivalence in analytic meaning'.
Carnap gives the following account of intensional isomorphism:
'Let us consider, as an example, the expressions '2+3' and 
'II sum V' in a language S containing numerical expressions and
f^. Katz & Postal 196^ p« 28 n. 10
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arithmetical functors. Let us suppose that we see from the 
semantical rules of S that both ' + ' and 'sum' are functors for the 
function Sum and hence are L-equivalent; and, further, that the 
numerical signs occurring have their ordinary meanings and hence 
'2' and 'II* are L-equivalent to one another, and likewise '5' and 
'V', Then we shall say that the two expressions are intensionally 
isomorphic or that they have the same intensional structure, 
because they not only are L-equivalent as a whole, both being 
L-equivalent to *7f, but consist of three parts in such a way that 
corresponding parts are L-equivalent to one another and hence have 
the same intension. Now it seems advisable to apply the concept 
of intensional isomorphism in a somewhat wider sense so that it 
holds also between expressions like '2 + 5' and 'sum (II,V)', 
because the use in the second expression of a functor preceding the 
two argument signs instead of one standing between them or of 
parentheses and a comma may be regarded as an inessential syntactic 
device. Analogously, if and 'Gr* are L-equivalent, and 
likewise '3’ and 'III', then v/e regard *3^3" as int ensionally 
isomorphic to 'Gr(V,IIl)'. Here again we regard the two predicators 
' >' and 'Gr' as corresponding to each other, irrespective of their 
places in the sentences; further, we correlate the first argument 
expression of ' )> ' with the first of 'Gr', and the second with the 
second. Further, '2 + 3 ^ 3 f is isomorphic to 'Gr sum (II,V),III', 
because the corresponding expressions '2 + 5* and 'sum (II,V)' are 
not only L-equivalent but isomorphic. On the other hand, '7^3f
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and ’Gr sum (II,V),III' are not isomorphic; it is true that
here again the two predicators ' /' ' and 'Gr' are L-equivalent and
that corresponding argument expressions of them are likewise
L-equivalent, but the corresponding expressions '7' and 'sum
(II,V)' are not isomorphic. We require for isomorphism of two
expressions that the analysis of both down to the smallest sub-
5designators lead to analogous results' .
Lewis specifies two conditions under which expressions are equivalent 
in analytic meaning: either
'(l) if at least one is elementary and they have the same intension, 
or (2) if, both being complex, they can be so analysed into 
constituents that (a) for every constituent in either, there is a 
corresponding constituent in the other which has the same intension,
(b) no constituent distinguished in either has zero intension or 
universal intension, and (c) the order of corresponding constituents 
is the same in both, or can be made the same without alteration of
g
the intension of either whole expression' ,
Condition (l) would include cases of synthetic synonymity, while
condition (2) would include only cases of analytic synonymity.
The use which can be made of the distinction - as e.g. in Carnap's
7
solution of Moore's paradox of analysis - affords ample evidence of its
importance, and at the same time of the inadequacy of the transformationalist'
5. Carnap 19^7 § lzUl.
6. Lewis 1 9 ^  p* 2*+6.
7. Carnap 19^7 § 15.1.
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concept of 'synonymy1 (='synthetic synonymy'). For the transform™ 
ationalist who operates with a semantic component as described by Katz, 
Fodor and Postal must say that the sentences 
(6) A brother is a brother 
and (7) A brother is a male sibling
although having different P-markers are 'fully synonymous' (are 'full 
paraphrases'), and he is thus unable to explain how it is that these 
sentences have different communicational uses, and in particular how it is 
that (6) is totally uninformative whereas (7) is not. This difference 
cannot be attributed to the difference in form between (6) and (7)» 
and must therefore be attributable to a difference between the meanings 
of the sentences* Yet, according to the transformationalist's account, 
there will be no difference between the meanings of the sentences.
Such examples point clearly to the need for distinguishing between 
two quite different implications of synonymity statements in a way which 
is, again, irrelevant at the level of phonological analysis.
3.5 The notion of 'intrinsic synonymy' (3*3) raises the question of how, 
ultimately, a distinction is to be drawn between items which just 'happen' 
to be synonymous, and those whose surface synonymity reflects an underlying 
identity at some more abstract level; as e.g. when we consider why one 
should treat pairs like
John kissed Mary 
and Mary was kissed by John
as coming from the same or noncontrastive P-markers, but not pairs like
John pleased Mary 
and Mary liked John.
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It may be - and has been - regarded as a defect in Chomskyite trans­
formational grammar that pairs of the latter type are not treated as 
transformationally related in a way that derives them from a common deep 
structure* Both pairs appear to be synthetically synonymous, and in a 
way which is systematically related to the synonymity of many parallel 
pairs of sentences in English.
A proposal which merits consideration in the present context is the 
following:
A3 In axy and bxy, a and b are synonymous if whatever difference 
in meaning there may be between axy and bxy is entirely 
determined by a difference in relations between deep and 
surface structure of axy and bxy.
Thus, for example, if a and b are verbs, and the semantic difference 
between axy and bxy resides in the fact that the ■logical subject1 of axy 
is also'the * grammatical subject' of the sentence, whereas the 'logical 
subject’ of bxy is not, then it becomes possible to regard that difference 
as automatically determining the choice between a and b if a and b make 
no other independent contributions to the meanings of axy and bxy, and if 
these deep structure/surface structure relations are characteristic for 
sentences containing a and b.
3.51 In Fillmore's elaboration of the theory of case grammar, it is 
proposed to treat the relations between various pairs of verbs as under 
A3* Each sentence is envisaged as having a 'case frame' which specifies 
the 'array of cases' the sentence provides. Case frames are represented 
in square brackets, with 'underline' indicating the position of the
156
element with respect to which the expression is an environmental frame;
e.g. the frame [   a ] is one into which the verb run may be
inserted, ’A1 standing for the Agentive case and specifying the require­
ment of a 'typically animate perceived instigator of the action identified 
by the verb*\ Verbs are envisaged as having in their lexical entries 
'frame features' which indicate the set of case frames into which the verb 
in question may be inserted. Frame features are represented in square 
brackets with '+' or in front, indicating that the set of case 
frames represented by the expression within the brackets is that which will 
(if the feature is marked or which will not (if the feature is
marked accept the lexical item in question. Parentheses indicate
optional choices, and linked parentheses the obligatory inclusion of at 
least one of the elements so linked. Thus the verb kill has the frame
feature '+[______D(ljA)] * specifying the requirement of 'An animate
being affected by the state or action identified by the verb', and either 
an 'inanimate force or object causally involved in the action or state 
identified by the verb', or a 'typically animate perceived instigator of 
the action identified by the verb', or both. Verbs are regarded as being 
distinguished one from another not only in respect of the case frames 
into which they can be inserted, but also in respect of their trans­
formational properties, including the selection of particular NPs to 
become surface subject or surface object of the verb.
1. Fillmore 1968 pp. 2^-25* Other cases are: Instrumental ('I'),
Dative ('D'), 'Factitive ('F'), Locative ('L') and Objective ('0').
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When sentences are analysed in this way, it is feasible to show,
according to Fillmore, 'that some syntactically different words are in
fact semantically identical (with respect to that aspect of their meanings
which is independent of the contribution of the associated cases)' . Thus
like and please 'may be described as being synonymous. Each has the
frame feature + £_________ 0 + D] ; they differ only in their subject
selection features. The verb like, in fact, has in its history the
2subject selection feature possessed by please1 •
2* Fillmore 1968 p. 30. According to Moore, the situation is somewhat 
more complicated than Fillmore allows for. Citing the examples
(lc) I liked the play 
(id) The play pleased me
(6a) The children pleased Sue yesterday by making their beds 
(6k) Sue liked the children yesterday for making their beds
Moore observes: 'I believe (6a) is ambiguous between the reading
that Sue was pleased by the children where the children are in the 
same case relation, OBJECT, to Sue as, in (id), play is to me and 
on the other hand the reading that the children are not in the case 
relation dominating the play,- but are dominated by AGENT and thus 
are assigned the reading: animate responsible source of the action
identified by the verb. Evidence that (6a) is indeed ambiguous 
is provided by sentences such as
the children set out to please Sue 
the children set out to like Sue
where the first, but not the second, seems a clear case of an 
ordinary sentence needing no special interpretation. This much 
additional evidence suggests that please requires in its case frame
the contextual feature +[ _____ OA] with the further constraint
that the OBJECT selected must be £+ human] , an object selection 
feature that does not apply to like' (Moore 1970).
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3*52 On this basis, a classification of lexical items may be dravm up,
depending on the various possible ways in which synonymy combines with
variation of frame features and other grammatical differentiae. Like
and please will belong to the class of synonyms showing identical frame
features. Show and see, on the other hand, will be synonyms which
contrast in presence vs. absence of a particular case category in their
frame features (show = + £_______ Q + D + a] v s . see = + £______  0 + D]
Whereas see and look will be synonyms which contrast in the substitution
of one case category for another in their respective frame features
(see =   0 + D] vs. look = +£______  0 + Aj )
3.53 An analysis on basically similar lines (although without the
specific case grammar framework) is involved in Lyons's proposals to
treat kill and die as 'alternative, syntactically-conditioned, phonological
1realizations of the 'same' verb' , or, more specifically, to treat kill 
as 'the lexicalized' two-place causative form of die', and likewise 
French montrer as 'the 'lexicalized' three-place causative of voir* •
Lyons suggests that the deep-structure descriptions of sentences will employ 
such labels as ' ag* (= Agentive) and * + caus' ( = Causative), and 
that the lexicon should contain e.g. such information under soft as will 
permit 'soft: + caus' to be realized as soften .
1. Fillmore 1968 pp. 30-31•
X. Lyons 1968 §8.2.^.
2. Lyons 1968 §8.2.1*K
3. Lyons 1968 §8.3.6.
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3*5^ Fillmore's proposals amount in effect to modifying the scope of
the concept 'synonymy' in a way which may be quite simply related to
2_
earlier proposals in generative grammar as follows (ignoring possible 
differences of opinion about the interpretation of particular examples). 
Under the definition of synonymy whereby
(D3) G and C^are fully synonymous with respect to PM and PM/ 
if and only if the set ox readings associated with the 
node labeled 'C' in PM and the set of readings associated 
with the node labeled *G/| in PM^are identical; PM may 
equal PM/•^
1. e*g. Katz & Fodor 19&3* Katz 8c Postal 196^ -*
2, Katz 8c Postal 196^ p* 27*
1 6 0
it emerges that in the case of constituents consisting of single items 
listed in the lexicon, two such items must have identical lexical 
entries in order to qualify as full synonyms. For only on that condition 
will the readings in question, i.e. the paths comprising a complete 
sequence of symbols for syntactic marker(s), semantic marker(s), distin- 
guisher (if any) and selection restriction(s), be identical.
Let us now introduce the term * 8-readingf to refer to that section 
of a path in a lexical entry excluding syntactic markers and selection 
restrictions, i.e. that part of the path comprising only a subsequence 
of semantic marker(s) and distinguisher if any.
We may now define ’nuclear equivalents’ as lexical items which do 
not differ in respect of their S-readings.
The suggestions made by Fillmore concerning the relation between 
the pairs like and please, show and see etc. amount to extending the 
term ’synonymy’ to cover cases of nuclear equivalence in instances such 
as these, together with a concomitant proposal about the deep-structure
syntactic characterization of lexical items by reference to cases, this
new method of characterisation allowing us to restrict the information 
required in the Spreading in various ways.
3*55 The question may now be put: 'What is there to choose between
a concept of synonymy which admits nuclear equivalence as a sufficient 
condition of the synonymity of lexical items (in at least some cases) 
and one which does not?'
What is ultimately at issue here is the validity of rival views
of the boundary between semantics and grammar. In order to count different
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lexical items as synonymous, we must be able to show that any apparent 
semantic difference between them is in fact ’merely grammatical’ and 
thus can plausibly be accounted for at the grammatical level, leaving 
the items in question to be characterized as identical at the semantic 
level,
Fillmore is open to the criticism of failure to provide this 
justification, and the criticism is not merely that he has omitted to do 
so, but that his position affords no possible basis for doing so.
It Is true that Fillmore has shown how to describe certain simil­
arities and differences between words by employing a grammatical term­
inology ('Agentive1, 'Dative', ’subject selection' etc.); but it would, 
be naive to suppose that it followed from the correctness and consistency 
of such descriptions that the facts described were grammatical facts.
The reason why e.g. like and please cannot be regarded as synonyms 
which happen to differ in 'subject selection’ is the same as the reason 
why king and queen cannot be regarded as synonyms which happen to differ 
in 'gender'; namely, that no amount of grammatical description or 
re-description will reduce the semantic difference. Particular 
grammatical and semantic facts may be closely interrelated: that does not
mean that there is a class of facts with regard to which it is an 
arbitrary choice, or one of convenience, whether we say they are part 
of the speaker’s grammatical knowledge, or part of his semantic knowledge. 
And even if there were such a ’borderline’ class, the facts about like 
and please have no stronger claim to be put in it than the facts about 
king and queen. It is, for example, quite clearly a grammatical fact
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about king and queen that either can be substituted for the other salva 
grammaticalitate in the sentence frame
The -------- —  lived in a palace.
To call it also a grammatical fact that the substitution cannot be effected 
salva significatione would make nonsense of any distinction between 
grammatical and semantic knowledge. (It would simply leave us to find 
new terms for a distinction between two essentially different types of 
'grammatical' knowledge.)
Similarly, it is a grammatical fact about like and please that 
either can be substituted for the other salva grammaticalitate in the 
sentence frame
John  ------- s Mary.
Equally, it is a semantic fact that the substitution cannot be effected 
salva significatione. But to say this is to say that there is a semantic 
difference between them. And to say that there is a semantic difference 
between two expressions is to deny their synonymity.
3.^6 If we hold that the boundary between grammar and semantics is 
relative to the form of linguistic analysis adopted, there is nothing to 
prevent the construction of an account of English according to which 
lion and tiger are synonyms, and 'stripedness' etc. are accounted for 
in the grammar as syntactic features. (This absurdity is an absurdity 
only because no plausible grammar of English is likely to operate in that 
way, not because no grammar of English could operate in that way.) The 
alternative is to hold, as has been maintained here, that the difference 
between grammatical and semantic knowledge is given in advance of linguistic
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analysis. Theories of synonymy based on the former assumption would 
have no requirements amenable to general discussion, and consequently 
fall outside the scope of the present study.
Synonymy and semantic analysis*
**•0 In semantic analysis questions of synonymy arise in con­
nexion with establishing the general (i*e* language-neutral) 
conditions governing criteria for relational characterizations of a 
certain kind in semantic descriptions* A semantic description 
is here taken to be an account of the semantic knowledge shared by the 
participants in communication-situations* In the case of a natural 
language, we postulate semantic knowledge in order to account for 
certain features of communication between language-users* In the
case of a constructed language, the specification of semantic 
knowledge serves to delimit the possibilities of communication between 
language-users* In either case, there must be procedures for
determining whether given expressions are in fact used in accordance 
with given semantic characterizations* These are the procedures 
which, in the case of a natural language, would be appealed to in 
order to support a correct characterization or to refute an erroneous 
one*
•^01 There are two types of semantic characterization we are 
particularly concerned with, and they may be represented as 
follows:
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A characterization of the former type tells us that expression 
f* and expression b, do not differ semantically, while a charact­
erization of the latter type tells us that ex£>ression .a differs 
semantically ( in some unspecified respect) from expression jb*
It is proposed to explicate the notion of a synonymity statement 
for purposes of semantic analysis - i.e. to answer the question 
"what is it to say of two expressions of L that they are (or are 
not) synonymous?1 - by reference to characterizations of the 
above types* We shall examine ho\r such a statement might be 
justified for any pair of expressions a. and b in a language L*
To do this, it will be necessary to consider how -character­
izations are related to characterizations of a different kind*
4*02 It is clear that a semantic description of L which pro­
vided only semantic characterizations of type *^ 1* and type 
f^2* would be incomplete in the obvious sense that, while 
telling us whether any expression of L did or did not differ 
semantically from any other expression of L, it would fail to 
tell us in what way any two semantically differing expressions 
differed* It would thus fall short of an adequate account of 
a competent speaker*s semantic knowledge of those expressions*
For example, a semantic description of English which includes 
the following £2 characterization
* rhinoceros ^ dibat as: * 
tells us that the words rhinoceros and dibatae: differ semantically.
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But in order to discover how they differ we should need to have 
available semantic characterizations of a different type from *£2* *
t
for example
1rhinoceros: quadruped with horned nose..**.*1 
1dibatag: long-necked antelope•••••••••'•
Characterizations like these will be termed *cr - characterizations* 
or 1 substantive semantic characterizations* and represented as 
'a:
*b: p**»****' etc*,
to distinguish them from the ’relational semantic characterizations* 
of type *^>1 * and type Vg2' • These typographical conventions 
correspond to the fact that *a*, *b* etc * are expressions of the 
object-language (or language under description), while *<x*, *^ * etc* 
are expressions of the metalanguage (or language of description)*
We may distinguish between a. stronger and a weaker condition 
to be imposed on semantic characterizations* In the case of 
£• -characterizations, the weaker condition is met if the metalinguistic 
description states a meaning for the given expression, but without 
indicating the semantic structure of the expression, i*e* without 
analysing the expression into its meaning-bearing elements, or stating 
how a composite meaning for the whole is provided by the arrangement of 
these elements* For example, the characterization 'sour apple* for 
an expression £ does not in itself indicate e*g* whether or not there 
is one part of e_ which means 'sour* and another part of £ which means
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'apple*, and another part, or feature of arrangement , of je 
which combines these two meanings in the way indicated by the 
metalinguistic expression 'sour apple'* The stronger cond­
ition for ^ -characterizations is that they should provide pre­
cisely such an analysis* Yfe may term characterizations which 
meet only the weaker condition 'synthetic characterizations', 
and those which meet the stronger 'analytic characterizations?* 
In keeping with the distinction earlier drawn (3*27, 3*4) 
between synthetic and analytic synonymy, we may likewise dis­
tinguish between synthetic and analytic ^ -characterizations, 
the former indicating only whether two expressions do or do not 
differ semantically as wholes, and the latter whether or not 
they differ semantically in respect of their internal structure* 
For notational convenience, we may distinguish when nec­
essary by prefixing '_S' in the case of synthetic, and *A* in
the case of analytic characterizations (So* A ¥ 1>¥2> ¥ 2) 
1/hen that distinction is irrelevant to the discussion, the pre­
fixed letter may be omitted*
In this way it is possible to treat a semantic description
1. Explicit proposals for systematizing semantic descriptions are 
discussed in Katz & Fodor 1963, Katz & Postal 1964, Weinreich 
1966, Katz 1967, and elsewhere. Such systematizations are not 
our present concern* Since the issues to be discussed in the
present chapter arise independently of any specific proposals 
as to the best means of arranging the information in a semantic 
description , it will be preferable to continue to treat sem­
antic characterizations in the abstract way exemplified above. 
For our interest here is in the content of a characterization, 
not in how that content ought to be represented,broken down, 
and related to other characterizations by means of devices such 
as projection rules,semantic markers etc* Furthermore, confin­
ement to a systematization of the kind currently accepted in 
work on the semantic component of a generative grammar is un­
acceptable, since that model embodies presupposition of the 
semantic determinacy of expressions, a position which is not 
well established (see below, and Bolinger 1965 p*57l)*
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as a store of information organized so as to produce when re­
quired cr -characterizations and ^  -characterizations; that is, 
for any given expression the description will provide a sequence 
of metalinguistic symbols (its <£ -characterization) formulating 
the competent speaker's semantic knowledge of that expression, 
and for any given pair of expressions the description provides a 
metalinguistic symbolization (^-characterization) expressing their 
semantic equivalence or non-equivalence. Such a description, if 
eschaustive, gives a complete account of the semantic knowledge of 
a speaker of L in the sense of including the information that 
would be given by a complete inventory of the expressions of L 
with their substantive semantic characterizations. It will tell 
us not merely that expressions of L differ semantically, but in 
detail how they differ semantically. Although a complete inven­
tory, i.e. list, cannot be drawn up if L is a natural language, 
because of the indefinitely large number of sentences in any 
natural language, the information available will nonetheless enable 
us to find the appropriate substantive semantic characterization 
for any desired sentence. By the same token, a complete list of 
synonymous expressions cannot be drawn up: the most we can hope
for if L is a natural language is to be able to determine for any 
desired pair of expressions whether or not their substantive 
semantic characterizations are the same.
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This completes our account of the minimum conceptual 
apparatus required to iachle synonymy as a problem of semantic 
description. T^e next step is an inquiry into the justification 
of ^  -characterizations.
4*1 We may approach the question of the relationship between 
relational characterizations (=£> -characterizations) and substan­
tive characterizations (£ -characterizations) by supposing first 
of all that we have available a completed semantic description of 
L, and postulating that it is organized in such a way that the 
-characterization for a, and b, expresses the identity or non­
identity of whatever £  -characterizations are assigned to a, and b*
On this assumption, relational characterizations of type * o^l* are 
abbreviated statements to the effect that a. and b, have the same 
<r -characterization, while relational characterizations of type 
1 ^2* are abbreviated statements to the effect that a, and l> do not 
have the same £ -characterization. We may term a semantic des­
cription of h which gives both relational and substantive 
characterizations an 1 internally consistent1 description if for 
any a and any b a & -characterization fa = b* appears if and only
“  r  —  —
if a and b have the same cr -characterization, and a £ -character-—  —  —  f
ization *£ *= b1 appears if and only if a and b do not have the 
same £  -characterization. In the case of synthetic £ -character­
izations there will be a corresponding synthetic £  -characterization
/
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(of type S&l or §^2)9 while in the case of analytic or -characteriz 
ati<m& .-there, will he a corresponding, analytic ^ -characterization 
(of type Ap1 or Ap2).
/ i
4*11 A criterion has now heen formulated hy which the in­
ternal consistency of semantic descriptions may be judged. 
Obviously, however, a particular semantic description of L might 
easily pass the criterion of internal consistency, yet be wrong 
in the sense of giving an erroneous account of the semantic facts. 
For exajnj^ le, a semantic description of English which contained 
the -characterization
Rhinoceros = dibatag* 
and the & -characterizations
Rhinoceros; quadruped with horned nose.*#., 
and 'dibatag; quadruped with horned nose... ••1
would be (in this resx>ect) an internally consistent description, 
but it would be wrong in view of the fact (granted that it is a 
fact) that for speakers of English the words rhinoceros and 
dibatag are not semantically identical, and specifically in view 
of the*fact that 1 quadruped with horned nose..*1 (granted the 
usual sense of these words in English, here taken to be the 
metalanguage) is not a correct semantic characterization of 
dibatag.
It follows that we cannot adequately characterize that 
semantic knowledge which is knowledge of synonymy in terms of the
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structure of a description of L, since the strongest guarantee 
of synonymy* this account gives is one of internal consistency 
of the semantic description of L. But because it is possible 
to construct an internally consistent description which could 
be wrong about instances of synonymity, there would be no way 
of deciding which of two different but internally consistent 
semantic descriptions of L correctly represented the knowledge 
of synonymy of speakers of L*
The difference between two rival semantic descriptions 
need not involve gross incompatibilities (as between a des- 
ciRption of English which included the ^  -characterization 
Rhinoceros ® dibataaRnd a description of English which in­
cluded the ^  -characterization Rhinoceros ^ dibatag*)» It 
might be the case that description fA* draws more or different 
semantic distinctions as compared with description *3*, with 
the result that expressions which are characterized as semant­
ically equivalent under one description are characterized as show-
1
ing a slight semantic difference under the other . Thus we 
should have two rather different accounts of the speakers1 know­
ledge of synonymy; but again the question which account was to 
be preferred could not be settled by reference to the internal 
structure of the descriptions concerned*
1* This situation is found in dictionaries which purport to
be dictionaries of the same natural language* One diction­
ary draws a distinction between two words which another 
dictionary glosses identically.
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4.12 The reason why proposals in semantics which afford no 
basis for external criteria of synonymy (i.e. criteria which 
go outside the structure of the semantic description) lack the 
means of deciding questions about the correctness of -charact- 
izations is that they leave unclear which facets of the speaker's 
semantic knowledge are to be understood as corresponding to the 
concept ’synonymy*♦ For example, in 'The structure of a semantic 
theory* Katz & Fodor speak of 'the ability to interpret sent­
ences', and distinguish various aspects of this ability;
'The speaker's exercise of this ability....provides 
empirical data for the construction of a semantic 
theory, just as the construction of a grammar draws 
upon empirical data supplied by the exercise of the 
speaker's ability to distinguish well-formed sen­
tences from ungrammatical strings, to recognize 
syntactic ambiguity, and to appreciate relations 
between sentence types. A semantic theory describes 
and explains the interpretative ability of speakers: 
by accounting for their performance in determining the 
number and content of the readings of a sentence; by 
detecting semantic anomalies; by deciding upon para­
phrase relations between sentences; and by marking
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every other semantic property or relation that 
plays a role in this ability*' ^
This formulation could perhaps serve as a model for drafting 
a preliminary statement about that aspect of the speaker*s 
semantic knowledge which corresponds to the concept 'synonymy1*
If for 'ability to interpret sentences' one substitutes 
'ability to interpret expressions' , then we could suppose that 
the speaker has the ability to place every pair of different 
expressions in the language into one or other of two classes, 
according to whether members of a given pair do or do not re­
ceive the same interpretation* Knowledge of synonymy would 
thus correspond to that part of interpretative ability which 
informs the speaker's judgments of interpretational 'sameness' 
and 'difference'*
But this takes us only as far as the notion of 
\p. -characterization' already discussed* For talk of the 
speaker's ability to put pairs of expressions into classes 
cannot be taken as indicating a type of informant test criterial 
for determining instances of synonymity* Until further progress 
can be made towards stating what typical skills flow from know­
ledge of synonymy, no more has been done than to draw a tentative
1* Katz & Fodor 19&3 P* 486*
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and quite general distinction within a certain area of ling­
uistic knowledge. (it is as if one had said, for example, 
that it is to be supposed that part of having normal vision is 
being able to detect similarities and differences of colour: 
doubtless true, but no more than a point of departure and, as 
the statement of an explicandum, a yague one at that.)
The clarification supplied in 'The structure of a semantic 
theory* is hardly satisfactory* A distinction appears to be 
drawn between two types of case where q language might have 
expressions differing in form but identical in meaning, the term 
'synonym' being restricted to expressions which constitute in­
dividual lexical items in the dictionary, and the term 'paraphrase* 
being applied to expressions which constitute sentences of the 
language* No account is given of communicational skills which 
correspond to knowledge of synonyms; but there is an account of 
'paraphrasing skill'. The coumiunication-situation imagined is 
that of speakers of English receiving an anonymous letter con­
taining only the English sentence '£>'• Their ability to in­
terpret *£}' is contrasted with that of 'persons who do not speak 
English, but are equipped with a completely adequate grammar of 
English'* 'Paraphrasing skill* is listed among the abilities 
of the speakers of English, and described in the following terms: 
'Finally, whatever sentence the anonymous letter 
contains, as a rule, speakers of English can easily 
decide what sentences are paraphrases of it and what
1?6
are not in the sense that they can answer such 
questions as; what does the letter say? does 
the letter say such-and-such? how can what the 
letter says be rephrased? This facet of the 
speaker's ability cannot be referred to his 
mastery of grammar either, for the group who are 
equipped with a grammar but who do not speak
English will be unable to tell whether or not a
\
sentence is a paraphrase of iS. The reasons are 
simply that there need be no definite grammatical 
relation between a sentence and its pax'aphrases; 
e.g. "Two chairs are in the room" and "There are 
at least two things in the room and each is a 
chair;" and that where a definite grammatical re­
lation obtains between a pair of sentences, 
neither need be a paraphrase of the other, e.g.
"The ball was hit by the man" and "The ball was 
hit," "The man hit the ball," and "The man did 
not hit the ball*" Thus, still another facet of 
the speaker's semantic ability which must fall
within the domain of a semantic theory is his
2
parapftra &ing skill•'
Katz & Fodor 1963 pp. 493-k.
V 7
This account invites, if it does not involve, a serious 
confusion between speech acts (e*g* those comprising a letter) 
and sentences* '"What does the letter say?1 is a question 
about speech acts, and so are the other questions put to the 
two imaginary groups of ‘informants** It thus appears that 
the Eatz-Fo&or account of paraphrasing skill is based on a 
latent theory of speech acts; but this theory is never made 
explicit, still less justified* Insofar as one can recon­
struct it from the somewhat scanty remarks in 'The structure 
of a semantic theory', it appears to involve at least the 
following thesisi
(All?) sentences in L can be grouped into pairs 
(e*g* 'SI* and *S2') or larger sdts ('SI', 'S2', 
'S3'****) of Paraphrases * between which certain 
(so far unspecified) semantic relations hold*
A speech act which is a question about the purport 
of another (any other?) speech act involving the 
utterance of 'Sx' can be correctly (and fully?) 
answered if (and only if?) the answerer knows 
whether some other sentence 'Sy* is a paraphrase 
of 'Sx'*
But if this partial reconstruction of the speech act theory 
underlying 'The structure of a semantic theory' is in essen­
tials correct, it becomes evident that the only account given
of 'paraphrasing skill' is a circular one* That is to say, 
'paraphrasing skill* is presented as (part of) the knowledge which 
enables the speaker to perform successfully certain speech acts, 
the speech acts in question being those which manifest a knowledge 
of paraphrases. This circularity is further evident in Katz & Fodor's 
comments on projection rules: e.g. it is asserted that the semantic
interpretation assigned by the projection rules must 'account...for 
the speaker's ability to understand sentences by, inter alia, suit-
A  V V * <5- ..jr.-7-T -xJT&Jyt ■*
ably relating 'sentences speakers know to be paraphrases of each other 
In other words , the rules must account for paraphrasing skill by mark­
ing paraphrases as paraphrases*
This leaves an explanatory gap in 'The structure of a semantic 
theory', a gap which is not — and could not be - filled by occasional 
exemplifications i.e. it is of no avail to say that e.g. There are 
at least two things in the room and each is a chair is a paraphrase 
of Two chairs are in the room* For this is merely to agree to call
f W K U l  Boat!fi.rar.afl U =^3B5»1-------lUMUUja v
a certain pair of sentences 'paraphrases', i.e. we here explain 
'paraphrasing skill* as knowledge that e.g* a, and b 'are paraphrases'•
3. Katz & Fodor 1963 pp*494-4*
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But what one wants to know is not what to call such sentences, 
hut just what it means to call them 'paraphrases'
There might he two possible explanations of this lacuna 
in 'The structure of a semantic theory'* One would be that 
'paraphrase' is not defined because there is already an est­
ablished and generally accepted theory of paraphrases, too
4* A similar objection may be brought against the use of 
the term 'paraphrase* by Southworth, who proposes 'that 
we consider as basic linguistic data the information 
that certain parte of a corpus are paraphrases of each 
other* (Southworth 1967 p*345)* In Southworth's case 
the objection is particularly crucial, since 'paraphrase* 
is a key term* Southworth* s claim is that paraphrase 
is one of the two 'inter-sentence relations* to which 
all others can be reduced. But it is not at all clear 
what Southworth means when he calls certain sentences of 
English 'paraphrases'* E.g* The committee rejected the 
proposal unanimously is said to have as 'paraphrases' 
both The committee's rejection of the proposal was tin- 
animous and Each of the committee members rejected the
eee#*jawcewtt a m o H A  nr* i m * n m u .  j*.-i*ii— e—  m  m w . n L w w tao n M ^ i r n v M K M a c i c E i a *
proposal* But it seems at least contentious that the 
truth conditions for these three sentences are identical, 
and thus in doubt whether they have the same meaning. 
Southworth*s comment that to call two sentences 'paraphrases' 
is not the same as saying that they 'mean the same1 is 
hardly illuminating, and apart from examples the only 
explanation of his claim is, unfortunately, a definition 
which relies on a prior notion (that of 'implication') 
which stands in just as much need of clarification*
well known to need explicit recapitulation* But this cannot 
he the explanation because in 1963, when Katz & Fodor's paper 
was first i^ ublished, there was no such theory. The other 
explanation would be the 1 we -a 11-kn o w- ( r ou gh ly ) -wlia t -i s-me ant- 
by-'x*' explanation. But this is an explanation which will 
not do at all here. Insofar as we do know (roughly) what is 
meant by Katz & Fodor's 'paraphrase', it is because we have 
read other (equally vague) grammatical and philosophical 
writings where that term is employed, not because we know as 
a matter of experience as language-users that there 'are 
paraphrases', that paraphrases 'really exist*• (The case is 
analogous to that of 'sense datum'. The term 'sense datum* 
gets is sense from its (somewhat controversial) role in dis­
cussions of the philosophy of perception, not from our obser­
vations of people (including ourselves) engaged in perceiving. 
Accordingly, it would be quite question-begging to impose as 
an empirical constx'aint on a theory of pei’ception that it 
account correctly for sense-data.) Of course, doubtless 
speakers do, in particular situations, react to the utterance 
of different sentences in ways which are in certain respects 
similar. But in order to clarify the concept 'paraphrase', 
what needs to be made clear is which of these similarities, 
or which aspects of these similarities, are under discussion 
when the term 'paraphrase' is used.
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The question then arises: what is the point of imposing 
upon a semantic theory - or upon any theory* for that matter — 
an empirical condition of adequacy *K* (in this case *K* is 
1 correct account of paraphrasing skill*) prior to a definition 
of the terms used in stating *Kf?
The answer is: none* .And the obvious explanation for
the appearance of such a condition in *The structure of a 
semantic theory* is simply that the alleged semantic skills 
have been invented in advance to provide explanatory functions 
suited to the capacity of the model which its authors are about 
to propose for the semantic component of a linguistic descrip­
tion*
To say this* it should be noted, is not to deny the 
utility of the model: it is simply to advocate dropping the
pretence that *K* states an empirical constraint*
*ul3 One further general point should be made concerning the 
correlation of descriptions to describienda* One might agree 
with someone who maintained that an important requirement for 
road-maps was that B-roads should be max^ ked as B-roads* 
Agreement with such a person is not entirely vacuous, inasmuch
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as there might be others who maintained the (surprising) thesis
that B-roads should be marked as A-roads, or others again who 
maintained that B-roads should never he marked at all* Thus 
agreeing with Katz & Po&or that paraphrases should be marked as 
paraphrases is to cast a vote against e*g. such proposals as 
that paraphrases should be marked as semantically anomalous, or 
that paraphrases should not be indicated at all. But the 
theorist of map-making may have a critic who maintains that, 
since a map purports to provide correct information about roads, 
unless there is an agreed definition of what counts as a B-road 
it may be misleading for a map to distinguish between B-roads 
and others. The same critic might also point out that, in the 
absence of such a definition, it is difficult to know exactly 
what insistence on the principle of marking B-roads as B-roads 
amounts to* To such a critic our theorist of map-making might 
perhaps reply: H!3verybody knows what a B-road is. In any
case, if there is someone who doesn't, then he should not look 
to me to supply a definition, because it is not my job."
(One would then form an appropriate viev; of his claim to be a 
theorist of map-making.) But it would be even sillier of him 
to reply: "Oh, but a map constructed according to my principles 
tells you which the B-roads are* The map itself supplies the 
definition*" If our theorist replied in this latter sense, he 
would have missed the point of the question, and have given a
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circular answer into the bargain* Anyone who supposed that 
'The structure of a semantic theory1 offered a means of de­
fining 'paraphrase' for any language described according to 
the principles there advocated would be involved in an exactly 
analogous circularity*
4*2 The conclusion argued for thus far has been the purely
negative one that an adequate account of knowledge of synonymy
cannot be provided in terms of the structure of the semantic 
description itself* Consideration will now be given to a 
more positive specification of the requirements, i.e* we shall 
inquire what constraints external to the structure of the 
semantic description of L affect setting up -characterizations* 
We shall first consider certain constraints which follow from 
the basic reasons for the explanatory postulation of semantic 
knowledge* Here there arises the question of how linguistic 
knowledge is connected with pragmatic judgments arising out of 
communication (e*g* judging whether what someone says is true, 
what the correct answer to someone's question is, etc*), such 
judgments presupposing the prior correct interpretation of 
words used in speech acts* We shall be particularly concerned
with the connexions between the meanings of sentences and the
possibility of using sentences to make true or false statements*
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4*21 Semantic knowledge is postulated - on the view we are 
here taking — in order to account for the possibility of 
communications! exchanges, including the exchange of information 
about extralinguistic facts. But, for epistemological reasons, 
acquiring knowledge of the truth of cannot be equated with 
understanding a verbal expression in which the statement j> is 
formulated* Otherwise, to cite Frege's example \  it could have 
been known without the help of astronomical observation that the 
sentence The Morning Star is (the same as) the Evening Star ex-nrirrfVT,niT-j ■""‘itn ra ^ tg r t'tn U ita ^  .-t .-t .-t .. ti-t Tr ^n“r m. ■wr.ico rr .n  in^- TTTrTTnrQi x r W
pi-essed a true statement. By the same token, we are led to
o
distinguish meaning from reference • For if an identity state­
ment expressed by a sentence of the form *a is b' is true, then■fc Cro) 4tra9 •
it must be the case that one and the same item X is referred to
both by the expression a, and by the expression b But if to
understand the expression a were no more and no less than to 
know that X is referred to by ci, and to undex’stand the expression 
b were likewise to know that X is referred to by b, then anyone 
who understood the sentence 'a. is b ' would also know the txmth 
of the identity statement.
1* Frege 1892.
2. In Frege's terminology, Sinn from Bedeutung. But there are 
reasons for questioning the usual translation of Frege's 
Bedeutung by reference (fugendliat 1978 )*
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4.22 The argument from identity statements enables us to
make some progress towards identifying the skills which flow
from knowledge of synonymy, for it makes apparent one con­
straint upon setting up P -characterizations, if the latter
are to serve the purpose of representing knowledge of synonymy*
Consider a proposed semantic description Sd of a language
La in which a and b are proper names having the same bearer
I M l H M  (iI U  . V
Let us suppose that JkL gives the following cr ~ characterizations:
*ju proper name of £ *
*b: proper name of E *
(where *£* is an individual constant in the metalanguage)*
It follows that if Sd is an internally consistent description
by the criterion previously proposed, Sd gives also the
-characterization:
But here the cf- characterizations represent the fact that
1* It is sometimes held that proper names *have no meaning*
(for a criticism of this doctrine, see Sjzfrensen 196j5 Ch*4), 
and it might therefore be questioned whether proper names fall 
within the scope of a theory of synonymy* The supposition 
underlying the present discussion is that a semantic descrip­
tion assigns a or -characterization to any expressions whose 
interchange systematically affects the content of speech acts* 
Thus if English speakers use e*g* Is this the road to Edinburgh? 
to ask a different question from Is this the road to London?,
A  rr^h** wi*L-»aiia ..  iwj.ijaBTnir.fcy’Ti *
and likewise I H ye in Edinburgh to make a different statement
from I live in London* etc. then the proper names Edinburgh
t*f*m eia^ym w n  i» u'l 1 ar5T%**,'OT«i9*MI.:«d * ** *
London are assigned cr -characterizations in a semantic des­
cription of English. The view that proper names have meanings 
is argued for in Erege 1892* Cf* also Searle 1958*
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speakers of La know the identity of reference of a and jb, which, 
if we accept the argument from identity statements, cannot he 
equated with knowing that a and I) have the same meaning* Thus 
if we wish our -characterizations to indicate synonymities, we 
are led to stipulate a prohibition on setting up relational
characterizations of type o^l* in any instance where the relevant
£  -characterizations merely supply an individual constant ident­
ifying the bearer of a name*
It should be noted that this prohibition also sets a con­
dition on the completeness of semantic descriptions* This is 
evident when we consider the result of applying the prohibition to 
Sd* Let us call the semantic description so modified tSdit *
In Sdi we are debarred from setting up the ^  -characterization 
!ji = b*. Should we, then, set up the *^ 2* characterization 
'a 4 bf? But this is not allowed either* for such character- 
izations are - so far - set up if and only if the relevant 
of -characterizations differ, and in this case they do not differ*
Thus we have a pair of expressions of the same semantic type 
(proper names), for which 8di fails to provide any ja -character­
ization at all. It follows that Sdi cannot be a complete description 
of La*
-An exactly parallel case can be constructed substituting for 
the proper names .a and b in La two referring expressions which are 
not proper names* In this way the argument is generalized from
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proper names to referring expressions of all kinds> and an 
exactly parallel prohibition on setting up -characterizations 
must be extended to all referring expressions. Thus if the 
jet -characterizations for referring expressions in La merely 
supply individual constants of the metalanguage identifying the 
referents of those expressions, no corresponding -character­
izations can be set up, and it must be concluded that the semantic 
description is incomplete. Such a conclusion is obviously cor­
rect, the missing element in the semantic description being a 
representation of the knowledge which might enable users of La 
to understand sentences formulating identity statements without 
ipso facto knowing the truth or falsity of the statements in 
question.
4*23 JFrege1 s argument from identity statements may be dev­
eloped further to throw some light on synonymy of referring 
expressions. 3?or if it is accepted that astronomical observ­
ation is required to determine whether or not a statement form­
ulated as The Morning Star is the Bvening Star is true, it is 
thereby implied that semantic knowledge is inadequate to settle
that question, i#e. that the truth in question is not an analytic
1
truth, and the sentence in question not an analytic sentence.
1* We may define an analytic truth as one belonging to a certain
conceptual system within which its denial is self-contradictory. 
It is thus, relative to the language in which it is expressed, 
a truth 1 grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact* 
(Quine 1961 p.20). Cox’respondingly, an Analytic sentence* may be 
defined as one expressing an analytic truth.
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But if this is so, however the meanings of the expressions 
The Morning Star arid the Bveninff Star be defined, it is at 
least clear that these expressions are not synonymous refer­
ring expressions. For if they were, then the truth of the 
identity statement would he assured without reliance on 
astronomers, since to question it would he to question the 
truth of a tautology which might he alternatively formulated 
a3 The Morning Star is the Morning Star.
This conclusion assumes: (i) that we are not dealing
2
with deferentially ambiguous* expressions , (ii) that we are 
concerned with a conceptual system in which the denial that 
X is X is self-contradictory, and (iii) that the copula sen­
tence is ’semantically endocentric* with reppect to the refer­
ring expressions occurring in it, i.e. that this is a case 
where *the meaning of a sentence is a function of the terms
2* Someone* who says John is not as tall as John does not 
contradict himself in the way he would have done by 
saying John is not as tall as himself: in the former case, 
we would normally suppose that John is referentially 
ambiguous, i.e. there are two different individuals in­
volved who happen to have the same name. Referential 
ambiguity also arises with deictic expressions; e.g. 
saying This is Luther * s translation of the New Testament, 
and this is the American Standard Version does not commit 
anyone to the proposition that one and the same text is 
simultaneously Luther’s translation and the American 
Standard Vex*sion as well.
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3
which occur in the sentence.'
We may for purposes of the present discussion define
’semantic endocentricity' as follows. Any expression is
semantically endocentrie with respect to its parts if and
only if the meaning assigned to it is exclusively determined
4
hy the meanings of the parts and of their combination*
3* Hates 1950 p.120* The sense of ’function1 here is that
borrowed from mathematics, the constituent terms and the
manner of their combination being regarded as the semantic 
variables•
4. An expression which is not semantically endocentrie is
1 semantically exocentric*. Thus, for example, the English
phrase red roof is semantically endocentrie with respect to 
the parts red and roof if the meaning of the phrase is 
uniquely determined by the meanings assigned to red('ruber*), 
roof (’tectum1), and the adjective + noun combination 
that is x*). Whereas the phrase white elephant is 
semantically exocentric if either it has no meaning deter­
mined by the meanings assigned to white (’albus1). elephant 
(’elephas1), and the adjective + noun combination ('y that is x*), 
or, as well as this meaning, has independently some other 
meaning ('unwanted gift')* (The question may arise as to why, 
in such a case, we choose not to give a semantic analysis ac­
cording to which in white elephant the adjective white may mean 
’unwanted* and the noun elephant may mean 'gift'* One answer 
might be that if neither white nor elephant occur with the 
meanings 'unwanted* and 'gift' respectively outside the one 
phrase white elephant, then the meaning 'unwanted gift' is pec­
uliar to that phrase and cannot approprx&tel^be considered the 
product of the independent meanings of white and elephant* If, 
on the other hand, white were found in other cases meaning 
'unwanted'and elephant in others meaning 'gift', the justific­
ation for regarding white elephant as semantically exocentric 
would lapse. This is not an entirely satisfactory answer, how­
ever, for there might be reasons, even were there other cases 
where white meant 'unwanted* and elephant meant 'gift',for re­
garding white elephant as semantically exocentric. One such 
reason would be if neither white gift nor unwanted elephant 
meant 'unwanted gift'*
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On the basis of assumptions (i) - (iii) we may gen­
eralize as follows. For any language L, let 'referentially 
unambiguous identity sentence1 (or '1-sentence') be defined 
as a two-place copula sentence('..*is...') in which each 
place must be filled by a referentially unambiguous refer­
ring expression of L, such that the identity statement ex­
pressed asserts the referent of the first-place expression 
to be (or, in the case of a negative I-sentence, not to be) 
identical with the referent of the second place expression. 
Now if the statements made in L belong to a conceptual system 
in which the denial that X is X is self-contradictory, a 
subclass of I-sentences of L will be analytic sentences.
Any affirmative I-sentence v/ill be analytic which conforms 
to the following rule:
r 1: for any first-place referring expression a, 
which has X as its referent, the second-place 
referring expression does not differ in 
meaning from a,.
For the supposition that the referring expressions in the 
same affirmative I-sentence might have different referents 
but not differ in meaning is incoherent, i.e. involves sup­
posing that either 'a, is iat might be false or 'a, is b* might 
be false even when a, and jb ex hypo the si do not differ in 
meaning, or both. But, given (i) and (ii), 'a is a,1 cannot 
be false, and if *ji is a1 cannot be false, 'a is b ' cannot be
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false either, since it differs from 'a, is a/ only in the 
substitution of an expression which does not differ in 
meaning from ja, and thus, given (iii), 'at is ja' and *£ is b* 
do not differ in meaning.
Thus at least there is a clear explication available of 
the notion 'synonymy of referring expressions in I-sentences*s 
namely, the notion of the relationship between referring ex­
pressions which differ in form but comply wither*. It follows 
that if L includes I-sentences, the competent sx^eaker's know­
ledge of L-synonymy may be x>srtially explicated in these terms, 
and we may say that knowledge of synonymy enables the competent 
speaker, inter alia, to determine which affirmative I-sentences 
of the form 'a, is b' reduce, by substitution of synonyms, to 
•a. is jl* •
Any language which had v* as a mandatory rule for affirm­
ative I-sentences would be characterized by the following 
features:
(1) For any communication situation such that X is the 
referent of a,, any affirmative I-sentence of L containing ja 
can be used to make a true identity statement about X.
(2) All affirmative I-sentences of L are analytic provided 
the referring expressions are not devoid of reference.
It seems clear that natural languages contain I-sentences
( j )  The highest mountain in the world is the highest
v r nan.'mpxj CX’TZi?3\5W,-w*iMISrri t a j e i a V E ' f e S c x ?  T'-’rcrm #«v> eT^rvnrtacvKQ «>>»*■«» i~- Iii^ ttit i» ^
mountain in the worldr~if  ~i fcni l  in   ....  n w u n  m-waxag-WJB fefitgR tortaA na
hut equally* clear that the generalizations formulated in (i) 
and (2) are counterinstanced respectively in natural languages 
hy sentences like
(4) The highest mountain in the world is the highest\  *  tsmwssmwm g^ijuiMMWumwiwWLji'jii m * i t h  1 ■■!■■ ■■!■ 1 h i m i■■ is m * * *  n ~r imhr m  ■ mi m ^ o i f  r  rirnwni
mountain in the British Isles 
and (5) The highest mountain in the world is the highest▼ r ctraw -**^* cg.j  11 iii^  1 < 1 I 't i im a jw ^ im  cvTar aa e$sB^5c*2$a c-ssji*rtj n u *m t n r i  n--r-rn—*—run rri.~B.mjr
mountain in Nepal*
We may therefore tentatively characterize natural languages 
as languages in which I-sentences occur hut vj is not mandatory* 
Thus some progress has been made towards identifying the com­
munications 1 skills which flow from knowledge of synonymy in the 
case of the speaker of a natural language*
4*24 Further progress can be made hy invoking the very power­
ful argument offered hy Mates, applicable to any semantically 
endocentrie sentence of L which can be used to make a true-or-false 
statement. If we change such a sentence solely by replacing one 
component expression by a synonymous expression, the resultant 
sentence must be synonymous with the original sentence, since, by 
the postulate of semantic endocentricity, the meaning of the whole 
has not been altered* In any circumstances under which the 
original sentence could be used to make a true statement, the
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resultant sentence can likewise be used to make a true state­
ment, and in any circumstances under which the original sen­
tence could be used to make a false statement, the resultant 
sentence can likewise be used to make a false statement*
Hence •synonymous expressions may be interchanged without af­
fecting the meaning or the truth value of the sentences in 
which they occur1* ^
The more interesting question then arises whether inter­
change of expressions without altering the truth value of 
sentences in which they occur is a sufficient condition of 
synonymity* On this point, Mates offers another argument, 
which may be summarized as follows*
In the tautological identity sentence ’a. is a/, a, may be 
replaced by any expression b and the statement remains true, 
provided fa is b 1 is also true. But if the semantically en- 
docentric sentences of L which may be used to make true-or- 
false statements include sentences containing a modal operator 
(*N* - •necessarily1), a stronger guarantee is required; for 
'N (a is a)1 will be true but *N (a is b)1 may be false* This 
stronger requirement is that *a is b 1 should be not merely true, 
but an analytic truth* But should the semantically endocentrie
1* Mates 1950 p* 210.
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sentences of L which xuay he used to make true-or-false 
statements also include sentences for reporting indirect 
discourse, beliefs etc., even this requirement is not strong 
enough. For since Jones may believe that *a. is a 1 without 
believing that *ja is Jb*, the sentence *N (Jones believes that 
a is a if and only if Jones believes that a, is a)1 may be 
used to make a true statement, but *N (Jones believes that £ 
is a. if and only if Jones believes that ji is ]>)* a false one, 
even where *ja is b* expresses an analytic truth. The stronger 
requirement in this case is that 'jl is Jb1 should be not merely 
a sentence expressing an analytic truth but that a and b 
should be synonymous.
•That nothing short of synonymity will guarantee inter­
changeability in a language of this type follows from the fact 
that the truth value of a sentence •Jones believes that A 1 de­
pends not upon the truth value of the constituent A but upon 
its meaning. If A is replaced by any other expression not 
having the same meaning, the truth value of • Jones believes 
that A* may be changed, which implies that the truth value of 
•N(Jones believes that A if and only if Jones believes that A)1 
will be changed. Consequently if two sentences A and B are 
not synonymous, they will not be interchangeable in all sen­
tences of our language. Similar considerations lead to the 
further conclusion that if any two sentence constituents x and 
£  are not synonymous, then they will not be interchangeable in
mthe true sentence,
'N(Jones believes that...*x .... if and only if Jones 
\ Pbelieves that..*x
tan r
If we accept that natural languages fall within the 
class of languages to which Matesfs argument applies, the
question remains whether or not this requirement is, as
3Linsky suggest, 'too strong'* For what Linsky calls 
'paradigmatic synonym pairs' (e.g. bachelor and unmarried 
man) fail to pass Mates's criterion, in view of sentences 
like
(6) Jones wants to know whether ja bachelor is an 
unmarried man 
and (7) Jones wants to know whether a. bachelor is _a 
bachelor.
Linskyfs exemplification of a 'paradigmatic synonym pair* 
is unfortunate, since it seems clear that bachelor and unmarried 
man are at least not analytically synonymous. But we do not 
need to rely on paradigmatic counterexamples at all, in view 
of the following considerations.
In the sentence frame
(a) Jones wants to know whether a .. ♦. is a_ ..... 
we can fill the two blanks either by the same form (a and j\)
2* Mates 1900 pp« 211-212*
3. Linsky 1967 p* 35*
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or by two different forms (a and b). Now regardless of the 
meanings of a. and b, it is clear that the two sentences so 
produced can report different things that Jones wants to 
know. But if that is the case, then difference of form must 
be a sufficient condition of difference of meaning for any 
language which contains sentence frames like ($) and any ex­
pressions which may fill the blanks in such frames. One con­
sequence of this for a language like English would be that no 
two nouns or noun phrases are synonymous.
But postulating a difference in meaning between every 
noun (or noun phrase) and every other noun (or noun phrase) 
would be not so much too drastic a way of accounting for the 
difference in meaning between sentences about what Jones wants 
to know as a very puzzling way. For it will be far from clear 
in many cases exactly what semantic difference could plausibly 
be introduced into the jr -characterizations of pairs of ex­
pressions such as to account for their noninterchangeability in 
frames like ($). E.g. if it happens to be true that
(9) Jones wants to know whether a pomelo is _a shaddock 
but not true that
(lO) Jones wants to know whether a, pomelo is _a pomelo 
then presumably Jones's uncertainty is occasioned by not knowing 
the exact relation between the fruit and one or both of the ex­
pressions pomelo and shaddock, i.e. Jones is uncertain as to
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whether or not it is the same fruit which is variously
called pomelo or shaddock, hut not uncertain as to whether
or not a pomelo is a pomelo* What at least seems clear is
that postulating a difference in meaning between pomelo and
shaddock is no way of explaining how it comes about that
Jones's uncertainty is correctly reported by (9) but not by
(lO). For that is already explained by the occurence in
(9) - but not in (10) - of the two words the co-existence of
4
which occasioned Jones's uncertainty •
From this the conclusion is not, as suggested by Linsky, 
that Mates's criterion is too rigorous, but rather that it is 
based on a requirement which is simply irrelevant.
4.25 The most obvious constraint upon setting up cr -charact­
erizations and -characterizations is that we need to be able
r *
to account plausibly for differences in the truth conditions of 
declarative sentences. The fact that there are communication 
situations in which
(11) Jones is eating an apple 
can be used to make a true statement, whereas
4. More exactly, there occurs in such cases surface structure 
syncretism involving underlying lexical items and their 
corresponding citation forms: &f. Harris 1970#
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(12) Jones is eating a, pear 
cannot so be used, needs to be accounted for in terms of a 
semantic difference between (ll) and (12). Here a difference 
in truth conditions answers to a difference in meaning, most 
plausibly located in the nonequiforrn expressions apple and pear.
The crucial question, however, in the present context is 
the question when it is correct to account for the identity of 
truth conditions of declarative sentences by postulating their 
synonymity.
This is a question more often dodged than answered, as e.g. 
by Katz & Martin in their rejection of Ziff's scepticism about 
the synonymity of
The tiger ate the man 
and The man was eaten by the tiger  ^.
Ziff argued that since 'to eat a man is hardly the same as to 
be eaten by a tiger' and since what is said of the tiger in one 
sentence is accordingly not what is said of the man in the other 
sentence, then the claim that the two sentences are synonymous 
comes down to nothing more than that 'one is true if and only if 
the other is true*. Katz & Martin concede the interdependence 
of truth conditions of the two sentences, but claim that 'this 
fact alone would not prompt us to say that the two are synonymous* #
1. Ziff 1966 p.231.
2. Katz & Martin 196? p. 488*
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Instead, however, of saying what would prompt them to call 
the two synonymous, they advance the somewhat bizarre (in the 
context) contention: 'Surely, the situation is the other way 
around: their synonymy prompts us to say that one is true if
and only if the other is.' This riposte is simply irrelevant, 
in the first place because Ziff had not challenged the correctness 
of the thesis that truth values are preserved under substitution 
of synonymous expressions, and in the second place because that 
thesis cannot be advanced to settle the question whether or not 
two particular sentences in a particular natural language are 
synonymous • If The ti&er ate the man and The man was eaten by 
the tiger are granted to be synonymous, then it follows that 
one is true if and only if the other is true* But what Ziff 
questioned was the grounds on which their synonymity should be 
'granted* *
Siatz & Martin are no more convincing in their attempts to 
deal with Ziff's sentences Someone is a wife and Someone is a 
husband, and Someone was a child and Someone was a, parent. They 
assert (invoking the authority of Chomsky and Abelard) that 
these pairs are synonymous and argue that, considered from the 
point of view of logical form, the difference between the first 
pair 'is only one of the order of existential quantifiers*
For example, using M for "is a male", F for "is a female", and 
W for "is married to",1 then Someone is a. wife comes out as
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" ( 3 x) Ox) (Mx*Jj!Si>l£E) "» whereas Someone is ja husband comes 
out as •Wxy)"« But this is to beg the question
against Ziff by assuming that Someone is a wife means the same 
as Someone is a, wife and someone (else) jLs her husband, while 
Someone is a, husband means the same as Someone is a husband and 
someone (else) is his wife. (And why stop there? If all
S i i M t t s i M o '  M m )  mcuwanim r c r - n ' v  a
entailments count as part of the meaning of a declarative sen­
tence, Someone is ja wife ought also to be synonymous with Two 
people got married and someone was the vicar or priest or 
registrar or ship1s captain..♦.)
u j i m w b i M W m i — i w n i  h m u m  « p a p m n v i n R P «  •
Since transformational semantics lacks the distinction 
between synthetic and analytic synonymity of sentences, it is 
not surprising that its apologists are forced to deny the re­
levance of differences of analytic meaning (which are the dif­
ferences Ziff's examples raise)* But that does not excuse the 
refusal to explain how synonymity of sentences is established.
For even if we were to dismiss differences of analytic meaning 
as irrelevant, that question still remains. It not only re­
mains, but becomes pressing in view of such concomitant as­
sertions by Katz & Martin as that Some triangle is equiangular 
and Some triangle is equilateral are 'true or false together', 
but that this is explained by 'geometrical theory', whereas 
the equivalence of Ziff's sentences is to be explained by 
'semantic theory*. For just what no serious theory of linguistic
201
knowledge can take for granted is a distinction between 
1 truths of geometry1 and 'truths of English'. One might 
just as well subsume the fact that wives have husbands under 
the heading 'truths of matrimony*•
4.251 Cases usually cited as throwing doubt on the contention 
that differences of meaning are invariably associated with dif­
ferences in truth conditions are certain types of conjunctive 
device and sentential adverb. Strawson observes that 'even 
sentences to which the notion of truth-conditions does seem 
appropriate may contain expressions which certainly make a dif­
ference to their conventional meaning, but not the sort of dif­
ference that can be explained in terms of their truth-conditions. 
Compare the sentence 'Fortunately, Socrates is dead' with the 
sentence 'Unfortunately, Socrates is dead'. Compare a sentence 
of the form 'ja and with the corresponding sentence of the form 
*j> but jq1» It is clear that the meanings of the members of each 
pair of sentences differ; it is far from clear that their truth- 
conditions differ' #
A further class of cases is invoked by Lakoff, who explicitly 
rejects what he describes as the usual assumption 'that two
1, Strawson 1970 p.11.
zo%
utterances are synonymous if and only if they are identical in 
truth value1* Instead, he proposes that 'one must consider 
those sentences synonymous that could be used with the same truth 
value, IN IDENTICAL ENVIRONMENTS* 2. If we find that 'they 
cannot both be used in the same environment* we must suppose that 
they differ in meaning. The evidence adduced in support of this 
position comes mainly from the use of indefinite quantifiers in 
English* For example,
1 wonder if Bill would lend me some money 
and I wonder if Bill would lend me anv money
MM CMMMMKPW t.f WIW (MiMMMM> MMMWHRU MPH WMMM
are said by Lakoff to be 'traditionally.... .considered synonymous* 
but in fact not to be so, since the first but not the second can be 
followed by the explanatory sentence Then 1 can buy that new Beatle 
record, while the second but not the first can be followed by the 
explanatory sentence 1 already owe him a thousand dollars.
According to Lakoff 'to exchange the two explanatory sentences in 
these cases would create two very odd utterances. Thus 1 conclude 
that in sentences of this type, at least, there is some difference 
in meaning between those containing some and those containing any.1
It is clear from this example that what Lakoff means by the 
condition of occurrence 'in identical environments' is that in any 
environment in which the occurrence of a is not 'odd', substitution
2. Lakoff 1969 p.610, n.2.
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of b for a must be possible without ensuing 'oddity1. By 
'oddity' he means that 'in certain situations, confusion and 
misunderstanding will x-esult'* Fairs of sentences not 
amenable to judgments of truth-or-faIsity, e.g. interrogatives, 
Lakoff apparently considers to have the same truth value (i.e* 
presumably, none), and in such cases, therefore, occurrence in 
identical environments becomes the essential criterion. (Curiously, 
Lakoff counts conditionals as 'unfalsifiable*; but this need 
not concern us here.)
It may first of all be observed that the formulation of 
Lakoff's criterion does not quite correspond to his intentions 
as witnessed by the examples he gives. To insist on interchange­
ability in identical environments is in fact too strong a con­
dition for Lakoff*s purposes, since this will exclude otherwise 
'synonymous* pairs which happen to differ in the ordering of 
surface elements. E.g. Ziff's
The tiger ate the man 
and The man was eaten by the ti e^r
cannot both take, without ensuing oddity, the addition of the 
co-ordinate clause and -promptly fell asleep. But it seems 
doubtful whether Lakoff intends to treat such pairs as nonsynony- 
mous for that reason.
If we follow the spirit rather than the letter of Lakoffs 
criterion, it nonetheless supports some of Ziff's cases; e.g.
20k
it seems distinctly odd to follow the first, hut not the second, 
of the pair
Someone is a wife
r te-n ■ ■ »-i« e=ta* ■.njg4i_ui
and Someone is a. husband
with the co-ordinate clause and therefore someone must be a wife*
On the other hand, application of the criterion does not seem to 
support Ziff*s general scepticism about the synonymy of actives 
and passives. It is difficult to think of a context in which 
e.g. John kissed Mary will be odd, but not Mary was kissed by John.irvaCttdxetsrn* y , f  iW H  f H W ii.  T ir r nam «" • l
However, not all of Lakoff*s interpretations are entirely 
convincing, because he has apparently overlooked a further some/any 
contrast, which involves the use of some for contextually definedr vrue-9* ^  w
reference (- certain). Thus Who wants some Xs? is commonly used
^ cErau-*t3e:i9[\-fi*\4«wi-cr=3 w nvaxKfrm cwvKifnvr^tui iwTfj«w ■ uw-'&i-icl "
when the offer is quite specific (= I have some Xss who wants them?)ii . t£U lrrrC‘-rJ'rVJi3iS» ip»i tttJ ~ - ■*-" r
and contrasts with.the speculative Who wants any Xs? (= X haven*t
m  u ^ h  e m u v i n  tora-ri;^ * .>r? «uv*-v-uicy7C'4',R c m
any Xs; but 1*11 see if there are any available). Similarly, infi.' f1— I*"* j rtL-jM*yw cliaJ *joa nrAr.-sS L n i n a r a  uK.1713.iL3  i t f i m M i m w u r t x s  ^  %f +
Xf you eat some spinach, 1*11 give you ten dollars
r r t t in u  J f — r—« fcwa*»«aisa cnr ffcmsjaJiAaa rr^ ta-wsss? * t y i  fcVrfca.eraTm'va* i w . i ’a s - j  «ua .?^km  w i >1 ■cj --.T-tJtr,j TP
some may be taken as indicating that it is not just eating any old
spinach that will earn ten dollars, but eating some particular
spinach the speaker has in mind. Lakoff, however, treats some here 
as indicating the expectation Hhat the pex*son addressed wants ten 
dollars* and implying that the speaker is offering a reward, as 
opposed to
Xf you eat any spinach, X*ll give you tea dollarsn ' i i u a  4fcm» n '■■!» l a x s b c l  ■■ j" * ■ ''■* ^  <!$£* '..I ffS fu iiJ tH ji ( i w i m v  C~a~iB>~SKm w it,Try pm-jin-a*
where *the only possible interpretation is that, for some reason,
aos
the person addressed does not want to receive ten dollars, 
and that this sentence is a threat*. This seems dubious.
A more natural interpretation of the latter sentence would 
be that the speaker offers ten dollars irrespective of what 
spinach is eaten.
The point makes some difference to Lakoff*s thesis about 
synonymy. For if we take account of this particular some / 
any distinction, then it is doubtful whether Lakoff has in 
fact produced any new examples of nonsynonymous declarative 
sentences having the same truth conditions. E.g. it may well 
be true that I wonder whether Bill will lend me some money 
(because the sum I have in mind is considerable) but not true 
that X wonder whether he will lend my any money (because 1 
know he never refuses a moderate request.) i\nd so on.
4.3 We have thus far considered only incidentally the extent 
to which synonymy criteria must take into account variations of 
linguistic and situational context. Xf it is conceded that ex­
pressions may have different meanings in different contexts, the 
possibility is open that two expressions may have the same mean­
ing in one context but not in another, and hence the necessity 
arises for distinguishing between ‘context-free synonymy* and 
‘context-bound synonymy*. (By 1context-free synonymy* is to be 
understood here synonymy independent of context, i.e. synonymy
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in all contexts*) A semantic description of L may be en­
visaged as accommodating such a distinction by adding sup­
plementary qualifications to relational characterizations* 
Thus, for example, a suitably qualified characterization of 
type i>1 might take the form;
(a = b) C
’OR* K M '
where !C* denotes the context or set of contexts for which 
the semantic equivalence between a, and b holds*
4*31 The type of problem which arises in delimiting context- 
bound synonymities may be shown by means of an example. Sup­
pose a semantic description of English distinguishes as least 
two meanings for the noun paper, one of which it shares with 
newspaper and the other with essay * Such a description en­
counters the problem of specifying the values of Cl and C2 for 
the following relational characterizations:
1* It is not essential to the example that these expressions 
should in fact have in English the meanings here attributed 
to them*
and (paper = essay) C2.
Any solution to this problem must presumably take into account 
at least the following three considerations*
(1) On some occasions when a sentence containing the word 
paper is used, the sentence is interpreted (and is intended to 
he interpreted) as would he a sentence identical hut for the 
substitution of newspaper for paper; hut it is so interpreted 
(and intended to he so interpreted) in virtue of knowledge 
about a particular communication situation* An example of this 
case would he the sentence The costs of publishing the paper are 
very high uttered by the editor of the local weekly at a Eotary 
club lunch*
(2) On some occasions when a sentence containing the
word paper is \ised, it is doubtful whether it is to he interpreted 
as under the substitution newspaper for paper * or as under the 
substitution essay fox* paper» unless further infoxmiation is obtain­
able about the relevant situation* An example of this case would 
be the sentence Professor Jones is reading his paper uttered in 
circumstances where the professor might conceivably be engaged in 
either of two activities, namely (i) addressing a learned society, 
or (ii) catching up on the day1s news o
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\ji) On some occasions when a sentence containing the
word paper is used, no such doubt arises because the rest of 
the sentence makes the appropriate interpretation clear.
Examples of such cases would be utterance of the sentences 
The paper ceased publication and The paper was on the matingmi i■ r ■ » ■■ t n ; i rffcile^®a=i*tes» iwrjR-flr-n *urasfr» «*ss»??sca^ ra
habits of the giraffe.
Various answers may be envisaged to the question as to 
how a semantic description should deal with facts such as these.
It will be assumed, for purposes of the example, that the lin­
guist is able to verify empirically under what circumstances 
doubt arises about the interpretation of words in pax’ticular 
communication situations, and this information may thus be 
looked upon as constituting part of the data available for the 
construction of a semantic description of L. The question to 
be considered, therefore, is the status of this evidence as 
warranting or not warranting the incorporation of possible 
features in the description*
One possibility is that facts of the kind described in (i) 
should be accounted for in the description by an appropriate 
specification of Cl, e.g. to the effect that paper and newspaper 
are synonymous in sentences uttered by journalists. This
o
course would be objected to by theorists who, like Katz & Fodor , 
2. Katz & Fodor 1963*
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claim that a semantic description of natural language cannot 
he expected to account systematically for the ways in which 
variation of situation, or 1 socio-physical setting* affects 
the interpretation of sentences* On the other hand, it would 
- at least in principle - he supported by theorists who, like 
Lyons, claim that an identification of the relevant situational 
context is an essential part of the establishment of instances 
of synonymity*
The difference between (l) and (2) seems to be that in 
the former case but not the latter the appropriate interpretation 
of paper is determined by features of the communication situation 
known to participants in that situation* The difference between
(l) and (2) on the one hand and (3) on the other seems to be 
that in (3) alone the appropriate interpretation of paper is 
determined by the linguistic context independently of situational 
features of the communication situation* Here, i.e* in (3)* 
there would presumably be agreement between followers of Katz & 
Fodor and followers of Lyons that a semantic description should 
account for the appropriate interpretation of paper by an in­
dication of its contextual synonymity with newspaper and with 
essay in the appropriate cases* However, the arguments which 
might be adduced for and against these solutions require closer 
examination*
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4*32 According to lyons, *once we accept that synonymy must
be bound to context, it ceases to be a theoretical problem at 
X
all1 , and in Structural Semantics a procedure is proposed for 
establishing instances of synonymity on the basis of interchange­
ability in a particular linguistic context (defined by a set of 
sentences of the language) and a particular situational context 
or range of contexts (e*g. fmaking a purchase in a shop1)* The 
linguist is envisaged as examining empirically how the speakers 
commitment varies under modification of sentences in certain ways, 
wki).e holding the situation-type constant* This procedure is 
held to determine a relationship which Lyons calls 1pragmatic 
implication1, and knowledge of synonymy is explicated as knowledge 
by the speaker of certain pragmatic implicational1 connexions 
between the utterance of certain sentences in certain types of 
situation*
For the description of natural languages accessible to ex­
perimental investigation by the linguist, Lyons would prbpose to 
establish an inst^ce of synonymity as follows;
ifTFi Minc'iii~i'TfWTT<rTirT'Wf~w i < • i ~i ' "   — - r nf nTTnr r n— i 1 T-1— '—  • r  r "" "  n    ■ " —— — —— —— ^
1* Xyons 19^3 §4.46. It is not quite clear how this statement 
is to be taken, i.e. what theoretical problems we are in­
vited to see as being solved by accepting that synonymity 
must be bound to context*
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'Let us take two utterances which differ formally in one 
respect only and let that difference consist in the oc­
currence of a form a, in the one utterance at the point 
at which an item b occurs in the other: We have a wide
range of cigars and We have ja wide selection of cigars* 
These two utterances, we will suppose, have been heard 
in a tobacconist's shop, and we are interested in seeing 
whether the forms range and selection are synonymous 
here. (Our reason for thinking that they might have the 
same meaning could be based on a 'hunch* or even on the 
statement to that effect by the native English speaker.) 
The test whereby we establish that two complete utterances 
of this kind are synonymous is, in principle, behavioural 
and empirical.
'The first problem is to delimit the context of 
situation. There is no need to exaggerate the theoretical 
difficulties of this... Ldt us here assume that the 
linguist has provisionally identified as the same sit­
uational context (itself 'culture-bound') the events and 
activities which constitute making a purchase in a shop. 
The linguist can satisfy himself that the utterances We 
have a wide range of cigars and We have a wide selection 
jof cigars occur in this context, if he is thorough in his 
methods, by going around apd exasperating several! tobac­
2 1 2
conists with his 1 informant^iecknique* • He can then 
try the effect of substituting different items in 
place of cigars* Assume that he has collected a number 
of utterances of the form We have a wide (ranee/selec-txjiirrs tiii.uiiiLwy rm V.oec '-irr j  vsoatm tcsr&TBj?
tion) of (______ ); that is, a number of utterances in
which range and selection are interchangeable, and there­
fore have meaning»•*,The question now is to decide whether 
the forms range and selection have the same meaning in 
these utterances* This does not consist simply in ask­
ing the informant; for this would be merely to invite him 
to invent some difference - say, for example, that the 
use of selection implies that he has chosen his stock 
with care* But the problems connected with testing the 
informant’s response to the substitution of the two items 
in the frame, though they exist, are problems of a prac­
tical nature, as are the problems of devising tests for 
identifying variants in phonology* The aim is to in­
veigle the informant, without prejudice to the issue, into 
accepting or refusing to accept utterance a as a ’rep­
etition* of utterance b If a has not the same meaning as 
b it will either not imply something which b implies or 
imply something which b soes not imply. And it should not
be beyonft the practical ingenuity of the linguist to dis- 
B 2
cover this•*
2* Lyons 19&3 § 4*46.
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Y/hat might well he questioned in connexion with Lyons’s 
method, however, is whether* it is not beyond the practical in­
genuity of the linguist to determine systematically all the
3
types of situation in which a context-bound synonymity holds*
Xf a serious attempt were made to delimit all the situations 
in which papex* and newspaper receive identical interpretations*
tfErgsT-atfVtogiaca A  *
it would doubtless soon become apparent that a vex'y complex 
weighting of the importance of different factors in the sit­
uation operates* It is highly unlikely, for example, that a 
criterion as simple as ’utterance by journalists* will turn out 
to be correct* (if it wei’e, then the semantic description of 
English would lead us to expect that an appropriate response 
to the eminent journalist who, about to address a learned 
society, announces *1 have mislaid my paper* might be ’Don’t 
worry; there’s time to go out and buy another*’) Nonetheless 
- the theorist of context-bound synonymy might argue - the 
practical difficulty of the enterprise of discovering in exactly 
what situations two words are synonymous does not impugn the 
validity of the concept*
3* Katz & Fodor adduce the fact t|xat it is practically impossible 
to produce a systematic analysis of all conceivable ways in 
which variation of ’socio-physical setting* may affect the 
intex'pretation of sentences as a reason for rejecting the view 
that a semantic theox*y should take situational context into 
account (Katz & Fodor 19&3 P*W9 )»
2l*f
*u321 We may pursue the matter further by considering the
following proposal ;
(ic) and b are context-bound synonyms in contexts
of type C if and only if in contexts of type C
the substitution of one for the other does not
affect the commitment of the speaker1*
It is of interest to examine what the consequences of a strict
application of such a criterion would be in the construction
of our semantic description of L •
The first consequence we may note is that equivalence in
1
the force of speech acts becomes a sufficient condition of 
synonymity, since the criterion proposed leaves the linguist 
free to set up as context-bound synonyms any two expressions 
for which a context-type C can be established such as to permit 
the substitution of expressions in certain sentences without 
affecting the commitment of the speaker in that context*
Thus consider the case of Picasso, who, called upon to 
identify a forgery, has the Choice between uttering the 
sentences This is not a, Picasso and This is not jo work of mine* 
In this context the two sentences, and the two constituents 
a Picasso and a, work of mine* may be regarded as context-bound 
synonymous expressions. It would be unavailing to object to
1* On the force of speech acts, see below Gh* 5*
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this proposal that the commitment is different in the two cases, 
since in saying the former Picasso does not commit himself ex­
plicitly to the proposition that the work is his, while in say­
ing the latter he does not commit himself explicitly to the 
proposition that it is by Picasso* This difference would in­
deed be relevant if we were being asked to consider the sentences 
in abstraction from the situational context; but under K what 
we are asked to attend to is, quite specifically, what Picasso 
commits himself to in that situation* In short, if pairs of 
locutionary acts are equivalent in force in a certain type of 
context, we may count the expressions which contrast as context- 
bound synonyms* (if we were pedantically inclined, we could 
of course require Picasso to identify the forgery by uttering 
some such formula as 19 Picasso* certify that this is not a work 
of mine* But this alters nothing, since the following formula 
will do just as well: JC, Picasso* certify that this is not a
Picasso*)
But this has the following consequence* If in defining 
a situational context or range of situational contexts it is 
permissible to include a necessary condition (£ such that Q 
specifies the relation of the speech acts in question to part­
icular language-users or particular timew and places, then 
there is no guarantee that a pair of context-bound synonyms 
will not include a deictic and a non-deictic member. Now any
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theory of synonymy which allows this may require us to concede 
e.g. that 'my-English* is semantically different from 'your- 
English', that the English spoken on the first of January is 
not the same language as the English spoken on the second of 
January, etc. The proposed criterion, in other words, permits 
the distinction within a 'language* of indefinitely many 
situationally-bound 'sublanguages', each with its own semantic 
rules and synonyms.
There is, it might perhaps be urged, nothing methodolog­
ically vicious about that, provided we are prepared to forggo 
2generalization • But unfortunately there is a further con­
sequence, namely the failure to distinguish semantic from ex- 
tralinguistic knowledge. This vitiates the method even in 
the investigation of the most strictly delimited sublanguage. 
The argument in support of this criticism is simply that if 
the interpretation of an expression depends on certain features 
of the communication situation, as distinct from the expression 
used, then to that extent the interpretation is not a matter of 
semantic knowledge* Thus, to take Lyons's example, supposing 
the linguist's investigation is confined to the semantics of 
'shopping English', or, more strictly still, to the semantics
2. Nonetheless, quot homines tot linguae seems a curious 
theoretical basis for linguistics.
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of 'tobacconist's English', even then the mothod proposed 
offers no sound basis for reaching the conclusion that e*g* 
range and selection are (or are not) synonymous* For it 
incorporates no way of distinguishing between the respects 
in which the speaker's commitment is based on knowledge of 
certain facts about the situation, and the respects in which 
the speaker's commitment is based on knowledge of the mean­
ings of the words used* To know that X is a tobacconist, 
or a journalist, or a bank manager, or to know that a con­
versation is taking place in a tobacconist's shop, or a news­
paper office, or a bank, is to know - so the argument would 
run - something about the world in which one lives, not 
something about the language one speaks* If the purpose 
of a semantic description is to account for communication by 
postulating semantic knowledge shared by language-users, it 
requires a method of investigation which distinguishes ev­
idence of semantic knowledge from evidence of extra linguistic 
knowledge.
4*322 The objection that criterion K involves a failure to 
distinguish questions about the force of speech acts from 
questions about the meanings of expressions may also be pressed 
on the basis of examples like the following*
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Gonsider the sentences:
(1) Yes
* * 4VKAttfcJm!?a
(2) I was in Boenor Regis on the 1st of January 1967
^ r BU t e w m i  I fclLJliJWfrWU.W.li I uijjw.m3 etetitonrife-m c u t M I M H  uij— i m u m M i k M l H M n  Ll l fcK W n g
(3) X would not he telling the truth if I denied it
>  f  xns.By.x.-uu&wt'i. r m  f t m e c M  \—jwu*  r  'wmwfi TnrTfraKMJiwBW cpnpi ni.uu uaj.<hmKJ ii iwmm t n M  cKz*HC*3?a»r**uM2 9  uaaigia
The speech act of confirming my presence in Bognor Begis on the 
1st of January 196? when asked Were you in Bognor Regia on the 
1st of January 1967? can he realized by my uttering (l)? (2) 
or (3)* But to say that this constitutes evidence of the 
context-bound synonymity of (l), (2) and (3) would be quite 
plainly to confuse two different senses of •meaning* , i*e* 
confusing what the words fmean* with what someone*s uttering 
them *means *♦ The special context does not confer synonymity 
upon (l), (2) and (3)1 any more than other contexts render them 
nonsynonymous• What the context does is afford me the choice
of meaning the same thing by uttering (l), (2) or (3)*
4*323 The further problem of determine what a speaker is 
* committed to^ by uttering a sentence in a given context may
be illustrated by an example given by Bennett;
(8a) M  this moment he1 s on a, train going to London
(8b) At this moment he/s in a train going to London. 
Setting aside, for purposes of the example, the somewhat 
extraordinary possibility of interpreting (8a) as meaning that
he is on the roof of a train going to London, we may ask: are
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on and in here context-bound synonyms ? But,first of all, 
are (8a) and (8b) synonymous in the context ? Bennett is in­
clined to regard this as a case of 1 coextensiveness1 rather 
than synonymity: for, he argues, these sentences *would
normally describe the same situation, but it would be counter­
intuitive to postulate some higher-level linguistic unit that 
can be realized alternately as on and in* since on-aess andV * iwjr.sm ,
in-ness are essentially different notions, i.e. on-- - and
in-""- differ in cognitive meaning. What we have, rather, is 
a case of coextensiveness. There are certain situations in 
reality that can be perceived by a speaker of English as in­
volving either on-ness or in-ness* One such situation is 
the boarding of a train, which can be perceived as getting onto
it or getting into it. Thus whether one uses on or in in
1(8), the situation described is the same.1
Setting aside the stratificationalist trappings, what 
Bennett*s answer comes down to is that (8a) and (8b) differ in 
meaning, but in such a way that the difference is always ir­
relevant in the context. Since stratificational theory leads 
him to hold that ■synonymy depends on the realizational phenomenon
Q
known as 1diversification1 * , he is inclined to reject the
synonymity of (8a) and (8b) because he cannot imagine a plausible
1. Bennett 1968 p. 164.
2. Bennett 1968 p. 159*
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unit which could here undergo ■diversification1. This 
may be good stratificational theorizing, but it is not 
convincing linguistic analysis. For ii© approach the pro­
blem in this way is to assume the availability of (nonlingu­
istic) criteria for deciding questions of conceptual classification. 
The nature of these criteria is allowed to remain obscure, e.g. 
we are not told why ■on-ness1 and 'in-ness* are ■essentially 
different notions* . But worse still, the argument prop­
ounded simply assumes what needed to be demonstrated, namely 
that to be on a train and to be in a train here correspond to
uonn tcrmpo* wDmmsrwiiv Mtm vwrm q n t c w i «
a * genuine* conceptual difference. Precisely what is at issue 
is whether English recongnizes a difference, not whether in the 
abstract a difference might conceivably be recognized.
On the other ha^ id, the application of criterion K yields 
no happier solution, since it is not clear what evidence we
woiild look for to decide whether a speaker takes on different
'commitments* in the context of describing X!’s whereabouts by 
uttering (8a) and (8b). And if this is not clear, it is 
because the notion of 'commitment* itself is not clear.
3* This is a puzzling assertion. It is not as if it would 
be out of the question to imagine a language which simply 
did not make the English distinction between on and in, 
but had only a single locational preposition translating 
both.
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433* More remains to be said about the validity of setting 
up context-bound synonyms as a way of accounting for instances 
where a choice between interpretations is resolved by the 
linguistic context, independently of situational features*
Beference has already been made to the rejection by Katz 
& Fodor of the thesis that a semantic description should take 
situational variation into account. Having pointed out that 
the possible ways in which situational factors may affect the 
interpretation of sentences are virtually limitless (hence not 
amenable to systematization), they conclude that a semantic 
description is adequate if it accounts only for interpretational 
variations dependent on the linguistic context.
The basis of this view is that * except for a few types 
of cases, discourse can be treated as a single sentence in 
isolation by regarding sentence boundaries as sentential con­
nectives*1  ^ Katz & Fodor argue:
*As a matter of fact this is the natural treatment. In 
the great majority of cases the sentence break in discourse 
is simply and-eonjunction. (in others, it is but, for, or, 
and so on.) Hence, for every discourse, there is a single 
sentence which consists of the sequence of ^-sentences that 
comprises the discourse connected by the appropriate sen­
tential connectives and which exhibits the same semantic
■ nii i >i lj i H ■Hill ibii i I iMipiiW«iiiiiin n i >  n.MDir I I*  i M y w w i ■ m u n i  I i ^ i^ niiinTr  imikhhiiiiii i 1 ' ~i 1 ■ i i in ■ ‘     — I ' ■ f
1. Katz & Fodor 1963 p. 490.
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relations exhibited in the discourse. But since the 
single sentence is, ex hypothesis described by a theory 
of semantic interpretation, in every case in which a dis­
course can be treated as a single sentence, a theory of
semantic interpretation is as descriptively powerful as
o
a theory of setting selection* *
In support of this view, Katz & Fodor adduce the following 
c ons iderat i ons *
*To illustrate this, let us consider the two-sentence 
discourse: "I shot the man with a gun,1' "If the man had 
had a gun too, he would have shot me first.11 The first 
sentence of this discourse is ambiguous in isolation, but 
not in this setting. But the problem of explaining this 
disambiguation is the same as the problem of explaining 
why the single sentence "I shot the man with a gun, but 
if the man had had a gun too, he would have shot me first,1 
does not have an ambiguous first clause. Likewise, con­
sider the discourse, "I heard the noise," "The noise was 
completely inaudible," and its single sentence equivalent,
"I heard the noise, and the noise was completely inaudible." 
In showing why the single sentence is anomalous, a theory of 
semantic interpretation exhibits precisely those semantic
2, Katz & Fodor 19&3 PP* 490-491*
relations in which the anomaly of the discourse resides.
This technique of replacing discourses or stretches of dis­
courses with single compound sentences, by using sentential 
connectives in place of sentence boundaries, clearly has a 
very extensive application in x^educing problems of setting 
selection to problems of semantic interpretation of sentences 
in isolation* Thus, given a theory of semantic interpretat­
ion, it is unclear how much is left for a theory of setting 
selection to explain*1 
Katz & Fodor concede that not all discourse can be converted 
straightforwardly into single sentences, but do not see this as 
a serious objection.
fFor example, the discourse "How are you feeling to-day?"
"I am fine, thanks" does not convert to "fHow are you 
feeling to-day and I an fine, thanks" because the compound 
sentence is ungrammatical. But the fact that sentences of 
different types cannot be run together in the obvious way 
may not pose a serious problem because it is not at all 
clear that less obvious convei'sions will not lead to a sat­
isfactory treatment of such cases within a theory of 
semantic interpretation* For example, we may convert the 
discourse just cited into the single sentence, "X asked,
3* Katz & Fodor 1963 p* 491 n* 12*
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* 'How are you Reeling today?' and Y replied, 'I am tine, 
thanks.•" If such conversions can he carried out 
generally, then any problem about disambiguation, detection 
of anomaly, and so on that can be raised and/or solved in 
a theory of setting selection can be raised and/or solved 
by reference to an analogon in the theory of semantic 
interpretation* But even if such conversions cannot be 
carried out generally, the most interesting and general 
cases will still be within the range of a theory of sem­
antic interpretation.
Thus in a semantic investigation of the kind envisaged by Katz 
& Fodor setting up context-bound synonyms would be one possible 
way of accounting for the fact that two sentences which do not 
receive the same semantic interpretation in isolation do so 
when forming part of certain longer discourses. For example,
(l) Smith read his paper 
and (2) Smith read his newspaper
will be, we may assume given different interpretations in isol­
ation by a semantic description of Fnglish, since they have dif­
ferent truth conditions. But considered as first sentences in 
the two-sentence discourse formed by the addition of, say,
(3) He looked first of all at the stop-press on the 
Back page
, - ^ ,i i|M ,M  atTirr—1— *-' '— — ------------- 1— — — — — ■—
4. Katz & Podor 1963 p. 491 n.12.
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they receive, let us assume identical interpretations. If 
Katz & Fodor1s proposals are accepted, these two-sentence 
discourses may he treated as the compounds
(4) Smith read his paper, and looked first of all at 
the stop-press on the hack page 
and (5) Smith read his newspaper« and looked first of all
. imi n eanmsmbmemt e n m M  M w i n n v n n M M i l i n M c w *  *  m i k c v m  w w i a M f t t M M m *  c m h i m i i m i  ( M m  . 1 • tii n
at the stop-press on the back page*
Accordingly, one possible way of accounting for the interpret­
ation of (4) and (5) would be postulation of the synonymity 
of paper and newspaper is certain contexts, the contexts in 
question being defined so as to include (4) and (5)*
4*331 Betting up context-bound synonymities is also a 
possible way - although not necessarily a theoretically des­
irable way - of dealing with certain other types of case*
For example, the sentences
(6) John grows flowers
and (?) John grows roses
will, we may assume, be represented by a semantic description 
of English as having different meanings in isolation* Consider, 
however, the two-sentence discourses comprising (6) followed by
(8) and (?) followed by (8):
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(8) Boses are the only flowers John grows.
These two-sentence discourses can be treated as the compounds
(9) John grows flowers. and roses are the only flowers 
John grows
and (10) John grows rosea * and roses are the only flowers*  r  tWrMBtflaa^pwa ( M k W V V W  T mnmr**WE39 **!uWWl*-3EJWHW3d* E£tafc$ttt£» T > l l  l
John grov/s.
It is relevant to note at this point that if we follow 
Lyons then* given appropriate informant response, both (4) 
and (5) and also (9) and (10) can be established as containing 
context-bound synonyms. The expressions paper and newspaper 
will be context-bound synonyms in the frame 1 Smith read his 
, and looked first of all at the stop-press on theciljp— pmu..-uiau 1 m v h w j *  vmvsaswvi A'KKSRKwmsrarittBRgB tnwuawnum'awi rajaan.i i  ■ c M f t t - s  *» r^a n  v w m e rs *  owvra. i im  r  % u n u n
back page1; while flower and rose will be context-bound
■ ii,hi 1,1 ma.uijj niiiiii i.i 1 a.u, j 9 «Tr«*twr-»^aw£!»if» «m*?a*£«assa
synonyms in the frame *John grows s, and roses are thev  v  jj.Mam.pii.Jia. IWW.MHLIWIIWII > I I in'll m ilW ll W  im  I Li *  I l u l l  ■> u M H t B M t & l  rppaw pw i " ^ T iT
only flowers John 1 ^
1. It suffices under Xyons's proposals to establish that (9)
‘px’agmatically implies* and is implied by (lO). Pragmatic 
implication and pragmatic equivalence are defined in terms 
of ‘assertion* and ‘denial** E.g. in the case of antonyms
such as single and married. *the denial of either one is im­
plicitly equivalent^to^implies and is implied by) the asser­
tion of the other. (More precisely, the denial of a sentence 
containing either one, Si, is equivalent to the assertion of
a sentence, Si*, containing the other.)* The linguist estab­
lishes this by investigating responses of informants* *He
will find, for instance, that the informant, having asserted
a sentence of the form X is single will reject a sentence X 
is married - perhaps adding indignantly 1 said once that he
wasn*t. or something of the sort.* (lyons 1965 pp.88-89) In
the present example, the informant, having asserted either of 
the pair (9) or (lo), is committed under pain of inconsistency 
to the assertion of the other.
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Now a semantic description of the type envisaged by Katz & 
Fodor might deal with (9) and (10) in one of three possible ways. 
The first possibility is that (9) and (10) are represented as 
semantically different (i.e. as having one or more readings not 
shared). The second possibility is that (9) and (10) are re­
presented as semantically equivalent (i.e. as sharing all 
readings) in virtue of the fact that flower and rose, although 
not in isolation synonymous, are in certain contexts (of which
(9) and (10) are examples) assigned the same reading. The third 
possibility is that (9) and (10) are represented as semantically 
equivalent in virtue of an operation of the relevant projection 
rules, whereby the difference in meaning between flower and rose 
is not allowed to contribute a difference in meaning to the 
eventual readings for the sentences (9) and (lO).
An examination of these three possible solutions shows that 
whether to set up flower and rose as context-bound synonyms must 
depend on the answer to the prior qxiestion whether (9) and (10) 
are synthetically synonymous. If they are not, it follows that 
the description should not be allowed to represent flower and
A  ns-'fat nnaryfP
rose as synonymous in this context* But no way of arriving at 
the crucial decision is proposed by Katz & Fodor, since they do 
not offer external criteria for synonymity. Lyons * s proposals, 
on the other hand, offer a solution, but manifestly the wrong 
one, since that would not distinguish the case of (9) and (10) 
from the case of (4) and (5)*
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4*332 It should he made clear at this point that the rejection 
of a notion of 1 context-bound synonymy1 which treats the two 
cases alike is not based on a covert argument from 1 intuition1.
It might perhaps be urged that it would be counterintuitive to 
propose a solution which treated rose and flower as synonyms
A  *  BTKWIiraWJP |I I I > I Him 1  I I PM ■ I > V  V
in (9) and (lO), but intuitively satisfactory to treat paper
newspaper as synonymous in (4) and (5). But we do not need 
to rely on intuitive satisfaction here, for there is a reason 
for distinguishing the two cases which does not appeal to intuit­
ions at all. The pair (9) end (lO), unlike the pair (4) and 
(5), falls under a general rule for English whereby the truth 
of the conjunction of a sentence 'only xs are P'and a sentence
u  V a m
'xs are p* stands or falls with that of a corresponding conjunc­
tion of sentences *y;s are j?' and 'only xs are P*, provided xs 
are a proper subset of ys*  ^ In such cases, the postulation of 
a context-bound synonymity is otiose, i.e. it does not contribute 
to an explanation of the facts to suppose that a particular re­
lation (context-bound synonymity) holds between two expressions, 
when the facts are already explained by a general rule which does 
not require that supposition. No such consideration applies to 
(4) and (5), where the postulation of a context-bound synonymity 
provides an explanation which cannot be derived from a correspon­
ding general rule.
      1 . . .1.11. 1.1 1 ■ r - •  1  ' ■ ■   —  ■ ■ 1 .  I . . . . . . . .  .  . .  .  . .1. 1.1
1. Here xs are r osesare flowers and P 'grown by John*.
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4*333 example where criterion li (4.321) leads to a
postulation of synonymity which conflicts with a better 
linguistic explanation of the case would be:
(11) No-one was in the room with John
(12) No-one was in the room except John*
* f a jijt » 1 —-'in 'ii bunt r ■'■ m 1 ymm %. r-rn»i 1 t^TiL
Here criterion K gives with and except as context-bound 
synonyms, a solution which is obviously wrong in view of such 
evidence as e.g. that we can have beside (12), without changing 
the meaning, No-one except John was in the room, whereas No-one 
with John was in the room is not equivalent to (ll).
4*334 Further, consider the sentences 
(X3) Hilary climbed Everest
and (14) Hilary climbed the highest mountain in the world.
If we assume that a semantic description of English will exhibit 
these sentences as having different meanings in isolation, the 
question arises how to represent the interpretation of the 
two-sentence discourses comprising (13) preceded by (15), and 
(14) preceded by (l§) :
(15) Everest is the highest mountain in the world.
These two-sentence discourses ean be treated in the familiar way
as the compounds:
(16) Everest is the highest mountain in the world and 
Hilary climbed Everest.
H M K a a i iH n M M  mmvMaMMVsnwMmjnnit u m p n v p w t s n w t a t i
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and (l?) Everest is the highest mountain in the world and 
Hilarv climbed the highest mountain in the world*
u iw.iiw  1 pp» 1 m 1 111 wr,1* w'wwhiq \ \ n w  n» — i rmaawfc-agpm KU jhuw i .    dm m m  w hih t - i  P M t M M i m *
Now if a speaker is identically committed by an assertion 
formulated either in the way represented in (16) or in the way 
represented in (17), then it follows by criterion K that 
Everest in its second instantiation in (l6) and the highest 
mountain in the world in its second instantiation in (l?) can 
be treated as context-bound synonyms* This seems to be the 
case, since it would be inconsistent for a speaker to affirm
(l6) but deny (l?), or vice versa*
However, it is an adequate justification of the speaker’s 
’commitment1 in this case that Everest and the highest mountain 
in the world be granted to refer here to the same unique entity#
Q S W I f  UW.WKW. W m M J  w  *6*
In other words, the required condition is merely that there is 
just one x such that (i) x is called ’Everest*, and (ii) x is 
the highest mountain in the world* Thus the ’context-bound 
synonymity* here assures us only of identity of reference, 
which is inadequate* Any theory of synonymy which allows this 
must be rejected, since it fails to distinguish between what is 
referred to by the use of an expression in a certain context or 
contexts, and what the expression means*
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4.4 Context-bound synonymy of the kind where the context 
in question is situational is a notion which seems unlikely 
to be helpful when it comes to explaining how a speaker’s 
knowledge of synonymy enables him to detect the analyticity 
of certain sentences, for the obvious reason that the 
feature of analytic sentences is that their truth value is 
independent of contingent matters of fact, and therefore of 
the context of situation in which they are uttered. Here 
at least, it appears, the construction of a semantic descrip­
tion of Ljjrequires ts to be able to set up ^  - characterizations 
without situational limitations.
4.41 It is not perhaps clear whether all natural languages
afford the possibility of characterizing a statement as
analytic , but it is at least clear that many of them do.
Such languages may be considered to be ’nonextensional*
2 .languages in the sense defined by Quine , i.e. as possessing 
devices equivalent to a modal adverb ’necessarily* which 
yields truth when and only when applied to an analytic state­
ment.
LWPj.iMiMiiii ■Ti~li"imi'H |II*'I»I ■ I > 1- i Li . t o' BM— w  ■ i i n m ii I n a —  til i il i I' hi  w ■ i I—
1. It is, in any case, possible to imagine one into which one 
would have difficulty in translating English sentences 
characterizing a statement as analytic (Harris 196?)*
2. Quine 19&1 PP» 29-30.
In the sentences of such languages, interchange of expres­
sions having identical extension does not guarantee preser­
vation of the truth of a statement* Quine designates the 
stronger relation which must hold between expressions in 
order to preserve truth values under substitution in the 
sentences of nonextensional languages 'cognitive synonymy1 3. 
His argument is:
'Interchangeability salva veritate is meaningless 
unless relativized to a language whose extent is 
specified in relevant respects* Suppose now we 
consider a language containing just the following 
materials* There is an indefinitely large stock 
of one-place predicates (for example, *F' where 
'Fx* means that x is a man) and many-place predi-
ram w v  »  «
cates (for example, *G* where *Gxy'means that x 
loves %)* mostly having to do with extralogical 
subject matter. The rest of the language is 
logical. The atomic sentences consist each of 
a predicate followed by one or more variables 'x',
*y*, etc.; and the complex sentences are built up 
of the atomic ones by truth functions ('not',
iwb  ; wrriiiitiai— k . h w  n ■ i n  im ii n \tmi \ w n.*. ij
3* The term 'cognitive* is here intended to rule out of 
consideration whether the expressions in question have 
the same 'associations', the same 'emotive value', the 
same 'poetic overtones' etc., and to indicate that one 
is concerned simply with the use of vrords in expressing 
statements to be judged true or false, and as conforming 
or not conforming to the patterns of valid inference.
'and', 'or1, etc.) and quantification. In effect such a 
language enjoys the benefits also of descriptions and 
indeed singular terms generally, these being contextually 
definable in known ways. Even abstract singular terms 
naming classes, classes of classes, etc., are contextually 
definable in case the assumed stock of predicates includes 
the two-place predicate of class membership* Such a 
language can be adequate to classical mathematics and 
indeed to scientific discourse generally, except in so far 
as the latter involves debatable devices such as contrary- 
to-fact conditionals or modal adverbs like 'necessarily*• 
Now a language of this type is extensional, in this sense: 
any two predicates which agree extensionslly (that is,
are true of the same objects) are interchangeable
. * 4salva veritate.1
It follows, according to Quine, that unless there is an assurance 
that L is nonextensional inter changeability salva verUate is too 
Y/eak; for that bachelor and unmarried man are interchangeable 
salva veritate in an extensional language guarantees no more than
ttA a w m u i'm i' m ma i rrr^j
that All and only bachelors are unmarried men is true. 'There is
■ (Ht,3W=ST75! ■ * * * « * & » O S ® » t r a i i ! = W = T V = *
no assurance here that the extensional agreement of 'bachelor*
and 1 unmarried man* rests on meaning rather than merely on
accidental matters of fact, as does the extensional agreement
5of ' creature with a heart1 and 1 creature with kidneys1•
However, 'if a language contains an intensional adverb 
'necessarily****or other particles to the same effect, then 
interchangeability salva veritate in such a language does 
afford a sufficient condition of cognitive synonymy1*
The argument can be adapted to fit various types of 
expressions, including proper names and sentences* Two de­
clarative sentences and b in a nonextensional language are 
cognitively synonymous if interchangeable salva veritate 
within biconditional formulations of the type 'Necessarily,
а, if and only if b'*
4*42 Since we cannot assume that nonextensionality is a 
linguistic universal, Quine's argument leaves us asking the 
question; how about extensional languages ? For no reason has 
been offered for rejecting identity of extension of predicate 
expressions as a sufficient condition of L-synonymity where L 
is an extensional language. In order to show that this possib­
ility too must be rejected, it is relevant to divide Quine's 
class of extensional languages into two subclasses, which might 
be termed 'Extensional 1* (or 'El') and 'Extensional 2' (or'E2'),
5* Quine 1961 p*31*
б. Quine 1961 p*31*
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according to whether or not in any such language it is possible 
to formulate an analytic truth other than a logical truth*
We should thus have a three-level hierarchy of languages* At 
the'lowest* level (322*) are languages in which logical truths 
are the only nonsynthetic truths which can be formulated • At a 
'higher* level ('El') are languages in which logical truths and 
other analytic truths can be formulated but cannot be character­
ized as analytic* At the 'highest* level ('nonextensional') 
are languages in which logical truths and other analytic truths 
can be both formulated and also characterized as analytic (by 
means of such devices as the modal 'necessarily')#
If now, by fiat, we remove from the English language all 
devices equivalent to Quine's modal 'necessarily*, but make no 
other changes, we are left with a language which qualifies as 
extensional, i*e* is such that in no shape or form can we trans­
late into it a propositionto the effect that such-and-such is 
necessarily true* Let us call this language 'English-E'•
Let us next consider the question whether English-E is an 
El language or an E2 language, and let us grant for the sake of 
the argument (a) that in the world of speakers of English-E no 
bachelors are married, nor are there any unmarried men who are 
not bachelors, and (b) that in the world of speakers of English-E 
no creature with a heart is kidneyless, nor are there creatures 
with kidneys but without a heart*
2  36
Now to say that Bnglish-E is an E2 language will be to 
maintain that the statements expressed by the English-E sentences
are either false or, if true, nonanalytic. But neither state­
ment, hypothesis is false: therefore both must be held to be 
nonanalytic.
since if bachelor and unmarried man have the same meaning in 
English-E, (l) states a truth guaranteed by the meanings of the 
words, i.e. an analytic truth. Thus for an E2 language identity 
of extension of expressions will not be a sufficient condition of 
synonymity.
However, there seems to be no reason which precludes the 
supposition that the semantic description of English-E could 
include the following relational characterizations
(S£ ii) 1 bachelor = unmarried man1
lBj> iii) 1 heart = kidney1 
(granted appropriate substantive characterizations to guarantee
(l) All and only bachelors are unmarried men 
and (2) All and only creatures with _a heart are creatures 
with kidneys
But if both (l) and (2) are true but nonanalytic, a semantic
description of English-E must include the relational
characterization
bachelor ^ unmarried man
the internal consistency of the description)*
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But if S#ii is correct, the statement expressed by (l) 
is analytic, since its truth is guaranteed by the meaning of 
(l), the negation of which is self-contradictory. It follows 
that English-E is an El language, since it affords the pos­
sibility of formulating an analytic truth other than a logical 
truth. If Spxii is correct, then creature with .a heart and 
creature with kidneys are, if semantically endocentric, non- 
synonymous• But in that case, identity of extension does not 
guarantee synonymity of expressions in an El language, since the 
pairs bachelor and unmarried man, and creature with a heart and
     j w wsvu f  uw.■.m jj. J' r =  taauitisifc:
creature with kidneys are each ex hypothesi co-extensional
1 W J HU W  -piiw m  uui.UmAJ.t liniiH Mi II■lilWIIB 1 M H H 1  jl,i 1
pairs in English-E.
It follows that whether English-E is an El language or an 
E2 language, in neither case is identity of extension a suf­
ficient condition of synonymity of expressions* But since 
English-E must be one or the other, identity of extension has 
been shown to be an inadequate criterion of synonymity for ex­
tensional languages.
4*43 This still leaves unanswered Quine*s question about the
source of the assurance that the agreement between certain co-
0
extensional terms 1 rests on meaning rather than merely on ac­
cidental matters of fact*. For the descriptive linguist con-
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eerned with the analysis of natural languages, the assurance 
must ultimately lie in empirical tests of some kind. The 
problem may therefore be put in the form: what kind of test
could give this kind of assurance ?
4.431 Failure to deal with this question vitiates Katz’s 
1claim to have solved precisely ’the problem of distinguishing 
analytic and synthetic truths raised by W* V* Quine1* In Katz’s 
analysis, the characterization of a particular sentence as 
analytic or synthetic depends ultimately on the semantic des­
criptions assigned to individual words in it* But since no 
account is given of the method for assigning semantic descrip­
tions to individual words, the explanatory force of Katz’s 
’solution1 is nil
When,in a later paper Katz addresses himself spec­
ifically to the question of empirical tests for determining 
the analytic sentences of a natural language, he offers the 
following x5roPosal!
I* Katz 1964.
2* It needed at least to be shown that the evidence for
assigning semantic descriptions to words was independent
of the assessment of sentences containing them as ’synthetic1 
or ’analytic*: otherwise the demonstration of the distinc­
tion must be circular*
3* Katz 1967b.
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*We present speakers with short lists of sentences*
List A contains only sentences that are clear cases 
of what we would regard as analytic* Lists Bs>C,D, 
etc* contain clear cases of sentences that are not 
analytic, but, say, respectively, synthetic, contrad- 
ictory, anomalous, etc* Then, we give the speakers 
a batch of sentences of all sorts and ask them to 
place these on the lists to which they belong* Each 
sentence is to be put on the list with whose members 
it is similar* If this experiment is conducted prop­
erly and if the predictions that the semantic component 
of the grammar makes m .ten the actual sorting performed 
by the speakers (cases that are put on list A are those 
and only those that are predicted to be analytic, and 
so on), then we can claim that we have evidence, obtain­
ed in a quite unobjectionable fashion, in favor of the 
semantic component, as a result of its successful pre­
dictions about the data* However, the qualification 
that the experiment be conducted properly is extremely 
important* If the controls used in the experiment en-
2*10
sure that the members of the short lists A, B, C, etc. 
are sufficiently different from one another in the ap- 
propriate respects, then there will be no spurious 
coimnon features that might lead speakers to classify 
sentences on the basis of irrelevant linguistic prop­
erties (e.g* in the case of list A, on the basis of 
some linguistic property other than analyticity). Pos­
itive results in this experiment can be interpreted to 
mean that the judgments of the speakers reflect a recog­
nition of the analyticity of the sentences concerned.
We can say, then, that our definition of analyticity, 
which enabled us to predict the outcome of the experi­
ment, describes the concept of analyticity employed by 
the speakers as their implicit criterion for identifying 
analytic sentences, i.e. for differentiating those of 
the test sentences that are similar to the members on 
list A from those that are not similar to them. We can 
say this on the grounds that assuming that this is their
criterion provides us with the best explanation of the
4behavioral data obtained in the experiment.1
4. Katz 196?b pp.50-51*
But this will not do either* Obviously, for any x, if E 
is an example of x we can construct informant tests designed 
to elicit further instances judged to be 1like E 1» A test 
based on this principle, however, falls short of what is re­
quired in at least three ways* First, as Quine in his brief 
rejoinder to Katz points ou% different lists will presumably
be required for English and for e.g. French, but fno linguist-
5ically general method is offered for making such lists1 * 
Second, even tor one language the test is in principle inade­
quate unless there is a prior guarantee that list A contains 
all the possible types of analytic sentence in the language, 
and only those. But where does this guarantee come from ?
For the problem under discussion is precisely how to draw up 
such a list. If only what Katz calls * clear cases* as© in­
cluded in the list, the test is simply a test of likeness to 
*clear cases1, not a test for delimiting the class of analytic 
sentences. Thirdly, nothing assures us that the analytic
5 .  Q u in e  1967 p .  53*
242
Sentences of a natural language will have in common only 
their analyticity; consequently, Katz1s test is not 
powerful enough to revearl what the criterion of analy­
ticity is, hut only powerful enough to elicit from in­
formants a set of sentences judged to be flike other 
(ex hypothesi analytic) sentences1*
Thus a flikeness* test offers no answer relevant to 
the question of distinguishing analytic from synthetic; 
rather, it assumes that distinction already drawn.
Indeed, unless it were already drawn, the claim that the 
semantic component is able to *predict* analytic sentences 
would lahk substance. But as long as the method of con­
structing semantic characterizations for individual words 
remains obscure, no explanatory advance has been made*
For it is there that a cleavage between semantic and ex­
tra linguistic knowledge must first be introduced if we 
are dealing with any kind of semantic theory which treats 
the meanings of sentences as functions of component 
variables.
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4*3 We have so far discussed no consideration which re­
quires us to revise our original proposal (4*l) concerning 
the relationship between & -characterizations and £-charact- 
izations*
There is, however, reason to believe that very many 
concepts, including everyday physical-object concepts, are 
indeterminate in the sense covered by Waismannfs term *open 
texture* and Carnap*s *intensional vagueness* * If this 
thesis is correct, it must follow that for many expressions 
in natural languages the enterprise of constructing a complete 
substantive semantic characterization lacks feasibility, in 
the sense that there is no end to the sei'ies of conceivable 
hypotheses which would heed testing in order to establish con­
clusively the semantic rule governing the informant *s interpre­
tation. 3?or any given expression investigated, the main 
features to be incorporated in the semantic characterization 
will doubtless become clear soon enough; but anyone who re­
flects upon the matter can easily convince himself that he 
would be hard put to it to elaborate the finer details of his 
own interpretation of words such as house, road, chair? jigl, 
lafe^red, etc* applied to objects and events in his familiar~i P i m m  ~i r miihwh A  w
environment*
1* Waismann 1943, Carnap 1953*
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The problem of 'open texture* and semantic indeterm­
inacy of expressions is dealt with (rather than solved) in 
the conventional dictionary by the introduction of a more or 
less arbitrary limit to the information supplied under each 
entry* For example, the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary
v  M  *  B K C H R K V n n B  lirr'S'WrhJTT'arfT'TTJ M f e m r d H M O Z k m B H R b
entry for house tells us that this word means 'a building for 
human habitation, esp* a dwelling-place1* The same entry 
also indicates various other meanings for house, but fails to 
tell us e*g* whether cottages count as houses, whether 
military barracks count as houses, whether caravans count as 
houses, whether igloos count as houses, etc* It does not 
tell us what to make of a sentence like That's not a house;f — litT n r  m  ctsa ir r fc ia r— I tmmr a
it's, a block of flats* nor of That's, not a. house; it's a. 
p&Ibcst
1.1— I >»■'. i.'J)
From the viewpoint of semantic theory, it is clearly 
unsatisfactory to have to concede that this is the best that 
can be done, ie* that it is arbitrary at what point we draw 
the line and say that semantic description is complete* As 
far as synonymy is concerned, the difficulty is particularly 
acute in that we have so far explained semantic equivalence of 
two expressions as identity of their respective semantic 
characterizations* But if we are now to concede that the 
completeness of such a characterization is arbitrarily determ­
ined in each case, or that there may be some expressions for
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for which the characterization cannot be completed, then it 
would seem that, at least in such cases, we have no real 
account of synonymity at all*
Thus a critic might object ; *It is meaningless to say 
that a, and b are synonymous unless a and b are expressions 
which are semantically determinate. But if they are ex­
pressions fox* which the substantive semantic characterizations 
are incomplete and cannot be completed, the claim that a_ and 
b are synonymous can, in principle, be neither verified nor 
falsified; For, conceivably, although the incomplete 
characterizations match so far, they might not match when 
complete* On the other hand, conceivably, incomplete 
characterizations which differ might turn out to match when 
complete* A claim which can be neither verified nor falsified 
cannot be taken seriously*1 Such a critic, in effect, requires 
a critex*ion of semantic determinacy as a prerequisite to 
claims of synonymity.
4*51 One possible way of replying to this critic would be to 
invoke what may be called the * standard meaning* argument*
This argument would begin by calling attention to the fact that 
the alleged semantic indeterminacy of expressions does not often 
show up in everyday discourse, and suggesting that if this is so 
it is because for most purposes of everyday discourse the indeterm­
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inacy does not greatly matter* Doubtless there are cases 
- suing guarantees, conforming to legal requirements, 
giving evidence in a court of law, etc. - when it may emerge 
that there is uncertainty about the exact meanings of words; 
but these instances are on the whole few and far between, 
except in such specialized areas as philological and philoso­
phical discourse. If that is so - the argument would run - 
then semantic description need not bother about indeterminacy 
any more than the average language-user does. All that 
commonsense requires is that we specify for a given expression 
its standard meaning*, and leave dispute about marginal cases 
to those who are interested in logomachy.
In support of this view, it might perhaps be urged that 
this is just how, as language-users, we treat questions of 
meaning. We do not in practice resort to counting raindrops 
in order to determine whether it is a storm or only a shower.
We undei’stand what is meant when someone says There was a storm
v ■nil. II " I u.l. g 1 I twnl. ll *
or There was a shower by reference to some kind of imaginary
■ I. ■ I I mil ,H.III|I CRH* 3W.W I HP i, — .IMP V V 1 V
1 standard case* of a storm or a shower* Accordingly, the 
'standard meaning* of an expression may be stated simply by 
giving an account of the relevant 'standard case*. In short, 
the problem of semantic indeterminacy is created - or at least 
highly magnified - by the very attempt to introduce irrelevant 
precision into semantic descriptions.
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This somewhat Platonistic view has a superficial 
plausibility; but it will not satisfy the 'open texture' 
critic on various points. For it seems dubious that meaning 
is normally a matter of tacit allusion to 'standard cases'. 
There may perhaps be an imaginary 'standard case* of the cat 
being on the mat, in the sense that one could describe an 
example where no-one would quibble about whether the cat was 
on the mat or not, e.g. Tibs curled up asleep right in the 
middle of the mat. But if I say The oat is on the mat when, 
perhaps, it has only its two front paws actually resting on 
the mat, I am not describing some 'degenerate version® of 
the 'standard ease'. If my description is correct, it is 
because this actual case, like the 'standai'd case', is a 
perfectly good instance of a cat’s being on a mat.
The 'standard meaning* argument seems to confuse two 
quite separate issues. There is the question whether we 
should all agree what to say in a particular case, and there 
is also the question whether a given meaning can properly be 
defined in terms of approximation to an uncontroversial 
exemplar. If someone disagrees that it is the right thing 
to say The cat is on the mat when the cat has only two front
v  .rrmww-rn rr iw, 11 .'■■nami-w »r«-»wmir.Ma v
paws resting on the mat, on the ground,-, that this is not 
sufficiently like the standard case of Tibs circled up, then 
he tacitly assumes that The cat is on the mat is in some sense
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short for a more complete description of the standard case.
But this is no way to refute the fopen texture1 critics 
his point is the difficulty of determining exactly what it 
is everyone is agreed on Because of the difficulty of det-V  ^ m,’fn;4ainsn«^F(AteiC«7» T.sfjmra V
ermining what it is anyone is committed to® But insofar as 
anyone’s commitment can be determined9 then in principle 
everyone’s can be determined®
The way round this difficulty which it is proposed to 
take here is to revise the notion that the relational charact­
erization ’a, = b* stands for identity of the complete substant­
ive characterizations of a( and b respectively# Ins tea cl 5 it is 
proposed to treat synonyny as definable by reference to cx'iteria 
for the formulation of substantive characterizations, i.e® we 
take advantage of the fact that while it may not be possible to 
specify complete semantic characterizations for a. and b, nonethe­
less it may be possible to adopt a particular way of formulating 
the criteria governing admission or exclusion of items with 
respect to substantive semantic characterizations which will 
enable a comparison relevant for judgments of equivalence to be 
made#
The proposal is to let *.a ~ b 1 stand for item—by—item 
matching of substantive characterizations; we opt, in other 
words, for treating the correctness of \a « b* as depending on
2k9
the same items being admissible to, or excluded from, the 
substantive semantic characterizations of a. and b*
km53 Having made this move, we are then at risk in claiming 
the synonymity of a. and b, in the sense that counter evidence 
may be produced which will refute the claim (i.e. debar a 
^ol-characterization) without waiting for completion of the 
jer -characterizations. ^
In order to validate this move, we have now to propose 
some way of determining whether any given item is to be admitted 
to or excluded from any given semantic characterization. But 
if any such proposal is not to be vacuous, it must be integrated 
in quite specific ways into a theory of linguistic knowledge.
1. The move is intuitively satisfactory, in that we do not 
feel that we need to know exactly what two expressions 
mean in order to be sure, in many cases, that they mean 
something different.
Synonymy and linguistic knowledge.
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5*0 It would bo idlo to discuss the role of synonymity 
statements in grammar and semantics unless it could be show 
that, in principle, it is feasible to formulate procedures 
which will make the construction of synonymity statements for 
L possible. But procedures of this kind cannot be formulated 
independently of the adoption of some specific concept of 
•linguistic knowledge1j for we cannot, ultimately, say what 
will count as evidence for or against a given synonymity 
statement unless we are clear about where the boundary between 
the linguistic and the nonlinguistic lies*
5.01 A concept of linguistic knowledge may be delimited with 
sufficient precision for our purposes by specifying (i) how 
much about communication-in-L is to be regarded as explained 
by the linguistfs descriptions, formal and semantic, of the set 
of items constituting the linguistic expressions of L, and (ii) 
what conditions must be satisfied in respect of a given ex­
pression and given item of knowledge such that the item of itnow- 
ledge counts as linguistic knowledge of that expression.
On the formal side, relevant proposals have already 
been put forward in previous chapters• It remains to deal with 
corresponding questions on the semantic side.
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5*1 The most ambitious concept of 1linguistic knowledge*
that could be entertained v«>ul&, presumably, be one which made 
the whole process of successful communication-in-L a matter of 
the linguistic knowledge of L* But if this is too ambitious, 
as it certainly seems, the question arises as to where a line 
shall be drawn between those features of communication acts 
(speech acts, acts of writing) which depend on linguistic 
knowledge, and those which involve nonlinguistic judgments of 
various kinds*
5*11 An important factor in this decision is the evidence
from natural languages that the category of a speech act is 
not uniquely determined by the particular expressions used 
(as might, conceivably, be the case for some non-natural 
languages)* Since the assignment of the correct speech act 
category is clearly of prime importance for effective communic­
ation between language-users, this suggests an obvious place to 
fix our boundary, and an obvious way to do it in terms of 
language description* By excluding any indication of speech
i
act categoi’ies from the chax'acterizations of the sentences of
!• This would be as a general principle; but it is easy to think 
of certain kinds of expression(e*g* greetings,farewells) where 
it would be difficult to apply this principle, and absurd to 
boot* The difficulty in some cases of stating the meanings of 
expressions independently of descriptions of the specific speech 
acts with which they are normally associated is well known.
(it is forcefully stated in Malinowski 1923*)
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a natural language, we place a significant limitation on the
postulated contribution of linguistic knowledge to speech act
2
interpretation.
2. Other proposals can doubtless be argued for: it is not so
far clear that they can be argued for convincingly* Searle 
suggests that if *we can reduce all illocutionary acts to 
some very small number of basic illocutionary types* then 
we might assign to the deep structure of every sentence *a 
simple representation of its illocutionary type** He rejects, 
however, the possibility that 'illocutionary act rules would 
attach directly to elements (formatives, morphemes) generated 
by the syntactic component, except in a few cases such as the 
imperative* (Searle 1969 § 3*3)* Boyd & Thorne want to go 
further than this, but their programme seems to be based on 
a misunderstanding of Austin's position, e.g. they refer to
*Austin's main point, which is that a complete account of the 
meaning of a sentence cannot be restricted to semantic analyses 
as they are ustially understood and that they must be extended 
to include information about the kind of speech act involved 
in uttering the sentence - that is, its illocutionary force* 
(Boyd & Thorne 1969 p.58: but see Austin 1962 p.100). They 
appear to envisage an analysis in terms of two basic categories: 
'statements and imperatives (the latter being subdivided into 
commands and demands) are the primary speech acts and all others 
are in a sense modifications of them* The point is that it 
seems that the analysis of all performatives can be produced 
through the addition of other features to the features STATE 
and IMP. For example, insist can be used to make what might 
be described as a modified statement (l insist that he went), 
a modified command (I insist that you go), or a modified
insist that he go). In each case the analysis of
11 -«Tnm»airnM hit n  gsTMHiuuw r
the verb insist differs from that of the verb state or the 
verb coimuand or the verb demand by possessing a feature which” 
thfy M  not (fcalliiti’r§+ ffiEHATIC3 • )* The explanatory advan­
tages of all this is far from clear, since it merely re-analy­
ses what would normally be regarded (cf# Shorter Oxford 
English Dictionary* art^ insist) as three different meanings 
of the verb insist. Furthermore, the analysis is highly 
questionable, (is the difference between saying I, insist that 
yjou go and I command you to go a matter of a certain emphasis 
added to the order? And even if it were, and were only that,
(cont.) can the kind of 1 emphasis’ involved simply be 
equated with the kind of ’emphasis* which marks the difference 
between 1 insist that he went and I state that he went? This 
seems to be simply playing with words.) But questionable or 
not, the new analysis adds nothing to a semantic description 
of sentences involving insist, since their semantic differences 
were always recognized anyway (i.e. as different ’meanings’ of 
insist). Nor is this all. Such cases as insist can be sub­
sumed under a general rule (i.e. one applying to various other 
verbs as well) that utterances of sentences with the verb in 
the first person singular present indicative can have - but 
do not invariably have - the appropriate performative force 
corresponding to their meaning* In other words, we can better 
explain what kind of speech act is being performed on these 
occasions by reference to the meaning of the verb involved 
than by calling it an ’emphatic statement *, or an ’emphatic 
command*, etc* (Since Austin clearly realized this, it seems 
a pity to invoke his authority in support of such a feeble 
analysis.) Finally, it is doubtful whether Boyd & Thorne have 
a firm grasp of the notion of a speech act at all, for they assert 
that ’under certain circumstances we substitute one kind of 
speech act for another. For example, under some circumstances 
we are likely to use the question Will you pass the salt?rather 
than the command Pass the salt and we would be surprised if 
someone took it as a question and not a command.’ Anyone 
who can say this must be confused over the difference between 
semantic categories (e.g. ’interrogative sentence*,’imperative 
sentence1) and speech act categories (e*g* ’question*). There 
is no sense in which one kind of speech act is here being 
substituted for another: on the contrary, Will you pass the
salt? and Pass the salt are in normal circumstances both used 
in speech acts to which one would assign the same category,
* request *•
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5*112 The boundary thus set up coincides with that normally 
assumed in post-Austinian philosophy of language, e.g. by 
Strawson:
fTo know the meaning (or meanings) of a sentence of a 
language is to be at least partially equipped to under­
stand how any serious utterance of it by a particular 
speaker in a particular context is to be taken. But 
evidently to gra^p the whole of what should be taken to 
be intended to be understood by such an utterance is 
generally something more than merely to know the mean­
ing of the words uttered* Somewhere in between grasp­
ing the former and knowing the latter comes the ability 
to identify any propositions actually expressed in the 
making of the utterance. It comes in between the two, 
on the one hand, because sentence-meaning alone, without 
help from the context of utterance, will rarely reveal 
just at what points the general concepts which figure in 
a proposition are there conceived as attaching to the 
world; and, on the other, because knowledge merely of 
what proposition is expressed does not include knowledge 
of how its expression is to be taken, or of all it is to 
be taken to imply. If, then, we speak of the whole of 
what may properly be taken to be intended to be understood 
by the making of a particular utterance as the force of
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that utterance, we have the trio: force, proposition^ ) 
expressed (if any), sentence-meaning** *
It should perhaps he emphasized that propositions are not 
here conceived of a sentence-meanings (as they have sometimes 
been construed ^ )# They stand on the frontiers of linguistic 
knowledge, and their * frontier status* is reflected in their 
classification into 1 synthetic* and * analytic1* Analytically 
true propositions constitute the limiting case in which linguistic 
knowledge alone takes us furthest towards comprehending the force 
of an utterance# To say this is, of course, to leave untouched 
the task of determining which such propositions are, and to this 
we mudt return below*
5*113 But first it should be noted that the proposed
semantic boundary for linguistic knowledge coincides reasonably 
well with intuitive notions of what it is to understand the 
meaning of a sentence, and with plausible tests for establishing 
whether or not someone knows what a sentence means#
For example, let U3 suppose that there are two readers 
of Kipling’s fflain Tales from the Hills who place different 
interpretations upon the first sentence *To the wittiest woman
1* Strawson 196? PP* 9-10*
2* Staal 1966, Lemmon 1966, Garner 1970*
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in India I dedicate this book1, solely in that reader A, 
unlike reader B, considers that what Kipling says in that 
sentence might be true or false* Now we should certainly 
wish to say that reader A had failed to grasp something; 
but his failure is a failure to graqp the force of the 
speech act  ^rather than a failure to understand the meaning 
of the sentence. If there is no respect in which Afs biz­
arre supposition about the truth-or-falsity of what Kipling 
says precludes A*s passing all the reasonable comprehension 
tests which reader B would pass as to the meanings of the 
words exemplified, and of the exemplified devices for Com­
bining them, then the conclusion must be reached that A and 
B arrive at their differing interpretations on the basis of 
the same semantic knowledge.
fSomeonei might, pex'haps, choose to maintain that one of 
the key tests is what you would say if asked whether what 
Kipling here says is true or false, and this is the test A 
fails to pass* But the motivation for setting up this test 
is not just weak but thoroughly obscure. For the sentence in 
question is not one which could never be used to make a irue- 
or-false statement at all (Kipling might conceivably have
1* Cf. Austin 1962 p. 33 et passim*
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uttered it appropriately on some other occasion, e.g. in the 
course of describing the hook to an interviewer on the eve 
of its publication, to make such a statement)* Header A's 
mistake, therefore, seems best described by saying that he 
here incorrectly assigns the speech act category ‘statement1, 
although knowing perfectly well the meaning of the sentence 
in question.
Assigning the coi’rect dategory to a speech act is
characteristically unlike assigning the correct meaning to a
sentence in that there is no total to be arrived at which is
the product of component parts. The judgment relates to a
unit which is the whole utterance, and any mistake is a mistake
about the category of the whole utterance. One might be wrong
about the meaning of one particular word in a sentence, although
right about the rest. Such a mistake has no analogue in judging
the category of a speech act. For we do not (to adapt a remark 
2 \of h.J. Cohen ) utter one word of statement and six of some­
thing else: it is the whole utterance which constitutes the
statement, not any part of it. Whereas it is typically one 
word or group of words which constitutes e.g. the referring 
expression in a sentence.
2 .  C oh en  1 9 6 2  p .  45*
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Failure to pay attention to such distinctions is a 
potential source of confusion in semantics. It may result 
(as with Katz; & Fodor's explanation of 'paraphrase* already 
commented on, 4.12-4*13) in a misleading use of verbs sttch 
as say* mean, applied indiscriminately both to speech acts 
and to expressions uttered in speech acts, or (as with Lyons's 
theory of 'context-bound synonymy', 4.32-4*321) in a lack of 
clarity concerning the role of context in determining interpret­
ation. It may also lead to confusion over sixch a notion as 
'semantic anomaly', which plays an important part in the sem­
antic theory of Katz & Fodor and in the discussion of analyticity 
generally. For example, a©m@©n@ might be led to consider as
semantically anomalous a sentence like - to take Austin's 
3
example - X appoint this horse consul, where the oddity is 
due not to the fact that the sentence lacks a plausible 
'reading' but to the fact that the coi'responding speech act 
lacks force*
Such considerations argue in favour of the proposal to
let the o' -characterization of an expression a represent the
knowledge a competent speaker of L may draw upon in interpreting
3* Austin 19^ 2 p. 35*
4. On the contrary, the sentence is semantically quite approp­
riate for the coimuunxeationa 1 purpose envisaged, if only
there existed a social procedure which gave its utterance 
the required force.
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any speech act, just insofar as that interpretation is 
determined by the use of a. in the speech act in question*
Thus a of-characterization is not, as such, called upon 
to represent the knowledge which enables the hearer to 
assign the correct speech act category to an utterance.
The decision to limit the content of jr -characterizations 
accordingly may, in the case of some non-natural languages, 
be otiose (e.g. for languages where all speech acts belong 
to the same category). Nonetheless, as regards natural 
languages a distinction is warranted by the radical dif­
ference in the kind of judgment called for.
On this view, linguistic knowledge does not explain
e.g. understanding the difference between Go for a walk as 
a suggestion and Go for a walk as an order, nor the dif-
D  w  * j- ia I B id i r t a A  fcirasj q^xJU— M Vl-U l
ference between You are asking for trouble as a warning and 
You are asking for trouble as a threat, unless such differen- 
ces are regularly signalled by linguistic means, e.g. by 
systematic differences of intonation In such pairs the
force of the speech act may be different, while the meaning 
of the expressions is the same.
nnHUr.TTH|«'i'Ti«M i. «m«mn ni  n. fto. . *  m* ■■ | *Wll pn. miin  dm 0 T i l l  iTT i 'iTT r ~i n . m  n .i i n i t  nT^p^j, n tnj iniim *■' m r iw  ■ n*«— nilwiMFilii iT - vTT1 rr~i  i pi >  ..... " I   , * nn« II I  J I I
f>. There will doubtless be borderline cases — these may be 
such - where it is not clear whether we should say there 
is a difference of meaning.
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The distinction is of particular importance as regards 
synonymy, since it may be perfectly possible to find sentences 
which are normally used with the same force in speech acts but 
have different meanings (perhaps Would you mind shutting the 
door? and Shut the door if you please 6), and also sentences 
which are normally used with different force in speech acts, 
but have the same meaning (perhaps jPrimatology jLg, the study of
5*114 In acceptance of the foregoing there is an imx>lieit 
rejection of fneo-Austinion* definitions of meanings in terms 
of speech acts, e*g* the definition of sentence meaning pro­
posed by Alston:
i in i i^ bH i nii*> iiii*na n wn pipm i—  n in —  ■ iw M * * i i i f c ^  u T T i r m an T i i n mi i ‘ I t ------1— n r *  n - w i r-n ■■ r t i  ,n i i n ■ i n i i n n i i 1— n 1 -  '  ~‘ 1 '
6* Xhridence of a difference of meaning is the fact that X may 
say Yes to the first if I am objecting, whereas if I say 
Yes to the second I am signifying readiness to comply* 
"(gome-one may say Yes to the interrogative sentence to 
indicate compliance; but if he does, this shows he is 
taking the utterance of that sentence as having the force 
of Shut the door if you please* or something similar, i.e. 
his Yes is not, as in the other case, the answer to a 
question*)
7* The first is normally, we may assume, intended to have the 
force of a definition, which it is difficult to attribute 
to the second.
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*S^  meqns 8>2 = ^  and 8  ^have the same illocutionary 
act potential1 ^
and associated accounts of synonymy, e.g.
means W(2 “ df. "lVL and W can he substituted for each 1 2
other in a wide range of sentences
without altering the illocutionary act
2potentials of those sentences* •
The reason why semantic definitions of this kind do not 
provide an acceptable basis for an account of synonymy in 
natural languages is quite simply that differences in illocut­
ionary act potential can sometimes be due to a formal difference 
between expressions. To take up, by way of illustration, the 
example cited in 5»H3> it is clear that there will be illocut­
ionary acts which can be performed by uttering Frimatology isV  A  w W  rwiw - 1 M W i i iW u i K a r u m  ruBt jh ■»,'«»>
the study of primates but which cannot be performed by uttering
Primatolo&y is primatology. e.g. the illocutionary act of get­
ting X to understand) what primatology is (granted that X does 
not know what primatology is: for example, supposing he has asked
For to say to someone, in effect, *1 gather you do not understand 
what primatology is, but, since you ask me, I will enlighten you
the question *Gan you explain to me what primatology is?1).
1. Alston 1964 p. 36.
2. Alston 1964 p. 37*
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by telling you that primatology is primatology* would be 
somewhat like saying *1 know the door is shut, but shut it 
all the same1 • In these and similar cases the speaker would 
be failing to 1take responsibility* (to use Alston*s phrase 
for his speech aet in the appropriate way*
What is missed in the 1 illocutionary act potential* 
definition is precisely the sense of ’meaning* in which the 
synonymity of a and b accounts for the correctness of the 
explanation *a is b*.
3*2 If we accept that a semantic description of L must be 
based on a prior decision to differentiate items of knowledge 
into two classes (those which count, and those which do not 
count, as items of semantic knowledge dbout particular ex­
pressions), and if the substantive semantic characterizati ona 
contained in a semantic description of L are interpreted as 
statements to the effect fS (the speaker of L) knows that 
**.*•’, then a method of formulating the content of semantic 
characterizations involves a procedure for selecting certain 
items from the totality of knowledge attributable to the
3* Alston 1964 p* 43*
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speaker* Such a view incurs the obligation to demonstrate 
that non-question-begging tests for classifying items of 
knowledge in the manner required are, in principle, avail­
able.
To take a simple case, if we treat the semantic 
characterization
fdibatag; long-necked antelope..... * 
as representing the proposition;
*S knows that long-necked antelopes.••.are called
dibatags *
the formulation of the semantic characterization implies a 
decision to include certain items of knowledge relating to a 
certain class of animals as part of the speake r1s linguistic 
knowledge, and to exclude certain others. Thus for any item 
of knowledge about dibatags attributable to the speaker who 
knows how to use the word dibatag (e.g* that they have an 
average gestation period of n days, or that they are almost 
extinct) the question arises whethex’ it forms part of the 
speakex'fs linguistic knowledge of the expression dibatag.
This question is, in effect, the question of delimiting what 
Katz & Fodox* call the ‘upper bound of a semantic theoiy* ♦
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Its relevance to analyticity is that according as different 
items are included in or excluded from a semantic character­
ization, so different sentences will consequentially be 
exhibited as analytic®
Katz & Fodor claims
1Since a complete theory of setting 
selection must represent as part of the setting of an 
utterance any and every feature of the world which 
speakers need to determine the preferred reading of that 
utterance and since*••practically any item of information 
about the world is essential to some disambiguations* it 
follows that 1such a theory cannot in principle distinguish 
between a speaker’s knowledge of his language and his know­
ledge of the world because, according to such a theory, 
part of the characterisation of a linguistic ability is a 
representation of virtually all knowledge about the world 
speakers share*1 ^
As an example of a piece of nonlinguistic information 
Katz & Fodor cite the fact that lions, but not children nor buses, 
are often kept in cages. Knowledge of this fact, they argue
!• Katz & Fodor 1963 P* 489*
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would, "be required for the selection of correct readings 
for the following three sentences!
Should we take the lion hack to the zoo ?
Should we take junior hack to the zoo ?
Should we take the bus hack to the zoo ?
BLB«Miam*»*W«saaT>e evEsrspq c.'l ii i inLiita iMtowtt »m«.i.w.LW omjjg tcrseesWiCV
Thus, even if informants concurred in assigning no inoi^ e than 
one reading to each of the above sentences in isolation, a 
semantic description of English should nonetheless — on this 
view — mark each sentence as ambiguous, silnee the informants.* 
interpretation is here based upon an item of information whiojt 
happens to be common knowledge, but not linguistic knowledge*
In the example cited, it is clear that the decision to 
mark each sentence as ambiguous means excluding certain in­
formation from the semantic characterizations of various 
words, e*g* we exclude from the semantic characterization of 
the word lion any such metalinguistic description as 1 *•• 
often kept in cages***1* But the question arises! what are 
the grounds for this exclusion ? To argue that the exclusion 
is justified because the knowledge that lions are often kept 
in cages is nonlinguistic knowledge would be beside the point; 
since for any given item of nonlinguistic knowledge we can 
easily formulate a corresponding item of information about
26?
the use of a linguistic expression, e®g«, that lion 
denotes a class of animals#»•.often kept in cages# The
question that needs to he answered is why this does not 
count as part of the speaker's semantic knowledge of the 
word lion*
The same issue is raised in a more general form by 
Bolinger's query: 'Where do semantic markers come from?£«
Bolinger points out that Katz & Fodor allow that in commun­
ication situations there are occasions where 'we achieve a 
disambiguation by way of something that is not a semantic 
marker', and asks:
'But why is it not a semantic marker?
Where do markers like (Animal), (physical Object), 
(Young), and (Female) come from if not from our 
knowledge of the world? What is strange about (Shoe- 
wearing) as a semantic marker - not as general, surely, 
as (Female), but general enough? The discalced branch
of Carmelite monks is identified by it, and it crops
2
up every now and then as a mark of status*#•#'
To such questions, however, neither Katz & Fodor nor Bolinger 
are able to supply an answer# Katz & Fodor take for granted 
a distinction between semantic and nonlinguistic knowledge, 
but attempt no explication of the distinction# At least two 
reasons require that such an attempt be made# First, until 
it has, the upper bound of a semantic theory remains unfixed,
2* Bolinger 1965 p* 568#
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i.e. we have no assurance that literally any fact at all 
about lions (e.g. that Nero kept them as pets) might not 
turn out to be part of the meaning of the word lion.
Second, as long as the upper hound of a semantic theory 
remains unfixed, the problem of analyticity remains un­
solved, for we shall be unable to say with certainty which 
the analytic sentences of 3L are. As Staal obsex’ves in con­
nexion with another example (Whales are mammals), 1 the semantic 
theory of a language does not solve this problem, but presupposes 
its solution. For the answer would depend on the way semantic 
trees are constructed. .For the above illustration, (jmammalj 
may or may not be considex’ed a semantic element of the tree for
whale, dependent on whether this zoological information is or
3is not considered part of the native speaker1s competence1 «
3o Staal 1966 p. 79« Staal, however, wants to have it all ways 
at once| for he claims that Katz (Katz 1964) showed how *a 
semantic theory enables us to decide which sentences of a 
natural language are analytic, The decision can be obtained 
quite mechanically with the help of formal definitions for 
analyticity, contradiction, etc.Here no circularity is in­
volved, since the construction of a semantic theory does not 
depend on notions like analyticity... * (Btaal 1966 p.68).
The claim that no circularity is involved is repeated (Staal 
1966 p.72). But nothing could be more patently circular; for 
the construction of a semantic theory depends on deciding what 
to count as included in the meanings of particular words, and 
since the type of semantic theory advocated by Katz & Fodor has 
as one of its objectives to explicate the semantic contribution 
of individual words to the sentences in which they occur, that 
in turn presupposes that a decision has already been taken as 
to whether e.g. the fact that whales are mammals counts as 
semantic knowledge. If it does, Whales are mammals will turn 
out to be analytic.
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5*21 The solution which seems best to meet the require­
ments of empirical linguistic analysis is to count knowing 
the meaning of an expression as including knowing that j> 
if and only (i) all speakers of L know that and (ii) the 
assumption that all speakers of L know that is required 
to explain their normal interpretation of some sentence or 
sentences of L comprising ox* containing the expression in 
question*
Where j) is an item of knowledge relating to the use 
of an expression at we can represent jo by including an ap- 
pr.Opx’iate metalinguistic expression in the semantic 
characterization of ja: 
fa;***«*?r»*« ••1
tssd
Then the following rule (e ) will govern the formulation 
of the content of substantive semantic characterizations:
(b ) : *]?or any expression the characterization
includes a metalinguistic description 2£ ii 
and only if (i) the information represented 
by 2T known to all speakers of L, and (ii) 
the information repx’esented by tt is utilized 
in the intex'pretation of some sentence of L* * 
Thus under E 9 if a. is the expression lion and jr is the 
metalinguistic expression f#**often kept in cages***19 for 
inclusion of this expression in the characterization of a it 
needs to be shown (a) that all speakers of L know that lion
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is a word for a kind of creature often kept in cages, and
(b) that this knowledge is utilized by all speakers of L
in their interpretation of some sentence of L.
Testing for (a) is, we may take it, straightforward
enough* Testing for (b) can be undertaken by constructing
sentences about lions in which some point of interpretation
a disambiguation of pronominal reference) is dependent
on knowledge of the fact that lion denotes a kind of creature
often kept in cages, and investigating whether speakers of L
1
utilize this knowledge in interpreting the sentences •
This proposal does not incur the objection voiced by 
Katz & Kodor against a theory of setting selection, that it 
involves as ■part of the characterization of a linguistic 
ability»*.a representation of virtually all knowledge about 
the world speakers share1® This objection is met by the
1® Katz & JPodor1 s example is somewhat more complex than 
this in that the simultaneous utilization of several 
items of knowledge is involved, namely: !lion:*..*
often kept in cages****1, *bus:. not often kept
in cages♦**.(, ■child:*..*not often kept in cages•.♦■* 
But we can run tests for the simultaneous utilization 
of such knowledge with sentences such as John could 
see buses and children and lions in their cages* and 
determine whether their cages is interpreted as refer­
ring to the lions* cages, or, as is syntactically 
possible, to the cages of the buses and children as 
well. It would be essential to construct the test in 
such a way that no information relevant to the disam­
biguation (e.g* that the lions were in cages, but not 
the buses nor the children) was supplied by the Context.
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satisfaction of both conditions incorporated in E, i.e. 
it is not sufficient that an item of knowledge should be 
shared by all speakers of L, but it must be shown also that 
this item of knowledge is utilized by all speakers in their 
interpretation of certain sentences of h* It is thisJbr t W |
latter condition which provided the justification for in­
cluding the relevant information in the characterization of 
a linguistic ability. It might perhaps be the case in some 
particular instance that all items of knowledge common to 
speakers of L could be shown to be utilized by the speakers 
of L in their interpretation of sentences. But if that were 
so it would be an empirical fact about that linguistic com­
munity, not a consequence which must follow from the adoption 
of E in the linguistic analysis of L* We may conclude, then, 
that the application of E satisfactorily determines the 
upper bound of a semantic theory of L*
5.22 On the basis of E, we may define synthetic synonymy- 
in-Xj by (i) making it both a necessary and a sufficient con­
dition for relational characterizations of type J^ *l that there 
be no metalinguistic description TV such that is excluded 
from the substantive semantic characterization of one but not 
the other of the two E-expressions in question, and (ii) making 
it both a necessary and a sufficient condition for relational
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characterizations of type S^2 that there be a certain 
metalinguistic description W  such that ?r is excluded from 
the substantive semantic characterization of one L-expression 
but not the other#
Similarly for analytic synonymy-in-L characterizations 
of type Apl and A^2 will involve the same guarantees for 
matching pairs of meaningful elements which occur as components 
of two synthetically synonymous expressions#
The answer thus j^oposed to Quine!s problem of disting­
uishing synonyms from expressions which merely agree extension- 
ally runs in brief as follows* Two co-extensional expressions 
(e#g. creature with #a heart and creature with kidneys)will be 
counted (synthetically) synonymous if all speakers of L know 
that they are co-extensional, and utilize this knowledge in 
interpreting appropriate sentences containing these expressions. 
They will not, however, count as analytically synonymous ex­
pressions if there are semantic differences between corresponding 
pairs of components (e.g# a heart and kidneys)* For such pairs 
of expressions as afford no basis for the semantic comparison 
of component parts (e#g. pomelo and shaddock) a distinction 
between synthetic and analytic synonymity cannot be drawn#
We need not be moved by objections todhe effect that this 
solution simply elevates factual knowledge to the status of 
semantic knowledge on condition that it play a role in inter­
pretation# Fox' we may reasonably, at this point, inquire of our
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objector what better reason he can think of for calling 
knowledge 1 semantic1.
Accordingly, any truth expressed in a sentence of the 
form !A11 and only .as are be1 will be analytic on condition 
that substantive semantic characterizations for a, and b admit 
and exclude the same items. This can be tested empirically, 
since the proposals advocated above allow us to determine, 
for any item of knowledge whatsoever, whether it shall be re­
presented in the semantic characterization of any given ex­
pression.
Normally, it will not be difficult to construct for a 
and b exactly parallel tests to decide whether a particular 
item shall be included in or excluded from the substantive 
semantic characterization. For example, we might wish to 
test the hypothesis that the word bachelor is interpreted as 
applying to a man who has no wife. If that hypothesis is 
correct, we should expect informants to be able to identify 
the subject of was refused admission in Peter arrived at the 
club with John, who also brought Peter1s wife in the car, but,
A s r n M j a )  ■gM a a »  % n i —  r i, fc n rlVrfci 1-nr mi m egt . w m . a u a  RRI wc*H=c*3jar=» msnafci w
being a bachelor, was refused admission; to detect an anomaly
tev«ii!MRF.is3eecS» rajju— <*wi > t Mimf — ts is iiw w  eiremc*9t * 3s» *^.-isaecs» \m nt>w
in There were twenty trade union officials at the meeting, of 
whom ten were bachelors and at least twelve had brought their
ft;* ,■  yq,™ t.< B f .M M W  p n K n a o n rO  I I liiiHW i 1 n !■■■ I l l 1 ~ 1  fn fc tB  fer^T^v^. m*w K M **r tT a
wives; etc. Let us suppose that the results with thes& tests
ewrjT i rnwu i. i i i * a  a
are positive, i.e. confirm the hypothesis. Now tests can he 
run with the setae sentences, substituting unmarried mag and
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unmarried men for ‘bachelor and bachelors respectively* If
|T"T l ml ' l Til i f lTllil  n i l'll*  fca O rti t ia  lilllTIIIT v IIW I l f  1111 MWW  IH W r . f W Wl'JHP*!* tlWl'IHWiU.J. «  V
these tests give the same results, we conclude that both 
for bachelor and for unmarried man the substantive semantic
| |TT- —-I wnnai u w  * i* irm~f  i w M a m r r a
characterisation must be so formulated as to include the in­
formation that the expression is interpreted as applying to 
a man who has no wife*
Mien we can elicit no further items of knowledge which 
appear to determine how informants interpret sentences con­
taining ja and sentences containing b, and any hypothesis 
confirmed (or rejected) for a. has been correspondingly con­
firmed (or rejected) for h 9 we may conclude that ja and b are 
(synthetically) synonymous* They will also be analytically 
synonmyous to the extent that similar results can be obtained 
for matching pairs of meaningful components*
5*23 The proposed method allows us to take account of other
than ‘cognitive1 differences between expressions. It allows
for as many different dimensions of semantic variation as we
can establish to be empirically relevant to communicati on-in-L.
For example, if it is established that all speakers of L know
that nigger is a more derogatory term than negro and use this
knowledge in assigning an interpretation to some sentence(s) of
L, the respective semantic characterisations for negro and nigger
1must reflect this difference*
,1 "TWTin-y ■*<■’ nwj'. 1 *i ■*» ")■■ 1 n iMi nfci Him Ibiii*....HIM * f I W* 1
1* For an analysis of some noncognitive dimensions, see Osgood, 
Suci & Tannenbaum 1957*
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5*3 lu conclusion, it may be claimed that an account of 
synonymy based on B will be adequate for purposes of the 
linguistic analysis of natural languages in just this sense i 
that it provides an unobjectionable basis for explaining what 
it means to incorporate into a clescription of L a statement 
to the effect that two jj-expressions have, or do not have, the 
same meaning, and renders any such statement amenable to 
verification*
Such an account, however, commits us to a concept of 
linguistic knowledge which goes considerably beyond the notion 
of the *intexmaliged rules1 of the ideal speaker-hearer of L. 
This figment of modern linguistic theory is the fashionable 
myth who has replaced Saussure*s mumbo-jumbo about a language 
existing only in the collective mind of the community. But, 
although ideal, he has his shortcomings; and one of them is 
that the question of what counts as linguistic knowledge for 
him not only cannot be answered, but cannot even be raised.
276
Bibliography
This list includes all items to which reference is made in 
the present study, and others directly relevant to the topics 
discussed*
.Abraham & Kiefer 1966
S. AlSraham & I?* Kiefer A theory of 
structural semantics* The Hague/paris,1966.
Alston 1964
W.P. Alston HLULoga^ ^  Jaagas^, Englewood Cliffs, 
1964.
Austin 1962
J. L* Austin How to do things with words, ed. J.O.
uiL.ii'wr. t=X£l£3Ua «555?BCfcT?AaMiMea5dl .w*rt1rTI'fll‘^  HL JJHitewftViant' *
Urmson, Oxford, 1962*
Bach 1964
E* Bach An Introduction to Transformational Grammars *
New York, 1964.
Bar-Hillel 196?
Y* Bar-Hillel, review of The Structure of Language, 
ed. Podor & Katz, Englewood Cliffs, 1964, in
Language XLIIX, 1967, pp.526-350.
Bazell 1954
C.E* Bazell *The sememe1, Litera* Vol.l, 19§4, pp*17-31*
Beard 1965
B.W. Beard 1 Synonymy and oblique contexts* Analysis 
Vol.26, 1965, PP*1-5*
Bennett 1968
D* C, Bennett *English prepositions; a stratificational 
ajjproach*, Journal of Linguistics Vol.4, 1968,x^ p. 
153-172.
Bloch 1948
B. Bloch *A set of postulates for phonemic analysis*, 
ge XOV, 1948, pp.3-46.
Bloch & Trager 1942
B. Bloch & G.L.Trager^Outline of Linguistic 
Analysis, Baltimore, 1942.
277
Bloomfield 1935
L. Bloomfield Language, London, 1935*
Bolinger 1965
D. Bo linger- 'The atomisation of meaning1,
XLI, 1965, PP. 555-573.
Boyd & Thorne 1969
J* Boyd & J.P. Thorne 'The semantics of modal 
verbs1, Journal of Linguistics Vol.5, 1969?
PP. 57-74.
Carnap 1947
B. Carnap Meaning and Necessity. Chicago, 194?.
Carnap 1955
B* Carnap 1 Meaning and synonymy in natural languages1, 
Philosophical Studies Vol. 7, 1955» pp.33-47.I.i H.l —  II .  M l ■ ,im» , ■ 1 *  I I I m w  ayjl BM Jteea .  ^  M  ^
Catford 1965
J.C. Catford A Linguistic Theory of Translation. 
Oxford, 1965*
Chomsky 1955
A. N. Chomsky 1 Semantic considerations in grammar1, 
Monograph Series on Language and Linguistics No.8,
1 1 nwitwi im aF^ . iifu HBi i 1 1 tain!" ■*. im.iwiMl.i-d* i HI— l> m iiW.iiiJ.iM  m u  rJ> ur li u r
1955, pp.141-153.
Chomsky 1957
N. Chomslcy Syntactic Structures. fs-Gravenhage, 1957.
Chomslcy 1962
N. Chomsky 'The logical basis of linguistic theory1, 
Preprints of papers for the Ninth International
■’■■■ nwRr.« c n E 4 * * » J * p x x m m )  wrtsX-r* lr*. 1^ 1.1 w  ^i"1 J W * w * ■
Congress of Linguists, 1962.
Church 1954
A. Church * Intensions 1 isomorphism and identity of 
belief1, Philosophical Studies Vol.5. 1954,pp.65-73*
Cohen 1962
L.J.Cohen The Diversity of Meaning, London, 1962.
Collinson 1939
W.E. Collinson 'Comparative Synonymies1 Trans­
actions of the Philological Society. 1939*,pp.54-77<
iibi. ii  I i Iipm m i ■ ■ ■ ! Ill KSf*nrteU3* Efrrc.-J.JU3t',■ n u * ■ - «ms=sf i f aaei »i FHS>v***T#  #  *
Dixon 1963
R.M.W.Dixon Linguistic Bplenee an,d logic, The Hague, 1963.
278
Duchacek 1964
0. Duchacek ’Differents types de synonymes1,
Qrbis XIII No.l, 1964, pp.35-49.
Ebeling I960
C.L.lbeling Linguistic Units., 1 s-Gravenhage, I960*
Fillmore 1968
C.J.Fillmore ’The case for case1 in UniverseIs of
’T'WiinmrTi
L^guj-stic Theory, ed. Bach & Harms, New York, 1968. 
Fiscber-J^rgensen 1956
E.Fischer-Jdrgensen fThe commutation test 
and its application to phonemic analysis1, 
For Roman Jakobson, The Hague, 1956,p p . 
140-151.
Frege 1892 t1
G, Frege ’Tiber Sinn und Bedeutung*, 2eitschrift 
fur Philosphie und philosphiache Kritik, Vol.100, 
1892, pp. 25-50.
Garner 1970
B.T. Garner ’Lemmon on sentences, statements and 
propositions’, Analysis Vol.50. 1970, pp.85-91*
Gleason 1966
H.A* Gleason An Introduction tjo Descriptive 
Linguistics, revised ed., New York, 1966.
Goodman 1949
N. Goodman ’On likeness of meaning’, Analysis 
Vol.10, 1949, pp.1-7.
Goodman 1955
N. Goodman *0n some differences about meaning*, 
iis Vol.13, 1953, pp.90-96.
Harris 1951
2.5. Harris Methods in Structural Linguistics0 
Chicago, 1951*
Hax’ris 1954
2.5. Harris ’Distributional Structure*, Word 
Vol.10, 1954, pp. 146-162.
Harris 1967
H. Harris ’Semantics and translation*, Proceedings 
of the Tenth International Congress of Linguists, 
Buchai'est, 1967, Vol.II pp. 465-469*
279
Harris 1970
B. Harris 1Deviance and Citation1, Journal of 
Linguistics Vol. 6, 1970*
Hockett 1958
C.f. Hockett A course in modern linguistics.
«*£=• n i H n a ^ ^ W M  «*•*»;**» I'l1 Hi — n'M wiHiwi ■ H W  1 miMmilli. tr I lai— i M a  J
New York, 1958*
O'ones 1962
D. Jones The Phoneme: its Nature and Use, 2nd ed., 
Cambridge» 1962•
Katz 196A
J.J. Katz fAnalyticity and contradiction in natural 
language1 in The Structure of Language, ed. fodor &
Katz, Englewood Cliffs, 1964, pp.519-543.
Katz 1967a
J.J. Katz "Be cent issues in semantic theory1, 
foundations of Language Vol. Ill, 1967? pp.124-194.
Katz 1967b
J.J® Katz fSome remarks on Quine on analyticity1,
The Journal of Philosophy LXIV. 1967. nr>.36-*54.
es=*=oft=a* u 1 >1 ■!—  m  ■p iapi.wtk. igaw +iva i.r-piM iii.i:|h|H nir n n l i ir f u  * 9 W A  A  ^  ^
Katz & Fodor 1963
J.J.Katz & J.A.fodor *The structure of a 
semantic theory1, Language XKOX. 1965*
(Page references are to the reprinting in 
The Structure of Language» ed. fodor &
Cg-i» imUL JP.<WtnW« i1l»lW..i1l «' ■.'■<>^**.1.. .W.I LI #
Katz, Englewood Cliffs, 1964, pp.479-518-)
Katz & Postal 1964
J.J. Katz & P.M. Postal An Integrated Theory
i  ■  L i , ; ?  — r n r  H i ' i  i i n i w  i i i — m  i f c u m  11 i
of Linguistic Descriptions. Cambridge.Mass•,n m  r ti i . . i n  Hi i ■ V"ii wa .ifciiri ~imii.»iiin ■ i m  i i i . * n i ' i  iB ^ ih — f a  w  * w
1964.
Katz & Martin 1967
J.J. ICatz & E. Martin Jr. fThe synonymy of 
actives and passives1, The Philosphical Beview 
LHXVI, 1967, pp.476-491.
Kiefer 1966
f. Kiefer ,8ome semantic relations in a natural language1; 
foundations of Language Vol. 2, 1966, pp.228-240.
Lakoff 1969
B.Lakoff fSome reasons why there can*t be any some-any 
rule1, Language XLV. 1969* pp.608-615.
280
Lemmon 1966
E.J. Lemmon Sentences, statements and propositions',
SrA'^il Analytical Philosophy, ed. Williams & Montefiore, 
London, 1966, pp.87-10?*
Lewis 1944
G.I.Lewis 'The modes of meaning1, Philosophy and
Eesearch IV, 1944, pp.236-249*
Linsky 196?
L. Linsky 1 Synonymity1, Encyclopedia of 
Vol.8, 1967, PP.34-57.
Lyons 1963
J. Lyons Structnral Semantics, Oxford, 1963*
Lyons 1968
J. Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics,v  b w a s s v s n a a u w u n t J a M e n  »  iwlhu p v p v tm i i in n  mu <.■»■ i ■ ■ ■ i iP f . n  *
Cambridge, 1968,
Malinowski 1923
B. Malinowski 'The problem of meaning in 
primitive languages', in C.K.Ogden & X.A .Richards 
The Meaning of Meaning, London 1923> Supplement I.n « W K T 1  Cili a  ftMwnH K m w , t j r t  ■ ■ mm * «  A
Mates 1950
B. Mates 'Synonymity', University of California 
Publications in Philosophy XXV, 1950,pp*201-226.— ■< j i  < « n  ■ L . m i i w t n w M ' t  r» H M *  i r c f . * « g » w a * i lJ t  m *  *  ■*• *
Meckler 1954
L. Meckler 'On Goodman's refutation of synonymy', 
Analysis Vol.14, 1954, pp.68-78.
Medlin & Smart 1957
B.H. Medlin & J.J.C. Smart 'Moore's paradox: 
synonymous expressions and defining1, Analyses 
Vol.17, 1957? pp.125-134.
Moore 1970
T. Moore 'Synonymy and case grammar', paper read to 
the Linguistics Association of Great Britain, April,1970*
Naess 1953
A. Naess Interpretation and jfeecialeneaa» Oslo, 1953*
281
Naess 1957
.&• Naess 'Synonymity as revealed by intuition', 
The Philosophical Keview 1X71, 1957, pp.87-93.
Nida 1949
E. A# Nida Morphology, 2nd ed., Ann Arbor, 1949*
Olds 1956
M. E. Olds 1Synonymity: extensional isomorphism*, 
Mind mr, 1956, pp.473-488.
Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum
G.E. Osgood, G.J* Suci & P*"U. 
Tannenbaum The Measurement of
■ H t t l M  iw.l PlJJa
Meaning, Urbana, 1957*
X^ ap 1955
A. Pap *Belief, synonymity and analysis1, Philosophical 
Studies Vol. 6, 1955, pp.11-15*
Pap 1958
A. Pap Semantics and Necessary Truth, New Haven, 1958. 
Perkins & Singer 1951
M. Perkins & I. Singer *Analytieity*, The 
Journal of Philosophy XLVI1I, 1951, pp. 
485-497.
Pike 194?
K. L. Pike 1Grammatical prerequisites to phonemic 
analysis*, Word Vol.5 No.3, 1947, PP*155-”172*
Pike 196?
K.L. Pike Language in relation to a unified theory of
I I IIIII im 1 WPP I ■ I I 11 I llll I HCJltVrt* ffTtSttTUg'T H W H I  I I J H W  IMMUi. «RA W  WaiW)f-*TI FII ■  H l | „ m i
human behavior, 2nd rhvised ed., The Hague, 196?.
Price 1950
E. A. Price *A note on likeness of meaning *, Analysis 
Vol.11, 1950, pp.18-19*
Putnam 1954
H. Putnam * Synonymity and the analysis of belief
sentences*, Analysis Vol.14, 1954, pp.485-497*
Quine 1943
W.V.O. Quine *Notes on Existence and Necessity*,
The Journal of Philoscmhy, Vol. 40, 1943, pp.113-12?.
282
Q u in e  1 9 5 3
WoV.O. Quine *The problem of meaning in linguistics*
in W.Y*0* Ouine From a logical point of viev.u Snd.ed.,tasaiiytaiaaasSjfl fcttw C t f t * y r . v g  aigy-ra tutvp^ — ,—r-> m-*3r>-»V * +
Cambridge, Mass*, 1961*
Quine I960
W.V.O. Quine Word and Object* Cambridge, Mass#* 1960#
Si eMti-ittXKW^ aa^  *=s*S2**f-«3 -yr * W  W *
Quine 1961
W.Y.O# Quine *Two dogmas of empiricism* in W.Y.O.
Quine From a logical point of view, 2nd ed., Cambridge, 
Mass., T9Sl7 
Quine 196?
W.V.Q. Quine *0n a suggestion of Katz *, The. Journal of
mtostty, i*w, 196?, pp. 52-54.
Beicheabaeh 194?
H. Eeichenbach Elements of Symbolic Logic# New
c^ *KMrsKTfidy:itil^ «»i!irlar«!eT #BLS-9^ 9 a.pg . M J . ca.T^ JsrlT'rfr'i-'t^ -'O *
York, 1947#
Bobbins 1952
B. Bobbins *0n synonymy of word-events *, Analysis 
Vol.12, 1952, pp.98-100#
Bo11ins 1952
C.B. Bo11ins 1Sameness of meaning - a reply to Hr * 
Wienpahl and others1, Analysis Vol.15* 1952,pp.46-48#
Bosenberg 1967
J#F. Bosenberg * Synonymy and the epistemology of 
linguistics1, Inquiry Vol. 10, 196?, pp#405-420*
Bosetti 1963
A . Bosetti 1Son-type et phoneme* Linguistics Yol.l* 
1963, pp.58-59.
Budner 1950
E. Budner {A note on likeness of meaning1,
Yol*10, 1950, pp.115-118*
Seheffier 1955*
I# Seheffier 1 On synonymy and indirect discourse*, 
Philosophy of Science Vol.22# 1955? pp.39-44*
Schwayder 1954
D# Schwayder *Some remarks on synonymity and the 
language of semanticiats’, Philosophical Studies 
Vol.5, 1954, pp.lS-5.
283
Searle 1958
J.E. Searle 'Proper names', Mind IXVTI, 1958, 
pp. 166-173®
Searle 1969
J.B* Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge- 1969*M,4-«rflVfii-'JlIS.Ty-tKTTJr IIWP ■ I ■ H * W W ^  "
Sellars 1955
W. Sellax’s ‘Putnam on synonymity and belief1,
Analysis Vol.15, 1955, pp.117-120.
Sorensen 1963
H.S. Sdrensen The Meaning of Proper Names,
Copehhagen, 1963*
Southworth 196?
F. C. Southworth fA model of semantic structure®, 
Language mill, 196?, pp.342-361.
Sparck Jones 1964
K. Sparck Jones Synonymy and Semantic Classification » 
Cambridge, 1964.
Staal 1966
J. P. Staal ,Analyticity*, Foundations of Language Vol.2, , 
1966, pp.67-93*
Stati 1966
S. Stati ‘Homonymie, synonymie et equivalence en syntax©*, 
Bevue ronmaine de linguistique XI. 1966, pp.133-146.
w*mjgg»ini.n »ttj i« hmij«i tn— >r, *j luli> •a«a1mtii« m« ininw,  ...  ' »**»=■ ^
Strawson 196?
P.F* Strawson Philosophical Loj^ ic, ed* Strawson, Oxford, 
1967, ‘Introduction* pp.1-16.
Strawson 1970
P.F. Strawson Meaning and Truth. Oxford, 1970.
Sweigart 1958
J.W. Sweigart Jr., * On sameness of meaning*
Philosophical Studies Vol. 9, 1958,pp.38-41.
1 m ■■ 1 ■ Mnrt>niiniir^ i i  mimi ■mn B i M i n i  * * *  *
Thomson 1952
J.F. Thomson *Some remarks on synonymy1, Analysis 
Vol. 12, 1952, PP*73~?6*
284
Trubetzkoy 1939
H. S. Trubetzkoy Grundzuge der Phonolpgie,
v  w i B g m w  m iiB i'iV 1 1 i w w w e ' i i  c<wiTai^B^w.>T:ji i w fcwiaffl *
Prague, 1939* (Page references are to the 
4th ed., Gottingen, 1967*)
Tugendhat 1970
E. Tugendhat !The meaning of *Bedeutung* in 
Ecege'j Analysis Vol.50.1970* pp*177-189*
Twaddell 1935
W.F. Twaddell On defining the phoneme.
jMiaiu P f m a w j '  am i*nJj iiip«v»piiPK*«wka *
Language Monograph XVI, Baltimore, 1935*
Ullwann 1959
S.Ullmann The Principles of Semantics, 2nd
ioBzat=a*a*!» <g»hn*i-i t ^ i r ' U M h i i i n n  <w> w*»csa» o . w m :’t *
ed., Oxford, 1959*
Waismann 1943
F.Waismann *Verifiability*, Proceedings of 
the Aristotelian Society Supp.Vol.19, 1943» 
pp*119-150.
Weinreich 1963
U. Weinreich f0n the semantic structure of 
language*, Universals of Language ed. J.H. 
Greenberg, Cambridge, Mass., 1963*
Weinreich 1966
U. Weinreich 1Explorations in semantic theory* 
in Current Trends in Linguistics. ed. Sebeok,
Vol.Ill, The Hague, 1966, pp.395-477*
White 1938
A. B. White 1 Synonymous Expressions*, The 
Philosophical Quarterly Vol.8. 1958, pp. 193-207*
Wienpahl 1951
I3. Wienpahl *More about the denial of sameness 
of meaning*, Analysis Vol. 12, 1951*
Winter 1964
W. Winter *Form and meaning in morphological analysis* 
Linguistics Vol.3, 1964, pp.3-18.
Wittgenstein 1958
L. Wittgenstein Philosophische Untersuchungen,
C-J w c g a * w i , i * i  ipaiini i i * m  ,nw * iw w » ,'y  *n iiij ............   *  a ^ s M iw i r w .u . j ii i ^ — M t e a m  w
2nd ed., tr* G.E.M* Anscombe, Oxford, 1958*
ziff i960
P. Ziff Semantic Analysis»Ithaca N.Y., i960.
285
Ziff 1966
P. Ziff 'The noasynonyiny of active and passive
sentences1. The Phi inann^^-i ^es
PP.226-232I
Review ISON, 1966,
